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1.0 Introduction 
 
Human–artefact interaction is a complex and important topic and has been studied from various 
viewpoints in recent years. This book adds a new dimension to the understanding of human–
artefact interaction by explaining how and why intuitive interaction occurs and what designers 
can do to encourage it.  
 
This chapter introduces the problems associated with using complex artefacts, consequences of 
these problems and the factors contributing to them. It goes on to discuss a potential solution – 
intuitive interaction. A brief overview of the book concludes the chapter. 
 
1.1 The Problems with Complex Artefacts 
 
This research is centred on the observation that products and interfaces are often difficult to use 
correctly, especially at first. Members of Western societies may each use thousands – even tens 
of thousands – of artefacts, and the numbers continue to grow. The consequences of problems 
with product use are serious: for manufacturers, there are wasteful costs; for millions of users 
worldwide, there are frustrations, difficulties and even the possibility of life-threatening risk.  
 
Taylor, Roberts and Hall (1999) suggest that the human context has become the driving force 
behind design as new products often incorporate software elements and so have fewer 
constraints on their form imposed by the hardware than previously. As electronic products 
become more integrated and more intelligent, the proportion of software elements to hardware 
elements seems to increase (Kwahk & Han, 2002, p. p243), and increasingly complex 
technology needs to be usable with decreasing amounts of training (Suchman, 1987). In the 
information society, knowledge and information become primary resources. There have been 
exponential increases in system complexity in industry, in various systems from aircraft to 
power plants. A growing proportion of the workforce is performing information handling tasks, 
and complex systems are used more and more in the home (Wickens & Seidler, 1995).  
 
A person in a Western society probably uses twenty thousand different objects, each specialised 
and requiring learning (Norman, 1993); however, people generally do not want to spend time 
learning how to use a product (Sade, 1999). Bonner (1998) claims that retaining device-
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dependent knowledge (for example, remembering which button will do what) is becoming more 
and more difficult for users as products become increasingly abstract and have similar or hidden 
functionality. Similarly, Giard (1989) states that the world has been inundated with so many 
manufactured products that the ability of the average user to understand these everyday objects 
is questionable. For example, in a marketing research project, many consumers could not 
formulate a mental simulation to describe how some common products worked (Klein, 1998). 
This suggests that designers should not assume that consumers know how products work 
(Klein, 1998; Wickens & Seidler, 1995). However, Krippendorff (1995) proposes that smooth 
and competent interaction with a product could provide intrinsic motivation to use it. 
 
Margolin (1994) stresses the need for design discourse to be expanded to include the realm of 
experience. A discourse about experience as it relates to design is a discourse about human 
interaction with products, he claims. Products are so ubiquitous that even when interacting with 
another person, people often use a product as a mediator. Humans have an ongoing engagement 
with products of many types, and each day are in situations with products that result in 
experiences of varying satisfaction (Margolin, 1994). Each generation faces an array of 
technologies that demand new skills to operate. However, currently:  
 
we are living through a period of particularly accelerated technological 
innovation which is causing a sea change in the way we use products…Thus 
our experience of products includes a larger component of learning than it 
has in the past and a successful product must depend on our willingness to 
master it (Margolin, 1994, p61).   
 
With products that require less knowledge, learning normally occurs by following cues in the 
interface. After learning to manipulate knobs and dials on radios, most people could manage a 
TV, but the VCR and remote control devices (referred to here simply as “remotes”) have 
outstripped the average person’s cultural experience and, Margolin claims, demand a process of 
specialised learning. As a consequence, VCRs appear to have become obsolete before becoming 
universally usable. 
 
Users in growing numbers are becoming more and more overloaded with a burgeoning range of 
products which have an increasing variety of purposes. Many of these products are not easy to 
use, especially for the first time. Manufacturers are realising that this is a problem that they 
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need to address more fully if they are to maintain their customer base. Furthermore, product and 
interface usability could be a major factor in worldwide competition for customers over the 
coming decades. 
 
1.1.1 Consequences of these Problems 
 
Problems with using products and interfaces affect millions of users worldwide and have a 
range of consequences. These include risk to the consumer (which could be life-threatening in 
some situations), negative experiences for the users, and costs for the manufacturers. 
 
Jordan (1998) states that mistakes are more likely to occur because the underlying principles of 
how a product works are not intuitive or are counter-intuitive. Casey (1998) relates the story of 
a fighter pilot being confronted in an emergency situation with a cockpit that had been re-
designed very differently from the previous model, and was so unfamiliar that he could not get 
the aircraft off the ground. Ryan (1987, in Benedyk & Minister, 1998), claims that risky 
behaviour that can lead to accident or injury can be unintentional, precipitated by factors such 
as poor design.  
 
Wiklund (2004) argues that most medical caregivers prefer devices that are easy to use from the 
start, especially as they encounter so many of them. Caregivers rarely have time for sufficient 
training for all the devices they may encounter (Wiklund, 2004), and up-to-date and easily 
accessible manuals for the equipment are rarely available (ebme.co.uk, 2002). Many first 
encounters with a device occur at the point of care (patient’s bedside). In these circumstances, 
users need to understand them easily and quickly in order to reduce the chance of error and to 
prevent harm to the patient. This is especially important under the stress of an emergency 
situation. 
 
All these authors point to the various levels of risk that counter-intuitive products could carry. 
The risks range from simple mistakes that can be corrected in a couple of seconds, to injury and 
death. However, even simple and correctible mistakes can have adverse consequences. Nation 
and Cooney (1982) conducted experiments which suggested that frustration with a system that 
reacted unexpectedly could lead to aggression. They tested whether aggression was evident 
when people were subjected to extinction in their set task (i.e. the system no longer responded 
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as previously and as expected). All their experimental groups responded aggressively to 
extinction. Their apparatus was designed to generate a tone while participants worked on their 
set task, and provided a number of ways of switching it off. The researchers found that once 
participants started to become frustrated with the task, they were more likely to hit the pad 
(repeatedly and increasingly harder) than use the other available methods of switching off the 
tone. Frustration with a product leading to negative feelings – and even aggression – is not an 
outcome that manufacturers would prefer.  
 
Designers  should not rely on user perseverance or technical skills to overcome poor interface 
design, so usable products are critical for attracting and keeping end users (Kwahk & Han, 
2002; Margolin, 1994; Smart, Whiting, & DeTienne, 2001; Wickens & Seidler, 1995), 
especially as technology becomes more and more significant in people’s lives (Asfour, 
Omachonu, Diaz, & Abdel-Moty, 1991). Dixon and O'Reilly (2002) postulate that although 
people can learn to do a wide range of difficult tasks if they have to, they would prefer not to 
and will refrain from using a device if procedures are difficult to figure out. Nielsen (2004) 
hypothesises that there may be a lack of what he calls “usability culture” in consumer 
electronics companies. They have had little incentive to emphasise usability as consumers have 
no chance to try the device until after they have bought it. Those who do make an effort to 
provide more usable devices are not emphasising the fact in their marketing (Kantrovich, 2001). 
However, the incentive is growing (with the potential profits) as consumers become more aware 
of usability issues (Nielsen, 2004).  
 
Consumer electronics giant Philips claims that the consumer electronics industry is failing with 
many innovations because they are too difficult to use (van Grinsven & Auchard, 2004). Philips 
CEO Gerard Kleisterlee has commented that technologies serve the needs of manufacturers and 
not customers. Thirty percent of all recently introduced home networking products sold were 
returned because the consumers could not get them to work. Also, 48% of digital camera buyers 
were delaying their purchase because they perceived the products to be too complicated (van 
Grinsven & Auchard, 2004). Harker and Eason (1984) also raise the issue of less obvious 
product failures, such as partial use of system potential due to poor design. This is not 
immediately seen in sales figures, but could affect future purchasing decisions. Meanwhile, 
Okoye (1998) states that counter-intuitive interfaces result in increased training costs.  
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Consequences of the problem are product misuse or under-use, dissatisfaction, frustration and 
even aggression among consumers faced with products which they find difficult to use, or even 
injury or death in the case of some medical and safety-critical products. These consequences 
incur costs and liabilities for manufacturers of products and systems, including lost business and 
increased training and support outlay. 
 
1.1.2 Contributing Factors 
 
There is a variety of reasons why products and interfaces have become problematic. These 
include overimputation on the part of designers, the division of control, problems with 
documentation, and the complexity and ubiquity of emerging new technologies. This section 
will review each of these factors. 
 
Overimputation 
 
Problems can arise from the natural human habit of imputing one’s own knowledge to others. 
People impute as a natural way of understanding others because: 
 
If one has no direct knowledge of what another…does or does not know, 
and little or no knowledge that would provide the basis for making 
inferences in this regard, the only thing left to do is to use one’s own 
knowledge as a default assumption as to what the other knows 
(Nickerson, 1999, p745). 
 
Surprisingly, the assumption that one’s own knowledge is representative of what other people 
know serves well, especially in a statistical sense. However, it can also be the basis for 
misunderstandings and failures of communication. When one knows something well, it is 
difficult to put oneself in the position of a person who has none of that knowledge (Nickerson, 
1999). Nickerson calls this problem overimputation, and says that designers are the worst 
people to judge the usability of their own products as they cannot put themselves in the position 
of someone who has none of their knowledge and is seeing the product for the first time.  
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Designers become so expert in using the artefacts they have designed that they do not believe 
that anyone else might have difficulties with them, and therefore cannot predict the problems 
people will have (Crozier, 1994; Norman, 1988; Thimbleby, 1991). Most participants in the 
product development process are technically orientated, which leads to designs less suitable for 
non-technical users. The users are therefore required to think in a way that is not natural for 
them (Sade, 1999). It is dangerous for designers to assume that if they can use something then 
so can everybody else; the motivations, specialist knowledge and expectations of the general 
population of users are unlikely to mimic those of the designer (Harker & Eason, 1984). Harker 
and Eason describe the distance between the user and the designer as a major problem. They 
also mention the time distance, as the designer is always trying to predict future user needs and 
preferences. 
 
There could be two reasons for overimputation: false consensus and illusion of simplicity. The 
false consensus effect is a tendency to see oneself as more representative of others than one 
really is, and the illusion of simplicity occurs when one mistakenly judges something to be 
simple because it is familiar (Nickerson, 1999).  
 
Thimbleby (1991) raises the point that designers are often too close to the problem to see users’ 
difficulties. Designers see the development of new models as an accumulation of easily 
understood increments; users, on the other hand, find themselves facing what seems like a new 
product with ten or twenty new features, even assuming they have used an older version of the 
same technology. The application of extra functions to products for marketing purposes or 
model differentiation can make them unnecessarily complex. Gros (1997) sees such functions 
as the new ornament: “waste is no longer decoration, but technical bric-a-brac” (p87). 
 
In addition, designers may not feel that consulting users is helpful in the design process. 
Designers interviewed by Bruseberg and McDonough-Philp (2002) were worried about how 
their image was perceived. They did not want to be seen to be merely doing what users actually 
wanted, as that would mean they would seem to be following culture rather than shifting or 
leading it. They were also concerned about how the additional task of carrying out user research 
might change their roles; they thought they would end up as mediators rather than creators. 
They worried that, having done research into current perceptions, they would not be able to 
design something new. They also felt that users were insufficiently knowledgeable about new 
technologies and materials to understand the available possibilities for new products. 
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Designers also may not access the human factors knowledge base as the sources may not be 
easily accessible, the data may be presented in research reports not easily interpreted by 
designers, or they may have little training in how to use the information (Harker & Eason, 
1984). As a consequence, designers may not be aware of available research and 
recommendations for usable products. This is compounded by the fact that they often do not 
know whether the users will find their products easy to use because they tend to overimpute 
their own knowledge and experience onto users. 
 
Division of control 
 
The division of labour brought about by the industrial revolution can be seen as separating not 
only the designer and manufacturer, but also the designer and user; previously, they would have 
been one and the same, or at least in a position to communicate face to face (Kivisto-Rahnasto, 
1998). Therefore, the designer has to somehow understand the users and communicate with 
them through the system image (the product and its interface). 
 
The technological revolution has forced another division, which Blackler, Popovic and Mahar 
(2002; 2003b) have called the “division of control”. The user no longer has direct manipulation 
of, or direct feedback from, the controls of many everyday products. This all occurs through a 
digital electronic interface. The term “opaque” has been used to describe a system that does not 
allow its function to be perceived from its structure (Fischer, 1991), and the terms “lack of 
visibility” (Norman, 1988, 1993) and “invisibility” (Sade, 1999) have also been coined for this 
purpose. Functionality used to be obvious because it was controlled by switches or dials on the 
surface of a product; now it is often buried in the product and reached only by knowing the right 
way through the menus and prompts (Dumas & Redish, 1993). This is not a bad thing per se as 
it saves users from having to become involved with complex, messy or dangerous parts of 
products, but it does demand good interface design. 
 
Before the technological revolution, people were able to see how artefacts worked; gears, 
chains and levers could be moved and users could see the effects. Now there is almost no 
physical and spatial relationship between the controls, the indicators and the state of the system 
(Norman, 1993). This situation could be an advantage if the designer were to use it to apply 
strong population stereotypes that would not have been possible in all situations when control 
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was more direct. However, there is a dearth of research into appropriate stereotypes for modern 
and digital products (Simpson & Chan, 1988). 
 
Norman (1993) divides artefacts into two broad categories according to their visibility: surface 
and internal artefacts. With surface artefacts, what the user sees is all there is, but with internal 
artefacts, part of the information is represented internally within the artefact and is invisible to 
the user. Artefacts with only surface representations do not need a special interface because the 
surface representation serves as the interface. Internal artefacts need interfaces to transform the 
information hidden within their internal representations into surface forms that can be accessed 
by humans. Therefore, users depend on the design of the device to make the information visible 
and usable. Just as the division of labour required designers to empathise with the user, the 
division of control means that they have to produce an interface with which the user can 
successfully interact. 
 
Documentation 
 
Cushman and Rosenberg (1991) state that lack of adequate user manuals is a serious problem. 
Many users avoid reading them whenever possible, and most users of some products 
completely ignore any manuals or instructions provided (Cushman & Rosenberg, 1991). Rettig 
(1991) agrees that “no one reads manuals. Well hardly anyone” (p 20). Even well written and 
well designed documentation is not read by adult readers. Most people will constantly skip 
ahead and begin to use the system without reading the whole manual (Brockman, 1990, in 
Rettig, 1991). 
 
It is not that people cannot follow simple steps, it is just that they do not. Many people can only 
gain understanding through the effectiveness of their actions in the world (Rettig, 1991). The 
world they are in is more real to them than a series of steps on a page and provides rich context 
and conventions for everything they do. People try things out, think them through, and try to 
relate what they already know to what is going on (Rettig, 1991). Therefore, most people do not 
read documentation. They simply start using a system, turning to the manuals only when they 
strike a problem or the system does not conform to their expectations. For computer systems,  
print or online help is seen as a last resort (Rettig, 1991) after repeating steps, rebooting and 
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asking co-workers for help. The only thing not done before looking at the documentation is 
calling a help desk (Smart et al., 2001). 
 
Furthermore, documentation is not always available, especially for shared or office equipment 
and software. For example, a site license does not automatically include manuals; they are an 
optional extra. Also, training courses may not include a manual. For miniaturised devices, there 
is a lack of equally portable external support materials to provide user guidance and training 
(Kaufman, Stewart, Thomas, & Deffner, 1996). In workplaces, users are often trained at roll-out 
of a new system but users joining the organisation later or changing jobs get only on the job 
training from co-workers (Rohlfs, 1998). Many manuals are also only available on CD or 
online, so users must be able to use a computer to access the manual. 
 
Because documentation is either not available or not read, human factors professionals tend to 
believe that a product should be usable without a manual. Even Phillips has conceded that if a 
product requires a manual, it may be too complex (van Grinsven & Auchard, 2004). 
 
Emerging technologies 
 
Product design has been undergoing a change from three dimensions to two dimensions as 
hardware disappears and transforms into interfaces (Gros, 1997). Gros suggests that multimedia 
design would increasingly concentrate on functional metaphors and clear signs for use. 
Interaction, rather than physical products, needs to be designed as products and services have 
become more interactive (Bonner, 1998). 
 
Advances in communication and computing are bringing new devices onto the market rather 
than the traditional Windows, Icons, Menus and Pointing Device (WIMP) interfaces. These 
devices are small, mobile and wireless and users interact with them through tactile, gestural, 
voice and pen input. These devices bear little resemblance to traditional computers and 
therefore offer new challenges and opportunities to interface designers (Smith, 1998). More and 
more novel forms of interaction are appearing that comprise physical objects with embedded 
computational power, such as electronic ink, interactive toys, smart fridges and networked 
clothing (Preece, Rogers, & Sharp, 2002). One of the characteristics of  these new generation 
products is that potential users can have difficulty understanding them (Smith, 1998). 
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Baber and Baumann (2002) discuss embedded, or ubiquitous, computing. An embedded system 
is any device that includes a programmable computer but is not itself intended to be a general-
purpose computer (Baber & Baumann, 2002). Thus, a personal digital assistant (PDA) would 
count as an example of an embedded system, as would a mobile phone or any domestic product 
that contains microprocessors.  Baber and Baumann (2002) recognise a growing trend towards 
embedded computer systems that are distributed throughout the environment, and propose that 
this trend raises significant issues for the usability of these products.  
 
Kaufman et al. (1996) discuss the impact of portable products. Portability requires smaller size, 
which severely limits the ease and efficiency of user–system interaction. Future devices will 
provide much more power and functionality than today's desktop computers, but will not even 
have keyboards. Because of the lack of large displays and supporting materials, users must 
depend on memory and mental models to guide navigation. Kaufman et al. (1996) state that the 
usability of these types of products will depend on their successful integration with human 
behavioural stereotypes and mental models, and that only human, everyday metaphors can help 
users benefit from the wealth of information, communication, storage and processing available 
through the new generation of tools.  
 
These new types of increasingly powerful, embedded and miniaturised technologies will create 
further challenges for designers. Not only are they more complex and physically less accessible 
due to their size, but they will be everywhere. Therefore, people will have less choice about 
whether or not they want to use certain technologies as it will be very difficult to avoid these 
types of products in everyday life. Designers will not be able to rely on the technologically 
inclined enthusiasts propping up the market; a huge range of people will need to be able to 
interact with them easily. 
 
1.2 Intuitive Interaction Research 
 
Some researchers have long held the view that machines ideally should be self-explanatory, in 
that their operation should be discoverable, possible without extensive training, and guided by 
information provided by the machine itself (Suchman, 1987). Krippendorff and Butter (1984) 
comment that especially innovative products rely on semantic clues to communicate their use 
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and minimise the need for instructions. Blaich (1986) proposes that every product should speak, 
communicating its purpose and correct operation without words or numbers.  
 
In general parlance, in advertising and in academic papers such as those of Rutter, Becka and 
Jenkins (1997), Frank and Cushcieri (1997), Thomas and van Leeuwen (1999) and McMullen 
(2001), the terms “intuitive to use” or “intuitive use” can be commonly seen and heard. It would 
appear that making things intuitive to use would address the problem. However, there was a 
need to de-mystify intuitive use and establish how it can be applied to new products in order to 
make them easier to use. The author therefore set out to investigate how designers can utilise 
users’ intuition in order to make products easier to use. 
 
The aim of this research was to provide designers with principles and tools which they can 
employ during the design process in order to make their products more intuitive to use. In order 
to achieve this aim, it was necessary to base the research on a theoretical foundation which 
includes an understanding of the nature of intuition itself and how it relates to product use, and 
to empirically test that understanding in order to see how it can best be applied to design. This 
book documents this research, its outcomes and future directions. 
 
1.3 Book Overview 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 review the literature on the nature and processes of intuition, finishing with a 
definition of intuition as a cognitive process that is based on past experience and is both fast and 
generally non-conscious. Chapter 4 reviews the limited previous work on intuitive interaction, 
and Chapter 5 details other relevant work which could contribute to intuitive interaction. It 
concludes with a definition of intuitive interaction as fast and generally non-conscious 
interaction that involves utilising knowledge gained through other experiences.  Chapter 6 
describes the research methodology employed and justifies the methodology according to the 
needs of the research and the available methods.  
 
Chapters 7 and 8 describe the first two experiments carried out on two different products to test 
the hypothesis that intuitive use of products is based on applying experience gained from other 
products. Results from these studies are discussed and explained. Chapter 9 covers the redesign 
process undertaken with a universal remote control. This process allowed a comparison 
 14 
between the re-design of location and appearance of features through a final experiment. The 
experiment is described and results and conclusions explained.  
 
Chapter 10 discusses the implications of all these results, draws conclusions and makes 
recommendations. Two main principles were established through the experimentation. Firstly, 
intuitive use is based on past experience and can be transferred between different products or 
systems. Designers can make products intuitive for target users by employing familiar features 
in their interfaces. Other researchers have suggested this idea but none have carried out 
experimentation to empirically test it and apply it to design. Secondly, the appearance of a 
feature is more important for intuitive interaction than its location. This suggests that the cues 
that people store in memory about a product feature depend on how the feature looks rather than 
where on the product it is placed. From these conclusions three principles and a conceptual tool 
that designers can directly apply to their designs have been developed. 
 
Chapter 11 covers further work that has taken place since the main studies were completed in 
2004. The chapter reviews testing and development of the conceptual tool, comparisons with 
other emerging research on intuitive interaction, and intuitive interaction and older people. 
 
1.4 Summary 
 
Chapter 1 has provided an introduction to the book, explaining the research problem and its 
possible solution in the form of the research question. In addition an overview of the contents 
and contributions is provided. This background will now be built upon in Chapters 2 to 5, as an 
understanding of intuition and intuitive use is developed.  
 
 Chapter 2  
 
Intuition  
 
 
 
 
 16 
 17 
2.0 Introduction 
 
Research on intuition in psychology and cognitive science has been patchy because intuition is 
connected with the unconscious, and traditionally was not regarded as accessible to scientific 
study (Bowers, 1984; Woolhouse & Bayne, 2000). Indeed, Bowers (1984) claims that intuition 
has been virtually ignored by psychologists. Overviews of the history of the concept and its 
intermittent study are provided by Boucouvalas (1997), Bastick (2003) and Fischbein (1987). 
This chapter firstly reviews definitions of intuition, and then goes on to look in detail at the 
proposed foundation of intuition: experiential knowledge. Research that has proposed theories 
of how past experience is used in memory, action and cognitive processing is reviewed as there 
is very little research into intuition itself. This work also supplies suggestions about the 
mechanisms by which intuition is informed by past experience.  
 
2.1 Definitions 
 
Intuition has been associated with preconscious processes, mysterious knowledge and 
subjective certainty of correctness.  A variety of terms has been used interchangeably with 
intuition, such as “right brain thinking”, “gut feeling” and “hunch” (Boucouvalas, 1997). There 
is no firm and definite agreement on a definition of intuition or exactly how the process works 
(Bastick, 2003; Fischbein, 1987; Laughlin, 1997), and Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson 
(1987) claim that researchers in cognition almost never explain what they mean by intuition; 
consequently, it is customary to define it in terms of what it is not. Even philosophers, they 
argue, fail to say what they mean by intuition.  However, this section will demonstrate that 
many researchers agree on its basic properties.  
 
From the Latin intueor (to look at, gaze at, consider or contemplate),  the Oxford English 
Dictionary (1989) defines the term “intuitive” as “knowledge or mental perception that consists 
in immediate apprehension without the intervention of any reasoning process”.   
 
Westcott (1961) assumes that intuition is obscure in the inferential process from information to 
conclusion and that sometimes the relationship between the two may seem to be lacking 
altogether, and defines an intuitive leap as “…an act in which someone reaches an inductive 
conclusion from a very limited number of examples or cases” (Westcott, 1961, p267). Jung’s 
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(1969, in Bastick, 2003) definition is “a non-judgemental irrational mental activity through 
which an individual can perceive an internal or external event or object in its entirety”. This is 
not in accord with most other definitions as Jung saw intuition as a personality trait rather than 
as a form of cognitive processing.  
 
Simonton (1980) defines intuition as “behavioural adaptations to the environment which tend to 
be unconscious, ineffable, and essentially probabilistic in character” (p6).  Eysenck (1995) 
interprets Simonton’s “ineffable” as “impossible to verbalise” (p191), which is generally seen 
as the operational measure of an unconscious process. Kahneman and Tversky (1982) present 
intuition as an informal and unstructured mode of reasoning, without use of analytical methods, 
while Gregory (1987) similarly defines intuition as arriving at decisions or conclusions without 
explicit or conscious processes of reasoned thinking. Several other researchers agree that 
intuition is a process by which understanding or knowledge is reached without evidence of a 
reasoning process (Bastick, 2003; Fischbein, 1987; Noddings & Shore, 1984). 
 
Bowers (1984) defines intuition as the possibility for being tacitly informed by considerations 
that are not explicitly represented in conscious awareness. He presents it as a distinct 
information processing mode in which unconsciously stored information is used to guide 
decisions and problem solving. Eysenck (1995) defines intuition as a mode of cognitive 
functioning located at the opposite end of a continuum from logical thinking, characterised by: 
speed and suddenness of reactions, a small number of relevant known facts, feeling of certainty 
about the conclusion, reliance on unconscious (non-verbalisable) processes, and not following 
the rule of logic but relying on unusual associations and analogies. The adjective intuitive refers 
to the process of arriving at the solution, not the solution itself. Eysenck claims that intuition is 
a cognitive process and not a moment or event. 
 
According to Richman, Gobet, Staszewski, and Simon (1996), “intuition is synonymous with 
the process of recognition” (p180). In other words, it is about identifying something that has 
been seen or experienced before. Cole (1996) equates intuition with pattern recognition. He 
states that a challenge for the future would be to explore pattern recognition as a key principle 
for information design. Berry and Broadbent (1988) also state it is likely that some general 
overall pattern matching process plays a critical role in implicit learning and knowledge use. 
Klein, who also equates intuition with pattern recognition, has done some of the most important 
work on intuition in recent years. His definition is: “Intuition depends on the use of experience 
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to recognise key patterns that indicate the dynamics of the situation” (Klein, 1998, p31). Klein’s 
work is discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.4.  
 
These definitions ascribe to intuition the main property of past experience informing cognitive 
processing. This crucial aspect will be explored first. Other properties identified are processing 
which a person is not aware of or has not consciously recognised, and the faster speed and 
efficiency of intuition over other cognitive processes. These and other issues that various 
researchers have discussed are explored in Chapter 3. 
 
2.2 Intuition and Experiential Knowledge 
 
This book is based on the underlying assumption that intuition is based on past experience. 
Evidence to support this assumption is presented in this section. Much research suggests that 
intuition relies on experiential knowledge (Agor, 1986; Bastick, 2003; Bowers, Regehr, 
Balthazard, & Parker, 1990; Cappon, 1994; Dreyfus, Dreyfus, & Athanasiou, 1986; Fischbein, 
1987; King & Clark, 2002; Klein, 1998; Laughlin, 1997; Noddings & Shore, 1984). Intuition 
depends on using experience to recognise patterns that indicate the dynamics of a situation. It 
relies on implicit memory and “grows out of experience” (Klein, 1998, p34). People draw on 
memory for large sets of similar incidents, not one specific instance, which may be why people 
are not aware that intuition is their own experience. Described in this way, intuition does not 
seem as mysterious as some people may at first assume (Klein, 1998).   
 
Klein believes that usually the experience bank works smoothly, providing structure and 
interpretation, even for unfamiliar tasks. Therefore, a stimulus would not need to be identical to 
those previously experienced, just similar enough to allow the association (Klein, 1998). 
 
The intuitive process integrates the information that one already has with what is perceived by 
the senses, and new associations between these two information sources produce insights, 
answers, recognition or judgements. Shreds of information that had no meaning before, become 
prominent in the light of new conclusions (Bastick, 2003). During intuitive processing, some of 
the premises are contained in the stimulus event and some in the coding system of the perceiver, 
and intuition can perform rapid extrapolation based on class membership of the event 
categorised (Eysenck, 1995). Boucouvalas (1997) suggests that intuitive knowing may have 
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different origins, for example: the memory, the senses, even the collective unconscious of a 
society. An optimum intuitive solution will have the maximum redundancy; the most attributes 
in common between the fewest elements (Klein, 1998). In other words, there will be a good 
match between stored experience and the current perceived situation. So, intuition uses a 
combination of existing knowledge and the perceived situation to rapidly generate answers. 
 
Bowers et al. (1990) state that “our model of intuition implies the role of memory and 
experience in judgement and problem solving” (p73). In particular, they propose that clues 
activate relevant networks in memory, thereby guiding thought to some hypothesis or insight. 
Bastick (2003) concurs that, if something has been experienced before, it will be intuitively 
recognised. Noddings and Shore (1984) found that intuition does seem to manifest itself in 
familiar domains, and that people most knowledgeable in an area are those who have the most 
frequent and the most reliable intuitions. One could interpret their finding as suggesting that this 
is because those with most knowledge on a topic have a larger store of information for intuition 
to use. King and Clark (2002) conducted case studies which revealed that their subjects (nurses) 
attributed intuitive feelings to experience of caring for similar patients. Many of the interview 
transcripts show that nurses believe that their intuition is based on their experience. 
 
Dreyfus et al. (1986) claim that people use intuition all the time in everyday tasks and that it is 
not wild guessing or supernatural inspiration. To guess is to reach a conclusion when one does 
not have sufficient knowledge or experience to do so, whereas “intuition is the product of deep 
situational involvement and recognition of similarity” (p28). They equate use of intuition with 
having expectations, which are associated with remembered situations. Intuition, they believe, 
plays a role in the human ability to make sense of an environment which is potentially infinitely 
complex. 
 
This dependence of intuition on previous experience is usually not recognised by the general 
public, and many lay people may assume intuition is instinctive or innate (Cappon, 1994). 
However, an individual’s experience gradually accrues over time. A baby’s intuition is 
composed predominantly of instinctive responses to stimuli which are indeed innate, but people 
include more and more learned responses in their intuition as they develop (Bastick, 2003). 
Nardi (1996) states that “all human experience is shaped by the tools and sign systems we use” 
(p10). This statement strongly supports the central idea that all the tools people use in their 
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everyday lives are adding to an experience bank which they can access in order to use similar 
objects. 
 
All those who have seriously researched intuition have agreed that intuition is based on 
experience rather than on supernatural inspiration or some magical sixth sense. This experience 
may be stored as an amalgam of previous situations, rather than as a specific, individual 
experience, and can feed expectations. Tools and artefacts are part of the human experience and 
contribute to the store of information on which intuition can draw. This section has clearly 
indicated that intuition is based on experiential knowledge, supporting the underlying 
assumption of the book. The following sections review relevant theories that apply to intuition 
based on past experience and suggest how intuition may utilise that experience. 
 
2.3 Experientialism and Embodiment 
 
Experientialism sees people’s sensorimotor, emotional and social experiences as the main 
influence on cognitive activity (Benyon & Imaz, 1999; Clark, 1997; Damasio, 1994; Johnson, 
1987; Lakoff, 1987; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). One of the reasons for this is the way 
in which the brain develops. Although the neurons are in the brain at birth, the design of brain 
circuitries that represent the growing body and its interactions with the world depends on the 
activities in which the person is involved (Damasio, 1994; Greenfield, 2000). The mind exists 
for, and in, an integrated organism, and minds would not be the way they are if it were not for 
the body–brain interplay. Mind and body combined are an indissociable organism, and that 
organism interacts with the environment as an ensemble (Damasio, 1994). The brain and body 
are integrated biochemical and neural circuits. This interweaving occurs in biological tissue and 
uses chemical and electrical signalling. The mind had first to be about the body or it could not 
have been; the brain evolved to control and respond to the body so, of course, it has to be 
inextricably linked (Damasio, 1994). The biological mind is first and foremost an organ for 
controlling the biological body. Minds are not disembodied, logical reasoning devices, but are 
organs for rapidly initiating the next move in real world situations (Clark, 1997).  
 
Varela et al. (1991) claim that cognitive science has had virtually nothing to say about what it 
means to be human in everyday situations. Similarly, Clark (1997) proposes that treating 
cognition as pure problem-solving invites researchers to abstract away from the very body and 
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the very world in which the brain evolved to guide humans. Cognitive science, he says, can no 
longer afford simplifications that take the real world and the acting organism out of the loop. 
 
Johnson (1987) argues that experience involves everything that makes people human; bodily, 
social, linguistic, and intellectual experiences combine in complex interactions that make up an 
understanding of the world. He states that human bodily movement, manipulation of objects, 
and perceptual interactions involve recurring patterns without which experience would be 
chaotic and incomprehensible. He calls these patterns “image schemata”, and claims that 
humans could not begin to understand their experience without image-schematic meaning 
structures. For example, the types of schemata he describes include: container, path, blockage–
enablement, cycle, part–whole, full–empty, iteration, surface, balance, counterforce, attraction, 
link, near–far, merging, matching, contact, object, compulsion, restraint removal, centre–
periphery, scale, splitting, superimposition, process and collection. All of these can be extended 
from merely physical actions to metaphors about how people understand the world and 
language.  
 
Understanding typically involves image–schematic structures of imagination that are extended 
and figuratively elaborated (Benyon & Imaz, 1999; Johnson, 1987). These give comprehensible 
structure to experience and connect up different experiential domains to produce coherence and 
unity in understanding the world. The image schemata are not concrete images or mental 
pictures; they are more abstract patterns. Johnson (1987) claims that this is how real human 
beings reason, rather than by some ideal standard of rationality. Therefore, people can 
understand objects because they have experienced basic image schemata through the working 
and interaction of their own bodies. People, as embodied individuals, use their experiences as 
models or image schemata to understand other parts of the world around them (Balkin, 1998). 
Similarly, when interacting with the environment, people describe forms in relation to their own 
body, vision or motion; for example, they allocate front, back, sides, and so on (Krippendorff, 
1995). 
 
Varela et al. (1991) take the term embodied to mean two main things: that cognition depends on 
the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities; and 
that the individual sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a more encompassing 
biological, psychological and cultural context. They emphasise that sensory and motor 
processes, perception and action are fundamentally inseparable. Damasio (1994) also concurs 
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that the human body, rather than some absolute external reality, is used as the ground reference 
for the constructions people make of the surrounding world.  
 
Held and Hein (1958, in Varela et al., 1991) conducted animal studies which showed that 
objects are not seen by the visual extraction of features but by the visual guidance of action with 
those features. For example, a young animal which develops in the dark but is allowed to move 
around in a normal way, will be able to interact well with its surroundings in the light. 
However, an animal not allowed to interact with the environment but allowed to see it, cannot 
interact with the environment at all when finally allowed free access to it. Similarly, Campos, 
Hiatt, Ramsey, Henderson and Svejda (1978, in Clark, 1997) showed that children who can 
crawl respond to a cliff or drop with fear, whereas those who have not yet experienced 
independent movement just show curiosity. This suggests that animals and humans learn about 
the world by performing actions within it, and that perception is action specific. 
 
Tucker and Ellis (1998, 2001, in Borghi, 2004) support this view. They found that eye 
movement was more accurate in selecting a target that had to be grasped than one that had to be 
pointed to, and concluded that action intention leads to different ways of focusing on visual 
properties. Borghi (2004) conducted experiments with objects and the results suggest that 
objects are conceived of in terms of the potential actions people can perform with them. Thus, 
the most important parts of an object concept should be the ones affording the most frequent 
actions performed with the object. The cognitive system subserves action by storing 
information which might be relevant for future actions in different situations (Borghi, 2004).  
 
The notion of scaffolding (the way in which experience with external structures might alter and 
inform a person’s intrinsic modes of processing and understanding) can encompass all kinds of 
external aids and support provided by others or the environment. A person draws on the 
resources of mind, body and world in order to accomplish tasks (Clark, 1997). This is similar to 
Norman’s (1988) idea of knowledge in the head and in the world. Norman encourages designers 
to put all the information they can into interfaces so that users do not have to memorise it. 
 
The research into embodiment and experientialism suggests that intuition utilises experiential 
knowledge gained through the experience of being in a human body. This is practical 
knowledge of things such as the effects of gravity and the possibilities and constraints of the 
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limbs and fingers. It appears that this sort of knowledge is learned so early and utilised so easily 
that it is likely never to become conscious for most people, yet still guides all their interactions. 
 
2.4 Connectionism 
 
Connectionists describe the mind as consisting of networks of relatively simple processing units 
connected by links. This is generally called “spreading activation” in psychology (Collins & 
Loftus, 1975; Holyoak, 1985; Quillian, 1962). The concept also applies to “neural networks” 
and “parallel distributed processing” (Clark, 1997). Connectionist models have changed the 
way people think about cognitive science. Previously it had seemed unnecessary to have any 
idea of brain biology in order to have ideas about cognition (Clark, 1997). Clark sees the brain 
as an associative engine. In the connectionist model, knowledge representation is based on 
interactions between networks, and if one unit or node is activated, the activation can spread to 
related items in memory that are linked through the network.  
 
Hebb (1949) proposed a cell assembly theory of cognition that went much further than the 
prevalent stimulus response work of the time, and laid the foundations for modern theories of 
connectionism.  Hebb’s rule, cited by Damasio (1994) and Varela et al. (1991), states that if two 
neurons tend to be active together, their connection is strengthened; otherwise, it is diminished. 
Therefore, the system's connectivity becomes inseparable from its history. Hebb suggested that 
the brain contains numerous redundant neural pathways, and proposed that the connections 
establish autonomous central activities which serve as the basis of further learning (an 
important link here with use of previous knowledge to tackle new situations). Interest in neural 
networks declined during the 1970s but was revived by Rumelhart, McClelland and the PDP 
Research Group (1986), who called it “parallel distributed processing” (PDP). PDP has been 
more cognitively eclectic than the original connectionist ideas, suggesting that cognitive 
processes might be constraint satisfaction processes, energy minimisation processes or even 
pattern recognition processes. It has also been largely defined in relation to a computational 
theory of cognition, and has been widely applied to artificial intelligence (Clark, 1997). 
 
Connectionist models could provide mechanisms for implementing a parallel, content-
addressable memory retrieval system (Holyoak, 1991). Holyoak claims that this type of network 
can represent the kind of difficult-to-verbalise knowledge associated with expert intuition. 
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Activation and deactivation of associations can be explained through the process of excitatory 
and inhibitory connections within the neurons. Therefore, when a stereotype (Kunda & 
Thagard, 1996) or mental model (Betsch & Fielder, 1999) is activated, activation spreads to the 
traits associated with it. Collins and Loftus (1975), Reason and Mycielska (1982) and 
Greenfield (2000) concur that frequency and recency of a connection will affect its activation 
level and, therefore, busy and well used neural pathways are more likely to be used repeatedly. 
That is, connections commonly made are more likely to be made again in a similar situation. 
 
Varela et al. (1991) claim that the resiliency of the brain to resist damage and its flexibility to 
adjust to new environments without compromising all of its competence are taken for granted 
by neurobiologists, but are not seen in the computational paradigm. In the connectionist 
approach, meaning is not located in particular symbols; it is a function of the global state of the 
system and is linked to the overall performance in some domain.  
 
Information is carried by a pattern of activation spread across a population of neurons. 
Distributed encodings present a number of advantages (Clark, 1997). Firstly, the pattern is 
encoded in such a way that minor variations in the pattern reflect minor differences. Secondly, 
it is possible to use methods of overlapping storage so that each neuron plays a role in encoding 
many different things. Thirdly, new items or events can be given non-arbitrary codings based on 
the extent to which a new one resembles an old one. The link Clark makes here between 
previous knowledge and the approach to new tasks – a link also emphasised by Holyoak (1985)  
– is important in understanding how intuition functions within this kind of network. 
 
Clark (1997) hypothesises that the knowledge of the system is encoded in the weighted 
connections between the units, and these weights are adapted during learning. Greenfield (2000) 
claims that intuition and common sense are dependent on endless configuring and reconfiguring 
of connections between neurons. Strength of associations between events or things in memory 
could determine whether they will be linked in certain circumstances (Simonton, 1980). 
Conditional probability would determine how strong these associations are, and low probability 
associations would be ignored. Intuition would therefore work by experiential build up of these 
associations (Simonton, 1980).  
 
The connectionist approach makes perfect sense when seen in the context of neurobiology. It 
can explain how intuition can access experience from many different domains to suit the current 
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situation, and emphasises how much people base new responses on previous experience. The 
experientialist account also fits well with these ideas, since the theory that the brain is a 
physical organ that can grow and change like other parts of the body fits with both positions. 
Indeed, the connectionist and experientialist approaches tend to be considered together by such 
researchers as Varela et al. (1991), Clark (1997) and Damasio (1994).  
 
2.5 Dynamic Memory 
 
Schank (1982) founded the theory of dynamic memory. He included “reminding” as an 
important part of memory and human functioning. Processing new situations uses memory 
structures that contain episodes most closely related to the new one. Thus, reminding occurs 
when the most appropriate structure in memory that will help in processing a new input has 
been located. Importantly, people use what they know to help process what they perceive, and 
they understand in terms of what they have already understood. However, prior to Schank’s 
work, this view of understanding had not been pursued by either psychologists or artificial 
intelligence workers. This view is shared by those who have worked on experientialism and 
embodiment (Benyon & Imaz, 1999; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987) and on intuition (Agor, 
1986; Bastick, 2003; Bowers et al., 1990; Cappon, 1994; Dreyfus et al., 1986; Fischbein, 1987; 
King & Clark, 2002; Klein, 1998; Laughlin, 1997; Noddings & Shore, 1984). 
 
One premise of dynamic memory is that conscious “remindings” and the remembering that 
happens unconsciously during understanding are products of the same retrieval process. The 
natural process of traversing the indexing structure of memory to find the best expectations 
provides remindings. Such remindings are unintentional and happen as a natural consequence of 
understanding (Kolodner, 1993). When performing an activity or thinking about an activity they 
have encountered before, people tend to be reminded of the earlier, similar one. People notice 
their own remindings when they are surprising; otherwise, they may not be consciously 
available (Kolodner, 1993).  
 
A major claim of the model is that memory is dynamically changing with each new experience. 
A dynamic memory, with indexed general and specific knowledge, learns by acquiring new 
cases, re-indexing the cases it has, creating new generalisations, learning what to pay attention 
to and learning new ways to index cases. This idea is consistent with the notion of 
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connectionism, or spreading activation, although it introduces dynamism to the memory model. 
This seems reasonable if one accepts Clark’s (1997) and Greenfield’s (2000) contentions that, 
like a muscle, the brain develops and changes through use, and that hard working parts of the 
brain grow more connections.  
 
2.5.1 Case-Based Reasoning 
 
Case-based reasoning derives from, and is based on, dynamic memory. A basic premise of case-
based reasoning is that “concrete, specific, operational knowledge in the form of cases is easier 
and more beneficial to reason with than abstract knowledge” (Kolodner, 1993, p130). 
Knowledge is in the form of specific events and generalisations of specific events. Knowledge 
access, or remembering, is a key part of reasoning, as understanding is a process of integrating a 
new experience with what is already known. People merge and adapt solutions to old problems 
to solve new ones. Kolodner (1993) assumes that novices begin with incomplete and flawed 
models of devices and of the ways they need to reason to solve problems. With experience, they 
acquire new cases and update the models. As people learn a new domain, they pay attention to 
the things that previous experience tells them are important (Kolodner, 1993).  
 
Claiming that people find case-based reasoning natural, Kolodner (1993) states that people 
learning a new skill often refer back to previous problems to refresh their memories. In the 
natural situations Kolodner observed, use of previous cases was far more important than 
applying abstract principles or conscious deliberation. Previous cases provided concrete 
manifestations of the rules that allowed them to be applied easily, although novices can have 
problems as they do not always access the right cases and they are missing the experience to 
build up the cases, as well as the judgement to decide which parts of a situation are important. 
This model implies that knowledge can be used within domains or transferred across domains in 
an unconscious process using the memories already stored about similar situations. This could 
be equivalent to the process commonly referred to as intuition. 
 
2.6 Expectancies 
 
William James used the term “preperception” for instances in which the stored visual concepts 
help to recognise insufficiently explicit perceptual patterns. He said that the only things people 
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commonly see are those they preperceive, and the only things they preperceive are those which 
have been labelled, and the labels stamped into their minds. A person who had lost her/his stock 
of labels would be lost in the midst of the world (James, in Arnheim, 1969, p93). Arnheim also 
refers to early experiments by Wundt (year unstated), in which reaction time is shortened or 
lengthened depending on whether a stimulus, when it appears, is expected or not. The effect of 
preperception depends not simply on how many times the prototypes have been met in the past 
(familiarity) but also on what the nature of the given context seems to require (expectedness). 
What one expects depends on what seems to belong in a particular place (Arnheim, 1969). So 
the perception of familiar kinds of objects is related to norm images in the observer’s mind.  
 
Wickens, Gordon, and Liu (1998) claim that expectancies based on experience tell the 
perceptual system what to look for or where. Oxman (2002) claims that visual prototypes guide 
perceptual identification. This suggests that prototypes made up of past experiences and stored 
in memory are forming expectations and guiding perception. 
 
Jentzsch and Sommer (2002) found that expected events were processed faster than unexpected 
ones and fewer errors were made for the more expected event. Participants’ judgement when 
performing certain tasks is usually influenced by expectation, and what they call intuitive 
judgement is commonly referred to as subjective probability or expectancy (Jentzsch & 
Sommer, 2002). The authors suggest that expectancy modulates the relative degree of activation 
of representations in memory prior to stimulus presentation. If the pre-activated and presented 
stimuli correspond, there will be an advantage in response speed and accuracy. Pearson and 
Schaik (2003) found that previous knowledge of display conventions such as colour coding and 
location of display items can influence effective search of a visual display (website), making it 
significantly quicker, and that search time will increase if information appears in an unexpected 
position. Expectancies work is related more to perception than to cognition, but is another 
demonstration of processing being profoundly affected by the past experiences that have shaped 
a person’s reactions.  
 
2.7 Decision Making and Intuition 
 
There is a growing body of research which demonstrates that intuition is integral to decision 
making (King & Clark, 2002). Decisions that are quick and relatively automatic are often 
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termed intuitive decision-making. Slower and more reasoned or deliberate decisions are called 
analytical (Wickens et al., 1998). Fast (or intuitive) decision making uses various heuristics, for 
example, the availability heuristic (people will most easily retrieve hypotheses that have been 
considered recently or frequently) and the representedness heuristic (a tendency to judge an 
event as likely if it represents the typical features of its category). Usually this is a very 
effective strategy. The generality of these heuristics has been tested and researchers have found 
that, in the real world, behaviour parallels the results found in laboratories (Wickens et al., 
1998). 
 
Intuitive processes inform decision making, and intuitive awareness often leads to analytical 
thinking to further address a perceived problem (King & Clark, 2002). In other words, people 
use analytical thought to verify intuition and justify a decision. This often happens in diagnosis, 
chess and other expert situations (Bastick, 2003; Dreyfus et al., 1986; Klein, 1998; Laughlin, 
1997). 
 
2.7.1 The Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) Model 
 
Klein (1993) introduced the Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) model, claiming that it 
describes how decision making occurs in real world settings. It is a model of naturalistic 
decision making that describes how experienced people make rapid decisions in real situations. 
He asserts that the decision is primed by the way the situation is recognised. In his field studies 
involving fire commanders, he found that, for many of them, their vast experience had enabled 
them to merge individual cases and to be able to use a judgement of familiarity or 
prototypicality that would not be present with the retrieval of an individual case (Klein, 1993).  
 
Experience allows a person to understand a situation in terms of plausible goals, relevant cues, 
expectancies and typical actions (Klein, 1993). Fire commanders’ experience let them see even 
a non-routine situation as a prototype, so that they knew the typical course of action. Their 
experience let them identify a reasonable reaction as the first one considered, so they did not 
need to think of others and processing was faster (Klein, 1998). Because the RPD model is 
based on decision makers using their existing experience, Klein (1998) sees it as a model of 
intuition. In the RPD model, proficient people detect patterns and typicality. They can size up a 
situation at a glance and realise that they have seen it or variants of it dozens or hundreds of 
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times before, even though each situation has something unique about it. Their experience buys 
them the ability to recognise when a situation is a typical case, or when a pattern is broken or an 
expectancy violated.  
 
Recognitional decision making is most likely when the decision maker is experienced, time 
pressure is great and the condition is not stable, but Klein (1993) found that professional 
engineers still relied heavily on recognitional decision making for difficult cases even when not 
under time pressure. Analytical strategies were often used by decision makers with less 
experience, and sometimes both recognitional and analytical decision making processes were 
applied within the same task (Klein, 1993). This accords with the Skill, Rule, Knowledge model 
(Section 3.3).  
 
After developing this model over many years of field studies, Klein (1998) presents its main 
applications as improving training and designing better systems. Klein’s work provides the 
strongest and most recent evidence that intuition is based on prior experience. He developed his 
model based on observations and interviews of hundreds of people in fields from fire-fighting 
and engineering to search and rescue and the military, and his work is highly respected. 
 
2.8 Metaphor and Analogy 
 
One way in which many researchers have suggested that experiential knowledge can be tapped 
is by using metaphor and/or analogy. Metaphors can provide immediate awareness of some 
aspects of the world (Dent-Read, Klein, & Eggleston, 1994), a claim also made for intuition. 
Metaphor and analogy are not synonymous. An analogue is an event or example drawn from the 
same or a related domain, while analogies consist of parallels in relations; for example, kittens 
are to cats as puppies are to dogs (Dent-Read et al., 1994). A metaphor comes from a different 
domain (Klein, 1998). The definition of metaphor is a point of controversy in philosophy, 
cognitive psychology and human computer interaction (Dent-Read et al., 1994). Metaphor, in 
the experiential sense, is a process by which people understand and structure one domain of 
experience in terms of another domain of a different kind. The most basic type of projection is 
metaphorically extending a schema from the physical to the non-physical. For example, using 
the containment schema to refer to a state of mind (I am in a bad mood). Metaphor operates at 
the level of projections and elaborations of image schemata, and people may not consciously 
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experience these projections (Johnson, 1987). People use analogues and metaphors for 
understanding situations, generating predictions, solving problems, anticipating events, 
designing equipment and making plans (Klein, 1998). 
 
The human conceptual system is fundamentally metaphorical according to Lakoff and Johnson 
(1981). Lakoff (1987) claims that metaphor is natural and motivated by the structure of human 
experience. Greenfield (2000) presents metaphor and analogy and the ability to draw them as a 
major evolutionary step in the development of mankind, and Holyoak (1991) claims that 
analogical thinking is particularly powerful, saying that it is one of the central mechanisms for 
transfer of knowledge across domains. Barker and Schaik (2000) and Norman (1993) agree. All 
the applicable factors belonging to the metaphorical vehicle are implied through the vehicle 
itself, so its use may be more economical and therefore more effective than the long list of 
factors that it represents (Gregory, 1987). The power of metaphorical models stems from their 
ability to shape – and hence limit – understanding and, without metaphorical models, 
understanding may be difficult or impossible (Balkin, 1998). 
 
Metaphor involves the retrieval of useful analogies from memory and the mapping of the 
elements of a known situation (the source) and a new situation (the target) (Holyoak, 1991; 
Lakoff, 1987). Once the relevance of the source is considered and an initial partial mapping has 
been established, the analogical model of the target can be developed by extending the 
mapping. Ideally, the goals, objects and constraints of the resulting target model will be as 
similar as possible to those of the source (Holyoak, 1985).  
 
Process and function, as well as shape, can be the basis of a metaphor. Some of the properties of 
the vehicle objects must be present in the depiction of the target objects in order for the 
depiction to be metaphorical (Dent-Read et al., 1994). A functional metaphor or analogy relates 
the function and operation of one object to those of some other object; for example, a typewriter 
as a metaphor for a word processor. A non-functional metaphor does not relate to function or 
operation but to some other aspects; for example, a sports car as a metaphor for a word 
processor (Janlert & Stolterman, 1997). Often, abstract concepts are defined metaphorically in 
terms of concepts that are more concrete and more clearly structured (Lakoff & Johnson, 1981).  
 
However, “a metaphor can serve as a vehicle for understanding a concept only by virtue of its 
experiential basis…no metaphor can be comprehended, or even adequately represented, 
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independently of its experiential basis” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1981, p202). Therefore, metaphors 
are grounded in experience and understood only in relation to experience. Each experience or 
vicarious experience can serve as a metaphor or analogue (Klein, 1998). Rasmussen (1986) 
mentions intuition as being enabled by this sort of transfer. Using metaphor, a problem is 
transferred “…to a level where immediate intuition from experience is available” (Rasmussen, 
1986, p123).  
 
A connectionist style network can use the similarities that link the components of the source 
and target problems. Therefore, the more properties a problem in memory shares with the target 
problem, the more likely that problem is to be selected as the source.  
 
Analogy and/or metaphor in thinking seems to help most when people know something about a 
situation but not enough for a satisfactory analysis (Klein, 1998). Metaphor can be seen as a 
process which may allow people to transfer knowledge between domains. When a person has 
relevant experience in a different domain, metaphors could be used to relate that knowledge to a 
new situation. Therefore, intuition could make use of this sort of reference in order to apply 
related knowledge to a new situation. 
 
2.9 Schemata 
 
Scripts and schemata are examples of one general class of representation that can be called 
schemata (Brewer, 1987; Rutherford & Wilson, 1991). A schema is a cognitive structure that is 
used as a representation – primarily to store and organise experience. Schemata are built up in 
the course of interaction with the environment and are available at increasing levels of 
generality and abstraction to guide subsequent perception and experience (Mandler, 1985). 
Scripts put actions and events into a context and can be used to explain and plan events 
(Neisser, 1987). A script defines actors, actions and objects likely to be present in a given 
situation. They are flexible, non-proscriptive (Fivush, 1987) representations of familiar, 
stereotyped events (Mandler, 1984; Medin & Smith, 1984). Scripts are the basic unit considered 
by Schank (1982) in the dynamic memory model.  
 
The everyday world is classified as types of situations, and assigned to each situation is a body 
of specialised knowledge (Suchman, 1987). Schemata relate familiar events, scenes and stories 
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to new ones; they tell people what to expect: when in a sequence, what objects might be there 
and so on. They guide expectations based on stored, typical experiences (Mandler, 1984). 
 
Activation of parts of a schema implies the activation of the whole, as prior co-occurrence 
determines mutual activation of features in the schema. Schemata operate interactively; input 
from the world is coded relevant to the schema currently operating and also prompts new 
schemata to run as appropriate (Brewer, 1987; Mandler, 1985). Whenever some event occurs, 
the activation process proceeds automatically to related schemata, and the activation of some 
schemata will mean the inhibition of others. Because schemata are linked by features, the more 
they are activated and elaborated, the more they will be remembered and used again (Mandler, 
1985). This view accords with the connectionist theories that well used pathways and 
connections will be strengthened and used further. 
 
Rumelhart and Norman (1981) propose that complex new procedures can be readily created by 
modelling them on existing schemata and modifying them slightly. This process of modelling 
they call “learning by analogy”. Carrying over existing features of the existing schema will 
allow people to make inferences about the new situation without explicit knowledge of it. It 
therefore allows them to learn a lot very quickly, provided that an appropriate analogy is used. 
Schemata provide a suggestion of how experiential knowledge could be stored and accessed 
during intuitive processing.  
 
2.10 Mental Models 
 
People are able to understand things they have never encountered before and Brewer (1987) 
claims that this anomaly can be explained by mental models. Norman (1988) maintains that 
there are three cognitive models of every object: the conceptual model (how the designer 
conceptualises the object), the user's model (which the user develops to explain the operation of 
the object) and the system image (the physical realisation of the conceptual model; the 
appearance and operation of the object, accompanied by any manuals that go with it). Thus, the 
only way the designer communicates with the user is through the system. This is critical as it is 
only through the system image that the user can develop an appropriate mental model.   
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One of the main purposes of the Users Conceptual Model is to explain how the user utilises the 
device in unfamiliar tasks, and how much of this behaviour is guided not by rational analysis, 
but by a feeling that that is the way one uses this device (Young, 1983). This feeling could be 
interpreted as the result of intuition. Rohlfs (1998) hypothesises that, if there is a good match 
between the system and the user’s model, then the system is intuitive and users will be able to 
complete a task on the first attempt with little help. Therefore, he recommends that the user’s 
model of the current system should be preserved as much as possible in a new system. 
However, “most user models are hazy and incomplete, and are constructed through interaction 
with the machine” (Crozier, 1994, p139). Despite this, because of the general prevalence of the 
application of mental models in the human factors and design communities, and their link with 
past experience – and, therefore, possible link with intuitive interaction – it is necessary to look 
at them in more depth. 
 
2.10.1 Definitions of Mental Models 
 
Johnson-Laird (1981), the originator of mental models theory, states that:  
 
A model represents a state of affairs and accordingly its structure…plays a 
direct representational or analogical role. Its structure mirrors the relevant 
aspects of the corresponding state of affairs in the world (Johnson-Laird, 1981, 
p174). 
 
Other definitions include: 
 
A user’s model of a complex system is a cognitive construct that describes a 
user’s understanding of a particular content domain in the world (Fischer, 
1991, p21). 
 
The purpose of a mental model is to allow the person to understand and to 
anticipate the behaviour of a physical system. This means that the model 
must have predictive power, either by applying rules of inference or by 
procedural derivation…in other words, it should be possible for people to 
“run” their models mentally (Norman, 1983, p12).  
 
Rutherford and Wilson (1991) concur with the latter definition. 
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Mental models theory sees reasoning as a semantic process based on the construction and 
manipulation of representations in working memory (Barrouillet & Lecas, 1999). Mental 
models are formed through the experiences and prior knowledge of users (Innocent, 1991); past 
experience, expectations, and what users perceive of the system (Rutherford & Wilson, 1991); 
observation, instruction or inference (Norman, 1983); experience, self-exploration, training, 
instruction, observation and accidental encounters (Fischer, 1991). Mental models generate 
expectancies about how a system will behave (Wickens et al., 1998), but can be unstable, 
incomplete, difficult to run, lacking in firm boundaries, unscientific and parsimonious (Norman, 
1983).  
 
2.10.2 Relationships with Other Representations 
 
The terms mental model and internal representation are often used synonymously. However, 
internal representation is a catch-all term used to refer to some activity or state within any 
organism or machine that represents some other entity. Mental models are a sub-category of 
internal representations (Rutherford & Wilson, 1991). A propositional representation is the 
result of a superficial understanding. A more profound understanding leads to construction of a 
mental model which is based on the propositional representation, but can also rely on general 
knowledge and other relevant representations in order to go beyond what is explicitly clear 
(Johnson-Laird, 1981). Therefore, mental models can be constructed or elaborated from 
propositional representations (Brewer, 1987).  
 
However, “…we have now reached the point where there is considerable confusion about the 
nature and function of these different forms of representation” (Brewer, 1987, p187). There is 
also much inconclusive debate about where imagery fits into the various representations 
(Johnson-Laird, 1981). There is still no clear definition of how mental models, scripts, schemata 
and other proposed types of representations fit together. 
 
2.10.3 Application to Systems Design 
 
Psychologists generally regard mental models as a tool for understanding the mind and 
behaviour. However, despite the lack of consensus on what mental models are and how they 
work, human factors and human-computer interaction (HCI) professionals have applied them to 
 36 
systems design (Rutherford & Wilson, 1991). Many of them believe that a user’s conceptual 
model should be able to explain aspects of performance, learning and reasoning, and be a basis 
for design guidelines (Norman, 1983; Young, 1983), and that a system should allow the user to 
predict system performance. In other words, the system should act like a mental model (Barker 
& Schaik, 2000).  
 
Fischer (1991) concurs that mental models should enable users to understand a system, but 
suggests that constructing models for general purpose systems and differing users can be very 
difficult. Therefore, in a complex system, he suggests one should not try to construct a perfect 
model, because it does not exist. The user’s model of the system contains concepts which do not 
belong to the system, and there are system parts of which the user is unaware. Similarly, 
Norman (1983) claims that most mental models that users have are “messy, sloppy, indistinct 
and incomplete” (p13). Another problem with applying mental models theory to design is that 
the need for different mental models for different brands greatly increases memory load for 
users (Wickens et al., 1998).  
 
Users do not need an accurate model of how a product itself works. They learn tricks common 
to many products (Norman, 1988). They do not need a model of how the details work to be able 
to fix common and simple problems, and they are not expected to fix malfunctions. Richards 
and Compton (1998) claim that systems that allow the user to decide how to use them are better 
than systems that try to anticipate what the user wants to do, such as those that employ user 
models. Therefore, in domains where an operator is interacting with a complex and dangerous 
system such as a nuclear power station, an accurate model of the whole system is essential in 
case of a breakdown (Patrick, Halliday, James, & Vaudrey, 1999; Vicente, 1997). When the 
operator is replaced by a user or consumer, a different approach would seem to be more 
sensible; for example, the internal structure of a calculator is so complicated that a user does not 
have (and should not need) a detailed picture of what happens inside (Young, 1983). Norman 
(1988, 1993) concurs. This makes sense because many aspects of the internal workings of 
equipment are irrelevant to most user tasks (Fischer, 1991), and an accurate rendition of the 
system’s inner workings will not necessarily provide the best resource from which to build a 
clear picture of its central abstractions (Fischer, 1991). 
 
Okoye (1998) claims to have predicted a shared mental model in order to facilitate intuitive use 
but is not completely convincing. Mental models are nebulous and hard to define, and it is very 
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difficult to assess if a person or group of people share a whole model or not. This makes it 
difficult to apply them successfully to systems or product design. Marchionini (1995) claims 
that each individual user possesses unique mental models, and some psychologists have 
suggested that mental models are not suitable to apply to systems design (Rutherford & Wilson, 
1991). For these reasons, this research is not based on a mental models approach. 
 
2.11 Summary 
 
This chapter has addressed the definitions of intuition and established that it is based on 
experiential knowledge. Many theories depend upon the fact that, when people encounter a new 
situation, they base their actions on their previous experience. Seen from a neurobiological 
standpoint like connectionism or embodiment, or from the point of view of a hypothesised 
model, script or schema, previous experience is the key to the sort of fast and efficient cognitive 
processing and decision making that all people do every day. Intuition – a process thought to be 
non-conscious, fast and efficient, and to provide answers sometimes seemingly from nowhere – 
has to be based on past experience. 
 
People can use intuitive processing in a particular situation only if they have had previous 
experience to draw on. Many theorists believe that the experiences gained simply through being 
in a human body in the world inform all of a person’s interactions, while experiences with the 
thousands of artefacts people interact with every day are also relevant. Intuition accesses past 
experiences in memory, probably through spreading activation of similar connections. Intuition 
can also work through metaphor, using a cue similar to something seen previously to solve a 
new problem, or it could possibly access and run mental models of the way things work. The 
evidence also suggests that it is past experience that allows intuition to inform decision making 
in many cases.  
 
Now that the foundation of intuition has been established as past experience, Chapter 3 will 
address other properties and aspects of intuition such as speed, correctness, un-conscious 
processing and emotion, and relate them to current, relevant models of cognitive processing. 
How intuition contributes to problem solving and expertise will also be examined.  
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Chapter 3  
 
Intuition and Cognitive Processes 
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3.0 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 established that intuition is based on past experience. This chapter covers other 
important aspects and properties of intuition. Various definitions ascribe to intuition the 
properties of non-conscious or non-verbalisable processing, correctness and speed. All of these 
properties will be discussed, as will the way in which intuition may fit into current cognitive 
processing models. Also explored are the way in which intuition is linked to insight, and the 
debate about individual and task related differences in the use of intuition.  
 
The actual possible mechanisms of intuition are also discussed through psychology and 
neuroscience research. Researchers have begun to link intuition with emotion, or somatic 
markers, which guide the unconscious processing. This important idea is explored and related to 
the theory already covered, to provide an overall picture of the workings and properties of 
intuition. Finally, a definition of intuition for the purposes of this study, based on the work 
reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3, is provided. 
 
3.1 Intuition and Consciousness 
 
Most modern authors see intuition as part of a continuum of processing which ranges from very 
controlled and conscious at one extreme to completely automatic and requiring no conscious 
thought at the other. Some lay people seem to believe intuition to be instinctive or innate 
knowledge. This may be because the process is non-conscious and, therefore, seems mysterious 
(Bastick, 2003). It has been argued that the reasoning process is not in evidence when intuition 
is used, as the cognitive processing takes place outside the conscious mind and the steps in 
processing are not known. Many researchers agree that the understanding or knowledge 
required during the intuitive process is retrieved from memory during non-conscious processing 
(Agor, 1986; Bastick, 2003; Bowers et al., 1990; Cappon, 1994; Dreyfus et al., 1986; Fischbein, 
1987; King & Clark, 2002; Laughlin, 1997; Noddings & Shore, 1984). People who were 
processing intuitively would often be unable to explain how they made a decision because it 
was based on stored memory associations (i.e. tacit knowledge) rather than reasoning per se 
(Wickens et al., 1998). Bastick (2003) claims that the intuitive process could be preconscious, 
with the exception of some of the gross sensations or guiding feelings of which the person must 
become consciously aware, and which are sometimes called an “intuition.”  
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Despite the fact that many mental processes are undoubtedly unconscious or subconscious 
(Vera & Simon, 1993), the notion that information processing can occur outside consciousness 
has a long and controversial history. Many people throughout history have proposed that more 
goes on unconsciously than most people believe (Baars, 1988), and it cannot be denied that at 
least some neural processing occurs outside consciousness. However, different assumptions 
have been made about the extent to which cognition and consciousness co-occur. These issues 
continue to be the object of lively debate (Atkinson, Thomas, & Cleeremans, 2000). For many 
years, the notion that unconscious mental processes played a role in cognition was viewed 
sceptically by researchers and theorists (Baars, 1988; Dorfman, Shames, & Kihlstrom, 1996).  
 
In cognitive psychology, due to the behaviouralists’ position that there were no non-conscious 
processes, the consciousness debate was deferred for decades. The  debate has been avoided by 
use of terms such as attention, perception, exposure to stimulus, verbal report and strategic 
control, which can disguise the real questions (Baars, 1988). More recently, however, the idea 
that mental structures, processes and states can influence experience, thought and action outside 
of awareness and voluntary control has been more widely accepted (Baars, 1988; Dorfman et 
al., 1996). The existence of unconscious processes is no longer questioned, although there is no 
uniform agreement about how sophisticated these processes are (Eysenck, 1995). Freud’s 
version of the unconscious is full of emotion and negativity; actually, unconscious processing is 
less strange and more useful than he believed (Eysenck, 1995).  
 
The processing in the nervous system that produces the world that people experience takes 
place within a network of millions of cells and interactions which are heavily influenced in their 
patterning by culture and personal development. Most of the knowing that goes on in this welter 
of processing is unconscious. Human brains are constantly testing expectations against 
perception, and most of this process of anticipation, recognition and cognition is intuitive 
(Laughlin, 1997). There is evidence that unattended streams of information in experiments are 
processed and represented whether they are conscious or not; perceptual events are processed 
for some time before they become conscious, if they ever do (Baars, 1988). This evidence 
emerges from a variety of paradigms including dichotic listening tasks, impressions of other 
persons, interpretation of ambiguous pictures, implicit memory in neurological patients and 
normal participants, and patients exhibiting "blindsight" (Bowden, 1997). Some of this work is 
discussed below. 
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Jacoby and Witherspoon (1982) report experiments which showed that people had enhanced 
perception of words they had previously been presented with, even though they were  unaware 
that they had been previously presented with them. Therefore, they conclude that: 
 
although deliberate remembering obviously does occur, many functions of 
memory may operate without intention or awareness. Memory for a prior 
event may influence the interpretation and encoding of a later event 
without a person being aware of remembering the prior event (p300).  
 
Remembering without awareness may operate in an early passive phase of processing that is 
involved in a variety of tasks, and Jacoby and Witherspoon (1982) claim that the judgement or 
processing that one remembers comes after the passive form of remembering, and suggest that 
effects of this sort may be important in both simple and complex tasks. Eysenck (1995) suggests 
that people are “unaware of their unawareness” (p183) and they imagine that consciousness 
covers a much larger ground than it actually does. He emphasises that the results and not the 
processes of thinking appear in consciousness, and sees intuition as a function of unconscious 
processes. Hammond (1993) also claims that low conscious awareness is characteristic of 
intuitive processes.  
 
Implicit learning is a process whereby knowledge of a complex environment is acquired and 
used largely independently of awareness of either the process of acquisition or the nature of the 
knowledge acquired (Reber, 1992). Reber presents intuition as the end product of an implicit 
learning experience. Implicit (or experiential or unintended or unnoticed) learning forms 
implicit or tacit knowledge, which allows processes based on experiential knowledge – such as 
the process of intuition – to operate. Reber, Walkenfield and Hernstadt (1991) claim that tacit 
knowledge is practical, informal, and usually acquired indirectly or implicitly. It does not lend 
itself to being directly taught and is the type of knowledge used for success in most real-world 
settings.  
 
Berry and Broadbent (1988) investigated implicit learning using various computer-based tasks. 
They found that, given a non-salient relationship between decision and action, subjects learn 
about control characteristics of these systems in an implicit way. They experience great 
difficulty in verbalising their knowledge of the system. Berry and Broadbent’s (1988) 
experiment showed that significant transfer of learning occurred when subjects were presented 
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with the same or a conceptually similar task. There was no transfer when the second task was 
conceptually or perceptually dissimilar from the first. Participants also showed no transfer if 
they were presented with two similar tasks but were told of the critical relationship between 
them. The authors claim that such a finding fits in with the idea that these tasks are performed 
in an implicit manner, with participants not being verbally aware of the basis on which they are 
responding. 
 
Bowers’ (1984) views intuition as a distinct information processing mode in which 
unconsciously stored information is used to guide decisions and problem solving. Bowers 
claims that perception and consciousness of stimuli are different, and that it is selective 
attention that transforms a perception into consciousness of what is perceived. For this case, he 
uses the term noticed. Information can be perceived without being noticed, but not vice versa. 
The threshold for noticing a stimulus is higher than the threshold for perceiving it, so whether 
or not something is noticed can depend on involvement in alternative activities. Bowers (1984) 
argues that there are two generic modes of non-conscious influences: those that go unnoticed, 
and those that are unappreciated as influences. The distinction between perceiving and noticing 
allows these two modes. Information perceived but not noticed is not likely to be processed into 
long term memory so is not available for later recall. However, information need not be 
conscious in order to be influential, and information perceived need not be noticed in order to 
have a demonstrable impact on behaviour (Bowers, 1984).  Bowers (1984) suggests that cues 
that trigger intuitive processing could be the things that go unappreciated.  
 
Baars’ (1988) Global Workspace theory describes the brain as a collection of specialised 
processors, with consciousness associated with a global workspace in the brain that can 
distribute to and recruit from many specialised, unconscious networks. Both conscious and 
unconscious stimuli are apparently analysed quite completely by automatic systems. However, 
unattended stimuli are not broadcast throughout the nervous system and conscious ones are. In 
this way, the nervous system can cope with novel information, but the most proficient systems 
are generally the least conscious. Intuition is one of these proficient, non-conscious processes. 
Baars (1988) claims that this makes sense as the mechanisms associated with conscious 
experience are remarkably small in capacity, when compared with the enormous size and 
sophistication of the unconscious parts of the nervous system. This theory relies on the 
connectionist, or spreading activation, paradigm and has similarities to Bowers’ (1984)  ideas 
about a noticing threshold: the things which are noticed are those that are broadcast, but things 
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that go unnoticed may never be broadcast and, hence, never become conscious. Whether the 
noticing threshold and the global workspace are appropriate metaphors or not, it is clear that 
intuition, along with other cognitive processes, can operate unconsciously.  
 
Ideas such as remembering without awareness, implicit knowledge, the noticing threshold and 
global workspace theory demonstrate how unconscious retrieval of information in long term 
memory for intuitive processing could happen without people being aware of the retrieval or 
even the storing of the information, thus giving intuition its strange reputation. Since these 
processes are non-conscious, or at best semi-conscious, intuition can seem to work like magic 
because, not only is accessing the experience non-conscious, according to research in implicit 
learning, storing it could be also. This means that people may believe that they have never been 
in a similar situation before. The fact that some people believe that intuition is used  when there 
is little information available (e.g., Westcott, 1961) is also explained by this: the information is 
not obvious in the perceived situation but it is available in memory and accessed non-
consciously. 
 
Klein (1998) claims that people have trouble observing themselves use their own experience 
and therefore find it hard to explain the basis of their judgements. Patterns can be subtle and 
people often cannot describe what they noticed or how they judged a situation as typical. 
Klein’s interview and case study participants were not aware they were using their own 
experience in their everyday decisions; one even thought that extrasensory perception (ESP) 
was providing the solutions. In this case, rather than giving the participant specific facts and 
memories of particular events, his experience affected the way he saw the situation, allowing 
him to recognise things without knowing how (Klein, 1998).  
 
3.1.1 Speed of Intuition 
 
Intuition also yields quick results, as it allows people to grasp meaning or significance without 
relying upon slower, analytical processes (Bastick, 2003; Salk, 1983). As Agor put it: 
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…intuition, fully developed, is a highly efficient way of knowing. It is fast 
and accurate. Our system will process a wide array of information on many 
levels and give us an instantaneous cue, how to act. We have the answer 
even though we do not understand all the steps or know fully all the 
information our system processed to give us this cue (Agor, 1986, p6). 
  
Clark (1997) claims that the speed of non-conscious processes is based on parallelism. There is 
a delay of up to half a second between the time the brain receives a stimulus and the time a 
person is conscious of it (Greenfield, 2000). Therefore, just from timing when reactions occur 
during skilled behaviour, researchers can conclude that such behaviour must be non-conscious. 
In automatic behaviour, the brain has reacted and initialised a response before the person is 
conscious of stimulus or response. Conscious reaction time is 100 times slower than the fastest 
potential firing rate of a neuron. Consequently, non-conscious processing is much faster than 
conscious processing, and the time needed to scan memory for previous experiences on which 
to base a response is much less than conscious reaction time (Baars, 1988).  
 
Although intuitive processing is not as efficient as automatic processing, the fact that a person’s 
most proficient systems are the least conscious helps to explain why intuition is generally non-
conscious. Because intuition is non-conscious, it is fast, and/or because intuition is fast, it is 
non-conscious. 
 
3.2 Intuition and Emotion 
 
Love (2003) stresses that current emotion-based approaches in design are problematic and that 
design research needs to take the sort of approach suggested by Damasio’s (1994) work 
(reviewed below). He states that theory-making about human aspects of designing (including 
theory-making in the area of interaction with designed systems, services and organisations) has 
been grounded in philosophically based speculations about internal process related to emotion 
and feeling, without relation to the physicality of these processes. 
 
Damasio claims it is not sensible to leave emotion out of any concept of mind, but this is what 
traditional accounts of cognition do. Arbib and Fellous (2004) agree that there is no easy 
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separation between emotion and cognition and believe that there is rich interaction of cognitive 
and emotional processing in the mammalian brain. Damasio (1994) sees feelings as having a 
privileged status because they are represented at many neural levels, and are tied inextricably to 
the body. Because of these ties, feelings develop first and retain a primacy over people’s mental 
lives.  
 
Dorfman et al. (1996) present the product or outcome of intuition as an informative feeling, 
which tells the person about processes that are happening unconsciously. Others also 
hypothesise that feelings may be the outlet through which the result of the intuitive process is 
communicated to the conscious mind. King and Clark (2002) investigated intuition in nurses 
and reported that intuition was often felt as an emotion; for example, a nurse may feel 
uneasiness or foreboding about a patient’s condition.  
 
Bastick (2003) and Klein (1998) regard emotion as not just the product but the very mechanism 
of intuition. Bastick (2003) details his theory of intuitive thought, which involves emotional 
“sets” driving the intuitive process. The emotional sets comprise associations of response 
tendencies and emotional states; in other words, prior experiences and the emotion attached to 
them are encoded together. Large amounts of information can be coded by associating the 
information with an emotional set so that being in that set recalls the information. Experiences 
of two situations producing similar emotional states enable one to consider these situations as 
intuitively analogous if similar emotional states (feelings) are associated with each. In this way, 
Bastick (2003) presents emotions as the internal contexts of information used in the  
intuitive process.  
 
3.2.1 The Somatic Marker Hypothesis 
 
Damasio (1994) stresses that the processes of emotion and feeling are an intrinsic part of the 
neural machinery for biological regulation, whose core is constituted by homeostatic controls, 
drives and instincts. Damasio (1994) defines emotion as a set of changes in body states caused 
by interaction with the environment, and feeling as the separate internal representation of that 
emotion. Feelings are neural representations of the emotional states. The neural representation 
seems to be equivalent to Bastick’s (2003) emotional set, and the current body state is the 
emotion itself. 
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An emotion may be induced through non-conscious engagement with the environment. 
Damasio (1994) discusses the possibility that people are wired to respond to certain stimuli or 
combinations of stimuli with a pre-defined emotion; for example, to size, sounds and 
movements related to threats from natural predators, or to certain bodily states such as severe 
pain. A person need not recognise the threat or know what is causing the pain in order to 
respond in a preset way. These are innate processes called primary emotions. Secondary 
emotions occur once people begin experiencing feelings and forming systematic connections 
between experienced situations and primary emotions. 
 
Both chemical and electrical (neural) signals get to the brain in the event of an emotion 
(Damasio, 1994). Networks in the prefrontal cortex respond to images that are formed through 
either sensory input or thoughts and memories. The prefrontal response comes from 
dispositional representations that embody knowledge pertaining to how certain types of 
situations have usually been paired with certain emotional responses in each person’s individual 
experience.  
 
The prefrontal, acquired dispositional representations needed for secondary emotions are 
separate from the innate ones needed for primary emotions. Damasio himself puts the whole 
idea very clearly: 
 
In conclusion, emotion is the combination of a mental evaluative process, 
simple or complex, with dispositional responses to that process, mostly 
toward the body proper, resulting in an emotional body state, but also 
toward the brain itself (neurotransmitter nuclei in brain stem), resulting in 
additional mental changes. Note that, for the moment, I leave out of emotion 
the perception of all the changes that constitute the emotional response…I 
reserve the term feeling for the experience of those changes (Damasio, 1994, 
p139). 
 
Damasio (1994) formulated the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) to explain how emotion can 
influence behaviour and cognition. As he explains:  
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In short, somatic markers are a special instance of feelings generated from 
secondary emotions. Those emotions and feelings have been connected, by 
learning, to predicted future outcomes of certain scenarios. When a negative 
somatic marker is juxtaposed to a particular future outcome the combination 
functions as an alarm bell. When a positive somatic marker is juxtaposed 
instead, it becomes a beacon of incentive. This is the essence of the somatic 
marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994, p174). 
 
People are born with the neural machinery required to generate somatic states in response to 
certain classes of stimuli – the machinery of primary emotions. However, most somatic markers 
used for decision making are probably created in the brain during the process of education and 
socialisation by connecting specific classes of stimuli with specific classes of somatic state. In 
other words, they are based on secondary emotions, which are based on experience (Damasio, 
1994). In order to select a response, a person needs neither conscious knowledge nor a 
conscious reasoning strategy. The requisite knowledge was once conscious; that is, when it was 
learned. However, experience with similar scenarios made the brain pair the provoking stimulus 
with the most advantageous response (Damasio, 1994). Damasio hypothesises that the critical 
and formative set of stimuli to somatic pairings is formed in childhood and adolescence. 
Somatically marked stimuli continue to accrue throughout life, but the formative ones are there 
from early stages.  
 
Associations with various markers will be different for each person based on his/her experience. 
However, Damasio (1994) states that the experience many people have had with basic things 
such as door handles or broomsticks is likely to be similar, whereas experience based more on 
social interactions will vary more between people. This augurs well for the idea of making 
interfaces that will be intuitive for large numbers of people, although it could be foreseen that 
this could change if human-machine interaction becomes more socially based. 
 
Somatic markers do not need to be perceived consciously. Triggering of activity from 
neurotransmitter nuclei (part of the emotional response) can bias cognitive processes in a covert 
manner and thus influence conscious reasoning and decision making (Damasio, 1994). Damasio 
goes on to relate somatic markers to intuition. He states that the explicit imagery related to a 
negative outcome would be generated, but instead of producing a perceptible body-state change, 
it could inhibit the regulatory neural circuits located in the brain core, which mediate aversive 
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and approach behaviours. A negative option might be avoided altogether and a positive one 
made more likely by this covert mechanism, which Damasio suggests may be the source of 
intuition. 
 
Damasio and his colleagues have conducted experiments with risk taking according to implicit 
rules with both normal participants (“normals”)and brain damaged patients (Bechara & 
Damasio, 1997). They devised the Iowa gambling task to test the SMH. The task is based on 
participants choosing cards from two packs, one of which has high risk but high rewards (the 
“bad” pack), and the other of which has lower rewards but lower risks (the “good” pack). These 
experiments have revealed evidence for a complex process of non-conscious signals which are 
based on previous experiences that have been stored with an appropriate emotional state that 
attends them. Both normal and frontally damaged people generated skin conductance responses 
(SCRs) as each reward or punishment occurred after turning a card.  
 
In normal subjects, within a number of card turns into the game, SCRs would be generated 
when considering a card from a “bad” pack. Normal participants began to trigger anticipatory 
SCRs when they pondered risky decisions before they verbalised their knowledge. The process 
of pondering is conscious whether the knowledge used is conscious or not. The process leading 
to anticipatory SCRs is mostly non-conscious, although it may become conscious in the form of 
a feeling. The magnitude of these SCRs increased as the game progressed and the knowledge 
became more conscious. The brains of normals were signalling the “badness” of the deck as 
they learned to predict a bad outcome. These responses were not there at the start of the game, 
showing that these things were learned from experience. Frontally damaged patients showed no 
anticipatory response, and normals were less likely to choose risky options than brain damaged 
patients.  
 
Damasio (1994) suggests that before and beneath the conscious hunch there is a non-conscious 
process gradually telling the normal player, with increasing insistence, that punishment or 
reward is about to strike if a certain action is carried out. He claims that the prefrontal networks 
would hone in on the ratio of “bad” versus “good” outcomes for each deck, according to the 
frequency of bad or good somatic states experienced after punishment or reward. The player 
would be guided into a theory about the game by this automated sorting out. Damasio (1994) 
doubts that this is a fully conscious or fully non-conscious process. This suggests that intuition 
is at work, as the process that operates between automatic, skilled processing and conscious, 
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knowledge-based reasoning. Damasio (1994) claims that gambling is analogous to life, where 
much of the knowledge by which people live and by which they construct their adaptive future 
is doled out bit by bit, as experience accrues, and uncertainty reigns. Real knowledge, like the 
player’s knowledge in the gambling task, is shaped both by the world with which people 
interact and by the biases inherent in the human organism; for example, preference for gain over 
loss and reward over punishment. These findings are analogous to the reports from King and 
Clark’s (2002) subjects that the product of intuition can be a sense of foreboding or of 
something being wrong, and clearly link emotional responses to past experience. 
 
Maia and McClelland (2005) claim to have repeated the experiment and use their results to 
refute Bechara and Damasio’s (1997) statements about when knowledge of the implicit rules of 
the game becomes conscious. However, they did not include the skin conductance 
measurements, which were a key component of the original experiment. Bechara, Damasio, 
Tranel and Damasio (2005) claim that Maia and McClelland’s study undermines the traditional 
methods for identifying implicit knowledge (unprompted protocol) by using a probing 
technique. They do not accept that Maia and McClelland’s results undermine the SMH. Maia 
and McClelland (2005) also concede that the SMH has not been disproved and they do not 
entirely agree that their findings are incompatible with it. 
 
Encoding or processing specificity assumes that, for an item to be recalled from long-term 
memory using a cue, the cue must have been encoded into memory with the original item 
(Brooks, 1987). Tulving and Thomson (1973) state that information that is stored is determined 
by what is perceived and how it is encoded, and what is stored determines what retrieval cues 
are effective in providing access to stored information. Tulving and Thomson’s (1973) research 
supports the encoding specificity principle as they found that strong extra-experimental 
associates of list items, when presented to the subject as recall aids, increase the probability of 
correct responses. This idea sits well alongside the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) and 
Bastick’s (1982, 2003) theory of intuitive thought as it postulates a way in which the emotion 
can be stored with the experiential memory and be used as part of the retrieval process. 
 
This work on emotion suggests that somatic markers could be coded when an experience is 
stored in memory and used as part of the search and retrieval process when people are looking 
unconsciously for matches for a particular perceived situation. Bechara and Damasio (1997) 
suggest that intuition works through experientialism, with emotional reminders in long term 
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memory as triggers. From this viewpoint, emotion is stored as part of the experience and it 
functions as part of the process of intuition but is not necessarily consciously felt as an emotion. 
Positive or negative somatic markers attached to records of experiences in memory guide 
intuition. Positive markers could be associated with the endorphin rush that is hypothesised to 
accompany an insight or “Aha!” experience, which could be equated to Bowers’ (1984) 
threshold of awareness. This work is important as it reveals a mechanism that could be 
responsible for the storage and later retrieval of information for use during the intuitive process, 
based on the idea that intuition utilises past experience. 
 
3.3 The Skill-Rule-Knowledge Model 
 
Rasmussen (1993) developed the Skill-Rule-Knowledge (SRK) model of task performance. 
This model is important as it explains clearly how the various cognitive processes work and 
interact. It relates the ideas considered so far in this chapter to each other and helps to explain 
how intuition plays a role in cognition. According to the model, people operate on the skill, rule 
or knowledge level, depending on the nature of the task and their degree of experience with the 
situation. Highly experienced people will process at the skill-based level. This is non-conscious, 
automatic processing. Those familiar with tasks, but lacking extensive experience, will be 
processing at the rule-based level. The cues are recognised as meaning certain things, termed 
“signs” (Rasmussen, 1990). These signs then trigger rules accumulated from past experience, 
and previous successful solutions or decisions (Schunn, Reder, Nhouyvanisvong, Richards, & 
Stroffolino, 1997; Wickens et al., 1998). The rules are if–then associations between cue sets and 
the appropriate actions. When the situation is novel, decision makers will have no rules stored 
from previous experience to call on. They will therefore have to operate at the knowledge-based 
level, which is analytical processing using conceptual information. 
 
According to the SRK model, in a real world context, a person might operate at the knowledge-, 
rule- or skill-based level and will switch between them depending on task familiarity. A novice 
can work only at the analytical knowledge-based level. At an intermediate point, people will 
have a knowledge base and some rules from training and experience. They work predominantly 
at the rule-based level but must move to knowledge-based processing when the situation is a 
new one. The expert has a larger knowledge base, a greatly expanded rule base and a skill base, 
so can work at the skill-based level, but lack of familiarity with something will revert the expert 
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to knowledge-based processing. The SRK model is consistent with accepted and empirically 
supported models of information processing which generally include perception, decision and 
action in a similar format to the SRK model (e.g. Wickens et al., 1998). 
 
Wickens et al. (1998) have expanded the SRK model into an information processing model that 
accommodates many of the processes postulated by others. Here they equate rule-based with 
intuitive processing, which separates intuitive from automatic processing. During intuitive rule-
based processing there is more active cognitive processing than for automatic skill-based 
processing, as the person must consider a variety of cues. The cues trigger a retrieval of 
appropriate cue–action rules from memory, and these specify the desired goal and action 
sequence that is to be executed. Which of these processing strategies people are most likely to 
use depends on the specific domain or job, level of expertise, amount of time and amount of 
uncertainty. A system and its displays will affect the type of decision strategies selected by 
operators (Wickens et al., 1998).  
 
It is important that Rasmussen (1993) and Wickens et al. (1998) split rule-based or intuitive 
processing from automatic processing. They claim that intuitive rule-based processing is 
founded on rules and procedures learnt through prior experience, but it is not a completely 
automatic sequence. When people use a new product, they cannot do everything automatically, 
but if the product is intuitive to use, they can call on previous experience to complete tasks 
easily. Intuitive processing is sometimes more conscious than automatic processing 
(Rasmussen, 1993; Wickens et al., 1998), but is consistently unappreciated (so, according to 
Bowers’ (1984) theory, intuition is not unnoticed but it is also not appreciated as an influence). 
This helps to explain why intuition seems so mysterious. 
 
Signals, signs and symbols are the information observed from the environment that can be 
equated with the skill, rule and knowledge categories (Rasmussen, 1990). Signals are sensory 
data that can be processed as continuous variables (skill-based). Symbols can be formally 
processed (knowledge-based). At the rule-based level, information is typically perceived as 
signs. Information perceived is defined as a sign when it serves to activate or modify existing 
actions. Signs refer to situations by convention or prior experience and can dictate stereotype 
acts (if–then rules). They can serve to activate stored patterns of behaviour, and operating from 
signs may be the normal way for humans to be efficient (Rasmussen, 1990). This is important 
as signs operate on the rule-based level, which Wickens et al. (1998) have called intuitive; so 
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intuitively processing signs in the environment may be the normal way in which people operate 
efficiently. A feature of the environment can mean different things to different people and so 
could be a sign to one person and a symbol to another. The distinction between signals, signs 
and symbols is independent of the form in which information is presented. It depends, rather, on 
the context in which it is perceived; in other words, upon the intentions and expectations of the 
perceiver. This can be based only on their experience.  
 
Consciousness is not needed in highly skilled and routine actions. Knowledge can fade from 
consciousness with practice, but then return when a task becomes more difficult. However, even 
though something may becomes less conscious with practice, it is still used in the task (Baars, 
1988). This is reflected in the Skill-Rule-Knowledge model as people can process on any or all 
of the levels depending on their experience with a particular task. 
 
Importantly, the SRK model accords with the idea that intuitive processing is based on 
experience, and that different features of the environment can be processed differently 
depending on the perceiver’s experience. It suggests a three-strand model of cognition, with 
intuition somewhere in the middle and analysis and automatic processing at each end. 
 
Based on these ideas, it appears that automatic processes (the skill-based level) are even less 
consciously available than intuition, and may be faster and more accurate, whereas conscious 
reasoning sits at the other extreme. Therefore, one can conclude that intuition allows efficient 
processing of situations similar to those previously experienced, but does not require the 
extensive overlearning needed for a person to process automatically. In order to make the 
relationship between automatic and intuitive processing clearer, the important field of automatic 
processing will be reviewed in the following section. 
 
3.3.1 Automatic Processing 
 
Research on automaticity (sometimes called bottom-up or data-driven processing) goes back to 
the 1890s (Bargh, 1989; Logan, 1989). Human performance has been hypothesised to be the 
result of two processes, referred to as automatic and controlled (Schneider, Dumais, & Shiffrin, 
1984; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). However, processing need not 
be cut and dried, and could involve a mixture of automatic and attentive processing (Schneider 
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et al., 1984), or there could be a continuum along which the processes lie (Isen & Diamond, 
1989; Logan, 1985). Schneider and Shiffrin  (1977) and Shiffrin and Schneider (1977), in their 
seminal work on automaticity, disagree with the continuum idea. However, the SRK model 
introduced by Rasmussen (1993) and further developed by Wickens et al. (1998), suggests that 
there are various points along a continuum between automatic and controlled, one of which is 
intuitive. People may not even always process the same stimuli automatically, but could change 
their processing method depending on other circumstances and their goals (Isen & Diamond, 
1989).  
 
An operator’s loss of consciousness about a predictable event is a signal that the event has been 
learned completely (Baars, 1988). Automatic processing is fast, parallel, effortless and not 
limited by working memory capacity. It is not under direct control, and is how people perform 
well-developed skilled tasks. In a laboratory situation, automatic processing can develop when 
subjects process stimuli consistently over many trials. Controlled, or attentive, processing is 
slow, generally serial, effortful, capacity-limited and regulated. It must be used to deal with 
novel or inconsistent information (Schneider et al., 1984; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin 
& Schneider, 1977).  
 
Controlled processing modifies memory and leads to the development of automatic processing 
(Schneider et al., 1984; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), and 
automaticity is considered the result of overlearning or repeated exposure (Isen & Diamond, 
1989; Lewicki, 1986; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Simonton, 
1980). Often, processes that are now automatic were once consciously learned; for example, 
grammar, or the journey to work (Isen & Diamond, 1989; Logan, 1985; Schneider & Shiffrin, 
1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Therefore, controlled processes are instrumental in the 
development of new automatic processes, and automatic and controlled processes, working 
together, allow a limited capacity processor to perform very complex tasks (Schneider et al., 
1984). Indeed, (Logan, 1985) suggests that automaticity is a necessary component of skill as 
there is not enough attentional capacity to develop higher level skills until lower level ones have 
become automatised. He claims that most skills have automatic components.  
 
Schneider and Shiffrin  (1977) and Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) take an attentional approach 
to their research, whereas Logan (1989) defines automaticity in terms of underlying memory 
processes; he calls this the instance theory of automaticity. The theory assumes that 
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automaticity is a memory phenomenon and automatic processing is based on single-step, direct-
access retrieval from memory. Humans acquire a domain-specific database that provides the 
right information by direct-access retrieval without much computation (Logan, 1989). The 
information provided by automatic processing seems to come unbidden; people can look at a 
familiar situation, recognise it and know what to do. 
 
Norman (1981) introduced the Activation-Trigger-Schema system (ATS) to explain this 
phenomenon. The ATS model assumes that action sequences are controlled by sensorimotor 
schemata, and that skilled actions need only be specified at the highest levels of their memory 
representations. Once the highest-level schema is activated, the lower-level components of that 
action sequence complete the action, to a large extent autonomously, without the further need 
for intervention, except at critical choice points. Schemata are triggered by satisfaction of their 
conditions by previous actions, by the environment, or by perceptions. For example, during 
driving, schemata for braking or steering are triggered by appropriate conditions (Norman, 
1981). Reason and Mycielska (1982) concur that familiar objects will trigger automatic actions: 
“...familiar objects possess what we call an immediate controlling region. Once in touch with 
them, our actions conform to the structural needs of the object” (p224).  
 
Therefore, attention is not necessary when the same cognitive process has been executed many 
times (Ericsson & Simon, 1984). Greenfield (2000) suggests that automaticity works by the 
skilled learning changing the way brain cells fire and permanently altering them. They 
subsequently need less input from other brain cells in order to fire the habitual response. 
However, just as predictability promotes automaticity, violations of predictability may re-create 
consciousness. Informal demonstrations suggest that many automatised skills can become 
conscious again when users encounter some unpredictable obstacle (Baars, 1988).  
 
Intuition is not an automatic process, and the use of a new product cannot be automatised until a 
user has had extensive experience with it. The SRK model explains where intuitive and 
automatic processing sit in relation to each other. Automaticity is a process which is even more 
efficient than intuition but relies on more experience. For certain tasks, intuitive processing may 
develop into automatic processing if the task is overlearned. How the relation between intuition, 
consciousness and automaticity is seen in these and other theories is discussed in more depth in 
Section 5.4. 
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3.4 Individual and Task Differences 
 
Much current thinking supports the idea that intuition is available to all people and will be used 
depending on the circumstances (Bastick, 2003; Bowers et al., 1990; Klein, 1998). Eysenck 
(1995) suggests that there is a continuum and that intuitive and analytical minds are extremes of 
the continuum, with most people somewhere in the middle (using both intuition and analysis). 
The Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), based on Jung’s work on personality, differentiates 
intuitive and analytical as distinct “types”. It is an inappropriate instrument, according to 
Bastick (2003). Jung based his classifications on his own observations, and did no experiments 
on the theory. Jung himself declared that the typology was just a scheme of orientation and that 
the classification of individuals meant nothing (Carroll, 2003). Further, although the MBTI has 
been widely applied, it was developed by amateurs and it, too, had no basis in experimental 
work (Carroll, 2003). 
 
Westcott (1961) looked at individual differences in intuitive thinking. He conducted 
experiments to study the distribution of people who were both willing to make inferences based 
on little information and tended to be correct in their conclusions. His experiments therefore 
involved confidence ratings for each solution participants reached. He also calculated an 
efficiency score for each participant’s performance. The confidence that participants showed in 
their conclusions was positively related to their actual success, so they generally knew when 
they were right, although no feedback was given. He found that participants who make intuitive 
leaps are the most predictably confident. However, he did not separate the problems he gave 
participants into insight and analytical problems, as is standard in insight research, and 
Woolhouse and Bayne (2000) doubt that Westcott was measuring intuition since there was no 
measure of awareness. Even so, this work would not disprove the thesis that intuition is based 
on experience, as the people who were more successful at making intuitive leaps may have had 
more relevant experience on which to base those leaps. The feelings of confidence measured by 
Westcott could be similar to the feelings discussed in Section 3.2, which are the mechanism by 
which the conscious mind becomes aware of a solution. 
 
Woolhouse and Bayne (2000) also conducted experiments in this field and claim that their 
research supports the position that there are individual differences in the use of intuition. 
However, there are some problems with their research. The re-coding system they used to 
classify interview responses has room for error and is not well justified. Their experiment also 
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depended on the use of the Myers Briggs Type Indicator, which other researchers [such as 
Bastick (2003) and Carroll (2003)] have discredited. They claim to have found that “feeling 
types” were more successful than “thinking types” at using intuition. However, the difference 
between feeling and thinking types (in use of intuition) that they present is not significant 
(although they ignore this fact). Also, they admit that many of the participants used explicit 
knowledge rather than intuition to perform the task (according to self-report) and so their 
intuitive capacity remains unmeasured.  
 
Woolhouse and Bayne (2000) did, however, find that there were no significant relationships 
between use of intuition and gender. Boucouvalas (1997) suggests that the issue of gender 
differences in use of intuition is semantic, with men preferring to use terms such as “hunch” and 
“gut feeling” rather than intuition. 
 
Such work on individual differences in intuition has been superseded to some extent by task-
induced mode research. Wickens et al. (1998) and Rasmussen (1990) suggest that different 
types of tasks will induce different strategies in different people depending on their level of 
experience with the relevant task (Section 3.3). Klein (1998) seems to agree that different 
conditions will mean different strategies, arguing that recognition primed decision-making 
(Section 2.2.4) is more likely to be used under time pressure, with a higher experience level, in 
dynamic conditions and with ill-defined goals. These ideas accord with the thesis on past 
experience and intuition, suggesting that people use intuition if they have experience to draw 
on, but use more analytical processes otherwise. 
 
Hammond, Hamm, Grassia and Pearson (1987) developed a cognitive continuum to classify 
intuitive and analytic tasks. They propose that the position of a task on the continuum 
determines the type of information processing triggered. Task conditions may also include some 
properties from each end of the continuum, and therefore some of the properties of both modes 
of cognition could be induced. Tasks with both intuitive and analytical properties may induce a 
compromise between intuition and analysis. After a set of experiments designed to get 
participants to think in different ways during a set of tasks classified from analytical to intuitive, 
Hammond et al. (1987) concluded that participants performed better when cognitive properties 
corresponded to task properties.  
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In the context of this book, the most important conclusion to come from their work was that 
intuitive cognition can perform as well as, and even out-perform, analytical cognition by the 
same person. Hammond (1993) went on to further investigate how task conditions can be 
located on a continuum that ranges from those that are highly intuition-inducing to those that 
are highly analysis-inducing. He lists task characteristics that he claims are intuition-inducing: 
large number, perceptual measurement, continuous and variable distribution, and simultaneous 
display of cues, high redundancy among cues, low degree of certainty in task, organising 
principle of task unavailable and brief time period to complete it. However, these characteristics 
are not developed enough to be applied to the design of products or systems. Hammond claims 
he used a quantitative method to order the tasks on the cognitive continuum, but still does not 
fully explain how he defines intuition and how he arrived at this list of its properties. 
 
Wright, Fields and Harrison (2000) explain that problems requiring internal representation in 
the mind, such as the Tower of Hannoi task or the 8 puzzle, make greater demands on problem 
solvers than problems in which rules are implicit in the structure and/or apparatus. Therefore, 
they claim that information in external representations can be accessed by the perceptual system 
alone, whereas internal representations have to be retrieved from memory. They recommend 
that information perceivable from an information display should exactly match information 
required for the task. If the display does not obey this mapping principle, then the task cannot 
be achieved unless the user has other information internally represented (Wright et al., 2000). 
The authors claim that their experiments with the 8 puzzle provide strong evidence that the 
design of external resources is an important factor in determining interaction strategy (Wright et 
al., 2000, p35).  
 
Cockayne, Wright and Fields (1999) agree that the way in which a problem is represented can 
affect the ease with which a solution can be found, and state that this is well known in problem 
solving research. These authors devised a new interface for the 8 puzzle which was direct but 
which also reduced moves needed (the roundabout interface). This roundabout strategy could 
also be used with the standard direct manipulation interface, but participants did not adopt it 
unless they had had prior exposure to the roundabout interface. This suggests that, while the 
perceptual features of the roundabout interface support the development of the strategy, once 
learned, it can be used in the absence of the external cues. This supports the idea that intuition is 
based on past experience, but also raises the issue that a good interface design can induce a 
better way of thinking about tasks. An internal representation of a problem in the mind of 
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course requires past experience to construct, so some people may still be able to perform this 
type of task intuitively if they have relevant past experience. However, making an interface 
intuitive for people with very little past experience could depend on using the kinds of methods 
investigated here. 
 
The work on individual and task difference suggests that all people have access to intuition as a 
cognitive process This is important, as designing for intuitive use must rely on users being able 
to utilise intuition if it is to have any impact. Most evidence suggests that tasks affect 
processing mode depending on whether or not they, or features of them, are familiar to the 
solver. This lends further support to the conclusion that intuition is based on experience. The 
SRK model also accords with this idea as it allows for use of different levels of processing, 
depending on experience.  
 
3.5 Correctness of Intuition 
 
Intuition is defined by some writers as necessarily correct (some researchers have even 
operationalised intuition as a correct answer), whereas most say it is only a useful guide that 
rarely misleads (Bastick, 2003). Bastick suggests that intuition is always considered to be 
subjectively correct; however, where there is an accepted correct answer for comparison, 
intuition may not always completely agree. Intuition is correct in that it harmonises all the 
subjective information currently available, and intuitive perceptions are experienced as true in 
the same way that sensory data is experienced as true (Bastick, 2003). However, often it seems 
that wrong intuitions are forgotten, whereas correct ones are remembered selectively. This 
contributes to the supposition that intuitions are mostly correct (Bastick, 2003). 
 
Klein (1998) and Eysenck (1995) agree that intuition is not infallible. One’s experience will 
sometimes mislead. For example, one can learn the wrong lessons from experience and 
therefore apply them wrongly (Klein, 1998). Hammond (1993) argues that analysis produces 
fewer errors than intuition; however, when errors in analysis do occur, they are more 
catastrophic than errors in intuition. 
 
As intuition is based on experience, one could conclude that the more relevant experience 
people have, the more likely they are to be able to use intuition correctly. Expert intuition 
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therefore tends to be very reliable (Richman et al., 1996), whereas intuition based on only a few 
relevant past instances, or on similar experiences that are not directly related to the current 
situation, could be less reliable. 
 
3.6 Intuition and Problem Solving Research 
  
The “Aha!” experience (sometime called insight restructuring) is an instinctive affective 
response involving suddenness (Bowden, 1997). Solvers are unable to report the processing. 
Insight involves a mental restructuring that leads to a sudden gain of explicit knowledge 
(Wagner, Gais, Haider, Verleger, & Born, 2004). Whether an individual will experience a given 
problem as an insight problem is a function of both the individual's personal knowledge and 
experience, and the features of the problem itself (Bowden, 1997). Solvers easily recognise the 
correct approach with non-insight problems although they may have difficulty successfully 
executing the necessary steps. In contrast, solvers may have difficulty recognising the correct 
approach for solving insight problems, but once the approach is recognised the solution is 
immediately obvious.  
 
Bowers et al. (1990) view intuition as having two stages: guiding and integrative. The guiding 
stage involves an implicit perception of coherence that guides thought unconsciously towards a 
more explicit understanding.  The integrative stage involves integrating into consciousness a 
plausible representation of that coherence, and occurs when sufficient activation has 
accumulated to cross a threshold of awareness. Transition between the two stages could be 
experienced as an insight or immediate perception. During a discovery-type experience the pre-
analytic, intuitive stage of the inquiry generates hypotheses. This seems to involve relatively 
automatic activation of networks by clue-words (Bowers et al., 1990). Eventually the build up 
of information crosses the noticing threshold (Bowers, 1984), seeming sometimes like insight. 
However, a continuous task can give the impression of a sudden solution because of the use of 
these non-conscious cognitive processes. At some point, the solution becomes conscious and 
this can seem like a miracle or sudden inspiration, such as a Eureka or Aha! experience. 
 
Bowden’s (1997) experiments tested the hypothesis that the Aha! experience associated with 
insight solutions is related to unreportable processing. In particular, it was hypothesised that 
unreportable memory activation and retrieval processes can make the solution available to the 
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solver, but leave the solver unaware of the solution’s source. Solvers may be most likely to 
experience the Aha! of insight when they solve a problem but are unaware of the source of the 
solution. Several factors influence the ability of solvers to retrieve solution-relevant 
information. The information in memory and the problem must share similar surface features, 
similar goals, or similar structural relations. Of these characteristics, similarity of surface 
features appears to exert the greatest influence over what information is initially retrieved 
(Bowden, 1997). This finding is in accordance with those who suggest that metaphors which 
relate to surface features are the most successful (Klein, 1998).  
 
Bowden’s experiments showed that unreportable hints lead to insight-like solutions. This 
provides converging evidence that unreportable processing can produce the Aha! experience of 
insight solutions. One could conclude from this that intuition may be the unreportable, 
unconscious process that leads to insight. The environment and the stored knowledge, 
combined, provide the clues needed for a successful solution (Bowden, 1997), just as intuition 
combines information in the situation and in memory to come up with solutions (Bastick, 
2003). 
 
The Aha! experience can be seen as the affective product of the unconscious processing that 
goes on during the solving process. It seems likely that people use intuition when solving these 
kinds of problems, and also possible that they experience something similar to an Aha! response 
when processing intuitively on other types of problems.  
 
3.7 Intuition and Expertise 
 
Expert behaviour involves the ability to recognise key features of situations and to access 
information that is relevant to them in memory (Richman et al., 1996). These authors argue that 
experts use intuition. Often, in well studied areas of expertise such as chess or diagnosis, an 
answer is identified immediately without the expert being aware of how; however, experts will 
then verify the answer to check whether it is correct. Intuition is reliable enough to permit the 
expert to proceed with the task much more rapidly and reliably than the novice, who must 
employ more tedious step-by-step search processes (Richman et al., 1996). This idea accords 
with the Skill-Rule-Knowledge model, suggesting that experts are processing at the rule- and/or 
skill-based level, while novices are using knowledge-based processing. 
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Salthouse (1991) suggests that knowledge of many different types is the thing that allows 
experts to perform better than novices. The knowledge of the expert includes an extensive store 
of representations that can be used in solving problems (Richman et al., 1996). This sort of 
knowledge is in long term memory and is often evoked when necessary. What appears to be 
held in working memory is a pointer to each chunk of information in long term memory, so that 
the contents of memory can be rehearsed by accessing the image of each chunk (Richman et al., 
1996). Therefore, Richman et al. (1996) suggest that an expert has the ability to recognise 
familiar cues and gain access to the relevant knowledge associated with them. Posner (1988) 
also stresses that it is knowledge use and storage that is at the root of understanding expertise, 
and Klein (1998) concurs.  
 
Experts use intuition to detect typicality and to notice events that did not happen and other 
anomalies that violate the pattern (Klein, 1998); this suggests that much of expertise is intuition. 
In support of this idea, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) found that what is intuitive for the expert 
is often non-intuitive for the novice. Reber (1992) argues that tacit knowledge is coded 
abstractly within the brain, linked to the relevant stimuli, and Richman et al. (1996) also suggest 
that this is how expert knowledge is encoded. This concurrence, as well as evidence from 
protocol analysis that suggests that the detail of expert knowledge is often not accessible to the 
experts (Ericsson & Simon, 1984), suggests that much expert knowledge may be accessed 
through intuition. 
 
Experts can store and access virtually unlimited amounts of information in long term memory 
with the speed and reliability normally seen with working memory (Ericsson & Simon, 1984). 
Ericsson and Polson (1988) assert that expert improvement beyond normal short term memory 
capacity is due to more efficient use of long term memory. Experimental subjects generate long 
term memory codings of information using their existing knowledge. At the time of encoding, 
retrieval cues are incorporated into the memory trace and allow retrieval of the information 
(Ericsson & Polson, 1988). This is an example of encoding specificity at work, which again 
suggests that intuition may be the process used by experts to retrieve and utilise their vast store 
of knowledge when appropriate.  
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3.8 Summary 
 
This chapter has reviewed the research relating to the nature and workings of intuition. Intuition 
is generally non-conscious and so is not verbalisable or recallable, and can influence people’s 
actions without their conscious knowledge. Information can be perceived without being noticed, 
and can be processed and responded to without being stored in long term memory (Bowers, 
1984).  
 
Rasmussen (1993) and Wickens et al. (1998) distinguished intuitive, or rule-based, processing 
from automatic processing. Intuitive processing is not completely automatic, but is consistently 
unappreciated (Bowers, 1984). It is likely that intuition is not a cut and dried process; rather, it 
operates as part of a continuum between highly controlled and completely automatic processes 
(Isen & Diamond, 1989; Logan, 1985). People making a decision at the intuitive level on the 
SRK-based scale (Wickens et al., 1998) would often not be able to explain how they made the 
decision because it was based on stored memory associations rather than conscious reasoning. 
Because people processing intuitively cannot verbalise their thinking process in detail, intuition 
can seem mysterious or magical, whereas it is in fact simply very efficient.  
 
Because it is efficient, intuition is also generally faster than conscious forms of cognitive 
processing, and researchers agree that it is often correct but not infallible. It also seems likely 
that everybody is able to use intuitive processing although the type of task and how familiar 
they are with it will influence the type of processing they use. 
 
Intuition very likely uses somatic markers (or emotional states), which mark experiences when 
they are encoded and therefore allow them to be retrieved at an appropriate time. Intuitive 
processes may be utilised by experts in their advanced processing, as well as during insight 
problem solving and other tasks such as product use.  
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From the understanding developed through Chapters 2 and 3, a definition of intuition was 
formulated: 
 
Intuition is a type of cognitive processing that utilises knowledge gained 
through prior experience (stored experiential knowledge). It is a process 
that is often fast and is non-conscious, or at least not recallable or 
verbalisable.  
 
Chapter 4 will address the previous work on intuitive interaction with products and systems in 
the realms of product design and human–computer interaction as progress is made towards 
relating this understanding of intuition to product use. 
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Chapter 4  
 
Intuitive Interaction 
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4.0 Introduction 
 
The term “intuitive” as used in the design profession had not been clearly defined before this 
research began. No author had thoroughly addressed the issue. However, intuitive use of 
products has been mentioned (although not fully addressed) by a variety of authors in diverse 
literature. 
 
The Principles of Universal Design (UD), developed at the North Carolina State University 
Centre for Universal Design, include Principle Three: Simple and Intuitive Use. A product 
should “be consistent with user expectations and intuition” (NCSU, 1997). In 2000, one of the 
authors of the Principles stated that “we have not done any deep research in this area” and “the 
concept makes so much sense to me I never questioned it” (Story, 18/12/2000, personal 
communication). At the time of writing, a more detailed definition of simple and intuitive use 
has been added to the UD website: “Use of the design is easy to understand, regardless of the 
user's experience, knowledge, language skills, or current concentration level” (The Center for 
Universal Design, 2008). This has been applied by other researchers in UD (e.g. Beecher & 
Paquet, 2005), although the nature and application of intuitive use has not been thoroughly 
investigated by UD researchers. 
 
Davis (1996) mentions the desirability of encouraging users to perform tasks in an “…intuitive 
manner” (p118), but gives no further details about precisely what this means, or how it should 
be done. Taylor, Roberts and Hall (1999) state that “products should communicate their purpose 
and means of use in ways which allow intuitive use…” (p218). They do not define or expand on 
the concept of intuitive use. Parks (1998) claims that some domestic appliances are designed for 
intuitive use, although she does not cite any research into intuitive use, or any case studies on 
how it was designed into these appliances. IBM (2005) include "products should be natural and 
intuitive to use" as one of their ten user rights, but do not explain what they mean by it.  
 
Birkle and Jacob (1988) claim that they developed an intuitive interface for sound system 
software but do not describe the meaning of the word “intuitive” and do not explain what 
principles they applied to their interface to make it intuitive. Rosson and Carroll (2002) have 
produced a textbook to help student interface designers make usable interfaces. They make 
liberal use of the word intuitive without explaining exactly what they mean by it. Richards and 
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Compton (1998) claim that flexible and intuitive systems are needed. They equate intuitive 
interaction with user friendliness and present intuitive interaction as a good match between the 
things the user sees and does and what they feel to be appropriate, but do not explain further.  
 
None of these authors identified intuitive use well enough to make it possible to draw firm 
conclusions from their work. The more in-depth work relative to intuitive interaction applied to 
design is reviewed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. This review includes work where the meaning of 
intuitive use and/or interaction is defined, or where the assumed meaning is clear. It is separated 
into the product design and Human Computer Interaction (HCI) realms, as the depth of 
understanding of intuitive interaction differs slightly between these fields. This difference will 
be demonstrated in the following pages. 
 
4.1 Relevant Work in the Products Realm 
 
Rutter, Becka and Jenkins (1997) discuss the design of the Rapport ergonomic chair. The design 
team wrote into the brief that the adjustment of the settings for a wide variety of users should be 
“intuitive in terms of the logic of their operation” (p29). As an example, they mention that the 
design language of the lumbar support panel was borrowed from a cushion. It was felt that an 
intuitive reaction to any discomfort would be to adjust the panel as though it were a cushion 
behind the lower back. This relates intuitive use of a new product to previous experience with 
an existing one, but no research or justification for this is cited by the authors. 
 
Frank and Cushcieri (1997) present a case study about the design of an “intuitive” mechanical 
surgical grasper for minimum access (keyhole) surgery, where movement of the fingers was 
replicated by the movement of the grasper jaws. Many existing graspers are counter-intuitive in 
that the movement of the jaws does not correspond to the movement of the handles (Frank & 
Cushcieri, 1997; Roderick, 2001). The new grasper was developed in close collaboration 
between surgeon and designer, and it is possible to infer that this grasper was intuitive because 
it transferred its movement system from the actions surgeons would use to grasp an organ in 
their hand in traditional surgery. However, no reference is made to how the designers knew that 
this was intuitive.  
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Wiklund (2004) argues in support of intuitive interfaces for medical equipment. He defines 
intuitiveness as initial ease of use, based on instructions in the device and existing knowledge 
and skills. Wiklund (2004) recommends standardising interfaces between brands so that they 
are the same in each ward, and comments that nurses become frustrated when interfaces 
contradict their expectations. He asserts that standardisation of controls and symbols will make 
experience with them transferable, again revealing an understanding of intuitive use as based on 
past experience with similar devices.  
 
Murakami (1995) developed a physical input device that allowed deformation of a foam cube 
which was translated into deformation of a CAD drawing on a screen. He calls this “direct and 
intuitive” throughout the paper. It is easy to see that interaction is direct; in direct manipulation 
everything is done graphically instead of in an abstract medium like a programming language 
(Hutchins, Hollan, & Norman, 1986). This is beneficial as direct manipulation interfaces allow 
the interface to disappear so that users feel directly engaged with the task (Hutchins et al., 
1986). Hutchins et al. (1986) argue that direct manipulation interfaces amplify a user’s 
knowledge of a domain and allow them to think in familiar terms, so that even novices can 
perform a task if they are familiar with the task domain and appropriate icons are used to depict 
that domain. This goes some way to linking direct and intuitive manipulation, but this link is not 
explained by either Murakami (1995) or Hutchins et al. (1986). 
 
Vroubel, Markopoulos and Bekker (2001) developed a prototype of a home messaging 
appliance. The driving design principles were simplicity of the application and intuitiveness of 
interaction. They wished to let people maintain current habits, and thought users should be able 
to use the device without directions or explanation. User trials showed that even those without 
computer expertise found it easy to transfer their knowledge of pen, paper and calendars to this 
application. All participants were comfortable using the system within five minutes. These 
authors also provide no definition of intuitiveness but the information reported implies that easy 
transfer of existing knowledge is the key.  
 
Thomas and van-Leeuwen (1999) present a case study describing the design of two mobile 
phones. One objective was that the phones should allow simple calls to be made intuitively. The 
concepts that were developed used conventional dialling behaviour and allowed users to apply 
their existing experience. Usability test results suggested that users would learn how to operate 
the interface quickly, and the phones were acclaimed in the press for their unprecedented 
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usability. Thomas and van-Leeuwen (1999) imply that inexperienced users are the ones who 
need tasks to be intuitive, and they applied users’ existing experience to make a task intuitive. 
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that they also believed that experience contributes to intuitive 
use. However, they do not define exactly what they mean by “intuitive”. 
 
Ardey (1998) designed an automated cockpit system for light aircraft according to what he calls 
the “principles of intuitive use” (p14-1). He does not define exactly what he means by this but 
he presents intuition as being the only processing mechanism available when attentional 
resources are limited. Therefore, he designed the cockpit to be easy and simple to use even 
when the pilot has his/her attention focused elsewhere. This system, for example, enables pilots 
to undertake trouble shooting on any system of the aircraft; in the past, only extremely 
experienced pilots could do this and only under low workload conditions. One of the criteria 
followed was intuitive perception, which is not explained at all, but Ardey also mentions 
tradition as another criterion, giving a hint that he may be linking intuition with past experience. 
Ardey claims that the revised shape and arrangement of input devices support “processes of 
intuitive acting…” (p14-7) but does not explain what these processes or actions may be. 
 
Dixon and O'Reilly (2002) conducted a research project into intuitive use. They argue that prior 
experience leads to intuitive interaction, and declare that adults almost never learn completely 
new procedures. Instead, they adapt previously learned ones. Where there is no relevant, 
previously learned procedure, people generally perform very poorly, even if a task is equivalent 
in difficultly to other tasks. For example, when Global Positioning Systems appeared, they were 
totally new products with very little reference to anything else, whereas a new phone or printer 
would refer to procedures and features that have been previously learned. Thus, tasks of 
equivalent difficulty are completed more easily with phones or printers. Dixon and O'Reilly 
(2002) make the assumption that most new procedures are successful because they are similar 
to old ones, and that most procedural learning is therefore critically dependent on prior 
knowledge of similar tasks.  
 
Dixon and O'Reilly’s (2002) work started from a solid foundation, by basing intuitive use on 
past experience. However, their classification scheme of procedures relied on plans, which have 
been largely superseded (Suchman, 1987). Clark (1997) explains that the work on classical 
planning assumed that complex sets of actions are determined by an internalised version of 
some set of instructions. However, looking closely at the real world behaviours of planning 
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agents (humans, robots or simulations), it has become clear that there is a rather more complex 
interplay between plans and the supporting environment that extends far beyond simple 
feedback. The problem solving methods of biological brains do not really follow the plan-as- 
program model (Clark, 1997). Instead, individuals deploy general strategies which incorporate 
operations upon the world as an intrinsic part of the problem-solving activity. Therefore, basing 
their classification scheme on plans was a poor decision for Dixon and O'Reilly. 
 
Dixon and O'Reilly divided interface similarity into three types: functional similarity 
(procedures that involve the same sequence of sub-goals); procedural similarity (situations 
where the same steps are used to achieve a given sub-goal); and interface similarity (where the 
same motor control schema is used for a given step). Their experiments involved people 
learning precisely controlled artificial tasks in a laboratory and then attempting to transfer this 
learning onto a new interface. However, this approach does not control or even take into 
account other previous experience or stereotypes that participants may have, so it is not 
ecologically valid.  
 
They found minimal or non-existent effects of functional similarity, and state that this may be 
because of the participants’ prior experience of other devices (which again exposes the 
weakness of their experiment design). They include appearance of button labels in procedural 
similarity and found a lot of difference between performance on training and transfer interfaces 
for this type of similarity (benefits from having previously learned the steps in the same order). 
Their interpretation of this is that this effect is not at the level of sub-goals or internal states of 
the device and does not involve reasoning about the device and how it works. They tested 
interface similarity by such manipulations as varying positions of buttons. The results showed 
some benefit from familiar layout but the performance measure (“transfer”) is their own 
logarithmic scale and is not explained. From the graphs published, it seems unlikely that this 
difference is significant. However, it was found that the same effect of button layout was 
observed whether the labels on the buttons were the same or different. Layout is likely to make 
a difference in this context as there is only one task previously learned from one interface, 
rather than many tasks from many products as in the real world. Also, the task was learned 
immediately prior to the transfer task so would have been easier to remember. Obviously, there 
is more to interface design than location and this author would argue that appearance is part of 
interface design, not part of procedure.  
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Dixon and O'Reilly (2002) claim that there was little effect in manipulating the graphics, fonts 
and logos. However, they do not report how they did this, or with what rationale. They claim 
that having the same button name helped very little if the steps were performed in a different 
order. This may apply if the task is a unique one only just learned (as in this case) but not 
necessarily with real tasks and button names and/or icons that are truly familiar. The main 
problems with this work are the lack of ecological validity (which is a serious confound), the 
absence of statistical analysis and the failure to explain the logarithm used for the measurement 
of success. Their reliance on outdated plans and sub-goal work, and the way in which they 
classified the different types of similarity, are also points of weakness. 
 
Although many of these authors do not spell out what they mean by intuition or intuitive 
interaction, and despite that fact that the term “intuitive” has been over-used and under-
explained in the literature, it can be inferred that most of them assume it is related to past 
experience and can be applied to products by using familiar features that users have seen before. 
The success of this approach has been demonstrated by Vroubel et al. (2001), Thomas and van-
Leeuwen (1999) and Frank and Cushcieri (1997), who all induced what could be called intuitive 
interaction by including familiar features in their designs. It seems that intuitive interaction has 
been applied but not necessarily categorised in the product design arena. 
 
4.2 Relevant Work in Human–Computer Interaction (HCI) 
 
Allen and Buie (2002) review various words used by usability specialists, one of which is 
“intuitive”. They argue that a rich and evocative word like intuitive is wasted if it sits in a “fog 
of uncertain associations” (p18). Their definition is: “an intuitive interface asks no more of a 
user than what he already knows or can immediately deduce from previous life experience” 
(p18). This clearly relates intuitive interaction to past experience.  
 
Raskin (1994) also discusses possible meanings of intuitive as it is commonly used to describe 
interfaces and concludes that intuitive equals familiar. He states that “it is clear that a user 
interface feature is ‘intuitive’ insofar as it resembles or is identical to something the user has 
already learned” (p18), and that “Intuitive = uses readily transferred, existing skills” (p18). He 
also comments that “…something cannot become intuitive over time, it is either intuitive or it is 
not” (p17). In this last statement he contradicts himself as this is an instance where the word 
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“familiar” cannot be substituted for “intuitive” – things can become familiar over time. Raskin 
himself claims to avoid using the term intuitive, believing it to be associated with the 
paranormal, and preferring to use familiar instead. None of the intuition literature associates 
intuition with the paranormal, although this may be an association made in popular culture in 
some places. The use of familiar to mean intuitive can also be misleading as intuition is a 
cognitive process, and intuitive use of a product or interface involves a cognitive process. 
Familiarity is not a cognitive process, so it is not an adequate term to describe what is 
happening. It can be used to describe interfaces or their specific features that have been part of a 
person’s past experience (to a greater or lesser extent) and that is the context in which the term 
familiar is used in this book.  
 
There has been, possibly due to Raskin’s (1994) easily accessible paper, more of a general 
understanding of a meaning of intuitive (as related to familiarity) in the HCI field than the 
design field. This is reflected in the larger body of research that has been generated in HCI 
which addresses or mentions the issue. However, there are still no authors who have 
investigated the issue thoroughly and most have not defined what they mean by intuitive use. 
 
In relating what he sees as the desirable qualities of a friendly system, Galitz (1989) relates 
several terms to intuitive use: natural (operations should mimic the worker’s behaviour patterns, 
thought processes and vocabulary); predictable (system actions should be expected within the 
context of the other actions that are performed); and self-explanatory (steps to complete a 
process should be obvious). All of these qualities depend on prior knowledge of similar things. 
 
Bielenberg (1992) claims that “intuitive” is not an ideal way to describe an interface and that 
any interface must be learned at some level and thus is not intuitive. However, he also claims 
that the nipple is the only intuitive interface, which reveals that he may have been confusing 
intuitive with “innate”. He cites no intuition research or definitions but has made his own 
assumptions about the nature of intuition, assuming that it relates not to past experience, but to 
instinct. He goes on to advocate the mental model approach to interface design, claiming that 
there will always be an underlying task structure that fits naturally. This approach assumes that 
every user has the same mental model, whereas Marchionini (1995) claims that each individual 
user possesses unique mental models, experiences, abilities and preferences. Bielenberg does, 
however, mention that a familiar metaphor turns something unfamiliar into something familiar 
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which can, in turn, tap into a previously established mental model. Thus, some understanding of 
the role of previous experience in intuition is evident.  
 
Spool (2005) argues that it is very hard to make an interface seem intuitive. It is a word he hears 
frequently from participants in user tests. He talks about the knowledge gap between the current 
knowledge point and the target knowledge point, very clearly relating intuitive use to prior 
experience, although not quite defining intuitive. The knowledge gap is where design happens: 
design is not needed prior to the current knowledge point or after the target knowledge point. 
He stresses that designers need to design in this gap to make target and current knowledge 
coincide. They can do this in two ways: train the user, or reduce the knowledge necessary by 
making the interface easier to use. Spool (2005) argues that most good design (at least in 
software) does both. He has discovered in the course of his work with users that there are two 
conditions where users will tell a designer when an interface seems intuitive: when both current 
knowledge point and target knowledge point are identical (the user knows everything s/he needs 
already); or the points are separate but the user is unaware of this as the design is bridging the 
gap (the user is being trained in a way that seems natural). Spool’s short paper is written for 
practitioners and firmly relates intuitive use to past experience, with some strong arguments 
from user testing and field studies. However, no rigorous research is cited. 
 
Barker and Schaik (2000) define the intuitiveness of an icon as “the ease with which a user can 
deduce its meaning without having had any previous experience of it (within a computer 
interface)” (p162), and Wright, Fields and Harrison (2000) state that novice users’ choice of 
menu names is informed by their knowledge of everyday meanings of the labels used. These 
workers seem to agree that intuitive use of features is based on past experience with similar 
things that can be transferred to new interfaces.  
 
McMullen (2001) reports on a project aimed at developing an intuitive library website for a 
university. She found that students did not possess enough information literacy to fulfil their 
research needs with the current site as the site was not intuitive for those who had no previous 
research experience. Those unfamiliar with research and research resources would need 
instruction and explanation in a manner that was clearly understandable from the initial screen. 
This suggests that McMullen has linked intuition with existing knowledge or experience, but 
she does not articulate this and intuitive is not defined.  
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Knopfle and Voss (2000) designed a software-based design review tool for the car industry that 
would allow changes to be made to Virtual Reality (VR) CAD representations rather than 
physical models. They used a familiar scenario (the design review meeting) and electronic 
versions of familiar tools that would normally be used for the same task (e.g. rulers) to make 
their intuitive interface. They also borrowed metaphors from other familiar products (such as 
jog dials from video cassette recorders) to make the VR environment more familiar to users. No 
testing is reported, and the authors have not defined the concept of intuitive use, although they 
do convey the idea that familiar features will make an interface intuitive.   
 
Raisamo and Raiha (2000) designed an alignment stick for use with CAD applications. They 
employed users’ existing drawing habits by adopting metaphors as close to the real world as 
possible (the metaphor they used was a ruler). They also tested their design using physical 
rulers and shapes before they even began to write the programme, making sure that they had a 
good idea of what happened in the real world before creating an appropriate metaphor. They 
conducted an experiment to compare time on task and subjective preferences, with participants 
using the alignment stick, a palette or a pull-down menu. The stick was significantly faster for 
the simpler tasks but significantly slower for the more complex task. Subjective ratings of 
naturalness showed no significant differences between the three methods and there was also no 
significant difference in accuracy between the methods. However, the authors felt that the stick 
was intuitive because users who had no previous experience of drawing programs could draw 
on other experiences in order to use the stick, and they state that intuitive interfaces are based 
on previous experience.  
 
Lehikoinen and Roykkee (2001) designed an interaction system for wearable computers (N-
fingers). They wanted the technique to be efficient and natural as they envisaged that such 
computers would be used while the wearers were also performing other tasks. They claim that 
the design is intuitive and easy to learn. The interface works by sensing the thumb touching the 
first two fingers. After an iterative design and testing process, the researchers developed a glove 
that utilised a layout based on the curser keys of a keyboard. This proved to be successful when 
compared with the same task using a keyboard during testing, and was as fast as a standard 
keyboard. Users judged it to be logical and easy to use, and the authors conclude that it is an 
intuitive technique. They argue that the intuitiveness of N-fingers would allow it to be operated 
even with external sources of distraction if users were doing other tasks. These authors applied 
users’ previous experience with cursor keys to an entirely new product and users found it 
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natural to use; this is more evidence for the thesis that applying familiar features to a new 
product can make it intuitive. 
 
Hummels, Smets and Overbeeke (1998) conducted two experiments to explore how designers 
use gestures to demonstrate a three dimensional shape. Hummels et al. (1998) define intuitive 
interfaces as “…interfaces that can be used without learning…” (p198). They conclude that a 
totally intuitive gestural interface would be possible. Dorfmuller-Ulhaas and Schmalstieg 
(2001) and O'Hagan, Zelinsky and Rougeaux (2002) are also working on this type of 
technology and  agree that gestural interfaces would be more intuitive than traditional VR 
approaches. Kang (1998) designed a system of hands-free VR navigation and claims it is 
“simple, intuitive and unobtrusive” (p247). This was done using facial pose tracking which the 
design team present as a step towards the development of human-centric computer interfaces 
that allow humans to interact with computers using natural speech and gestures.  
 
These gestural studies suggest that intuitive use could be induced by using more “natural” 
gestures or movements than traditional interfaces allow. These types of gestures (those which 
people learn from childhood in order to interact with others) are possibly based on formative 
sets of stimuli to somatic pairings formed in childhood and adolescence (Damasio, 1994). 
According to the connectionist theories, the connections required for these responses or gestures 
are reinforced by constant use and so would be very strongly preferred. This could be what 
makes them seem so natural, even though they need to be transferred into a different context. In 
addition, people tend to interact with computer technologies as though they were 
communicating with other people (Janlert & Stolterman, 1997); this could be another advantage 
of gestural and other interfaces being closely based on existing human interaction habits.  
 
Okoye (1998) produced a thesis detailing her study on intuitive graphical user interfaces 
(GUIs). She does not discuss what intuition or intuitive use is, providing no definitive meaning 
of intuition. She defines an intuitive interface as one that allows novice users of computer 
applications to be productive with little or no training, and which allows ease of learning and 
recall, and subjective satisfaction. Okoye (1998) stresses that “the element of familiarity is the 
most crucial cognitive factor in making an interface intuitive…” (p40), stating that intuition can 
be added to an interface by adding familiarity, and citing Raskin (1994). However, she does not 
explain the theoretical foundation for this definition. 
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The aim of her project was to use a metaphor-based mental model as the foundation for the 
intuitive design. Okoye’s goal of applying metaphor to interfaces was to evoke a certain mental 
model already built by the user, with the metaphor acting as a catalyst or trigger. Therefore, the 
target user community must be familiar with the metaphor, which must have a definitive 
meaning or structure so that when it is invoked, everyone knows what to expect. Okoye (1998) 
first conducted tests in which people were asked to link various icons with their meanings. The 
icons were designed in three groups: intuitive (based on familiar things), Windows-style and 
random. She claims that this research suggested groups of users could share a mental model. 
The testing she did revealed that users had a shared understanding about what familiar icons 
meant, which does support the idea that intuitive interaction is based on familiarity and 
experience. However, an icon is not a model. A mental model of a whole product or system is 
implied by the use of the term “mental model”. 
 
Okoye (1998) then designed and tested her Intuitive Metaphor Mental Model based interface, 
comparing it again with a Windows-based and a random interface. She used time on task as an 
index of ease of use, and a subjective survey instrument to measure user interaction satisfaction. 
The intuitive interface performed better and she contends that the users had the support and 
guidance of a model in long-term memory which enabled them to use the interface intuitively. 
Again, this research supports the idea of experience enabling intuitive use, but the use of the 
mental model approach does not appear to be justified. Some psychologists have suggested that 
mental models are supposed to describe cognition and are not suitable to apply to systems 
design (Rutherford & Wilson, 1991).  
 
It is unclear whether or not there is any reliable way to predict what a mental model might be 
and how to trigger it. Okoye (1998) claims to have done this but is not completely convincing. 
Okoye cites studies which show that people do form mental models; however, she also details 
failed attempts by other researchers to apply them to interfaces. She saw hers as the first 
successful attempt but it is difficult to see how her work really relates to mental models. 
 
Smith, Irby, Kimball and Verplank (1982) report on the revolutionary Star Interface which was 
designed by Xerox. It had one of the first “what you see is what you get” (WYSIWYG) GUIs 
and was the first to use the office desktop metaphor. This was an object-oriented interface and 
much simplified the interaction process. This made it very different from the code-based 
operating systems that were prevalent at the time, and started to open up computing to the 
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general public, rather than just enthusiasts. The authors argue that when everything is visible, 
the display becomes reality; the user model becomes identical with what is on the screen.  
 
One of the design principles was to allow user experience in one area to apply in others. The 
principles used to design the interface included familiar users’ model, universal commands 
across the system, and consistency. The team decided that the metaphor of the physical office 
was appropriate to the experience of prospective users and created electronic counterparts of the 
physical objects in an office. Therefore, users were not exposed to entirely new concepts all at 
once, as much of their existing knowledge was embedded in this base. The team did this to 
make the electronic world seem more familiar, less alien and require less training; and their 
experiences with users and the continued use of similar metaphors have confirmed that this 
worked. 
 
Their intention was that users would “intuit” things to do with icons (Smith et al., 1982, p258). 
They predicted that, if the Star interface modelled the real world accurately enough so that 
familiar ways of working and existing concepts and knowledge were preserved, and if there was 
sufficient uniformity in the system, and principles and generic were commands applied 
throughout, then the system would allow lessons learned in one area to be applied to others. The 
Star team believed that people do use their existing knowledge when confronted with new 
situations, and based the design of the system on that knowledge so that people could intuit new 
uses for the features (Smith et al., 1982). These authors clearly imply that intuitive use depends 
on previous experience, although they do not define intuition or cite any research into intuition 
and past experience. 
 
Perkins, Keller and Ludolph (1997) report on the design process for the Lisa user interface, an 
early GUI developed by Apple . The Lisa team had contact with the Star team during the 
development process through a share deal; also, some of the people were on both teams. The 
authors claim that the use of graphics in interaction set Lisa apart from its competitors and went 
a long way towards making the system friendly, usable and enjoyable. They mentioned that 
“intuitive icons” (Perkins et al., 1997, p42) could be designed to indicate certain messages to 
the user. As with Star, the desktop metaphor was employed. The development team felt that the 
interface needed something familiar to the office worker in order to gain acceptance, and they 
believed that through graphical representation of the familiar desktop, the icons and controls 
shown on the screen would become more real and the interface would begin to disappear. 
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Perkins et al. (1997) claim that an interface would be intuitive if modelled on documents and 
other office-based objects instead of unfamiliar computer concepts. Again, it seems that they 
linked intuitiveness with familiarity but, unlike Okoye (1998) and like the Star team, they aimed 
to design intuitive icons rather than complicating the issue by relating it to mental models. The 
team also planned for all applications to be similar in appearance and employ commands that 
would be common to each other so that users would interact with all Lisa applications in the 
same manner. Perkins et al. (1997) conclude that the team combined clear, concise presentation 
and an intuitive, smoothly operating set of controls with a distinctive style and therefore 
popularised a new way of working with computers. 
 
Workers in the HCI field have a much clearer idea of the nature of intuition and intuitive use, 
and intuitive use is generally accepted as being associated with familiarity. Although many 
authors write about intuitive use without defining it, their belief that intuitive use depends on 
past experience does come through fairly clearly. Intuitive interaction has been successfully 
applied to early and subsequent GUIs and to recent websites, wearable computers and VR 
software. This makes it a relevant, current (though little understood) design tool. The HCI 
tradition has tackled intuitive interaction more fully than the product design arena, and Raskin’s 
(1994) definition is possibly the reason for this greater willingness to tackle the issue in HCI in 
recent years. Despite the greater depth of understanding in the HCI fields, no authors had 
established empirically how people can use things intuitively, and exactly how designers can 
apply familiar things to an interface in order to make it intuitive prior to the work described in 
this book.  
 
4.3 Summary 
 
The concept of intuitive interaction has been widely mentioned and even applied but never 
addressed in depth. Several authors (for example, Ardey, 1998; Birkle & Jacob, 1988; Frank & 
Cushcieri, 1997; Kang, 1998; Knopfle & Voss, 2000; McMullen, 2001; Murakami, 1995; 
Okoye, 1998; Perkins et al., 1997; Rutter et al., 1997; Smith et al., 1982; Thomas & van-
Leeuwen, 1999; Vroubel et al., 2001) discuss with varying degrees of detail how they applied 
intuitive use  to new designs. However, none of them describe in sufficient detail exactly how 
products and systems can be designed to encourage intuitive interaction. Some do not define 
what they mean by intuitive or intuitive use, not even saying explicitly that they used familiar 
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features in their designs; and many who discuss using familiar metaphors or symbols for new 
interfaces do not describe in detail how they decided what would be familiar to target users. 
Some of these authors used a mental models approach to applying intuitive use to software (not 
a successful or appropriate approach in all situations), and those who assumed a mental model 
for the users did not convincingly argue that a model can be correctly assumed. 
 
In some of the literature, interfaces, features or icons are given the attribute “intuitive”. 
However, the interface, product or feature itself cannot have the trait intuitive, or even 
“familiar”, as that depends on the experience of the users; it is a characteristic of the user, not 
the product. The terms “intuitive interface” and “intuitive product” are misnomers. Spool 
(2005) agrees that an interface itself cannot be intuitive, although he sees nothing wrong with 
using the terms “intuitive interface” and “intuitive design”. One could more correctly say that 
an interface is designed to be intuitive for a certain user group, or one can talk about the process 
of intuitive interaction with a product, but stating that an interface itself is intuitive could be 
misleading. It is likely that this looser use of the term will continue among researchers, 
practitioners, marketers and users; and, although trying to prevent that may be futile, the 
distinction is useful if researchers and designers are to think clearly and carefully about what 
they are doing.  
 
This review has shown that intuitive interaction has, in most cases, been related to familiarity 
and prior experience and some authors have successfully applied these ideas to designing 
interfaces. Chapters 6-9 report on research that goes further in empirically establishing how 
intuitive interaction and familiarity are related and how the different aspects of an interface 
design can affect intuitive interaction. Prior to this, Chapter 5 will explore the various theories 
that relate to intuitive interaction with products and systems in order to place intuition (as 
applied to interaction) within a theoretical framework. 
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Chapter 5  
 
Intuitive Interaction, Artefacts and Interfaces 
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5.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to position this research within the fields of Human Factors, HCI and Design, 
and to show how it relates to existing theory and practice in these areas. Since the existing work 
in intuitive interaction itself is limited, this chapter looks at what these related areas can 
contribute to a better understanding of intuitive interaction. It starts by relating previous work 
done on the importance of prior knowledge – the area most directly related to intuitive 
interaction. Other areas covered include usability, the ecological approach and affordances, 
population stereotypes and mapping, applying metaphor, consistency and, finally, product 
semantics. 
 
5.1 Prior Experience 
 
There is general consensus about the importance of designing artefacts that relate to users’ prior 
experience and familiarity – particularly in HCI, but also with growing force in design. This has 
been related to intuitive use and discussed in Chapter 4. For example, when describing a “good” 
design, Preece et al. (2002) talk about the advantage of using familiar things in an interface and 
recommend representing basic functions in terms of the behaviour of everyday objects, which 
capitalises on ubiquitous everyday actions. Learned conventions, once accepted by a cultural 
group, become universally accepted; for example, the use of windowing and icons on desktops 
(Preece et al., 2002). To make systems easy to learn, Preece et al. (2002) believe designers 
should capitalise on users’ existing knowledge. For example, a CAD system does not teach a 
person how to draw, but should be able to utilise what they know about drawing to allow them 
to learn the system quickly and easily. 
 
As people use their existing knowledge when they are confronted with new situations, the 
design of a system should be based on that knowledge (Bonner, 1998; Kellogg, 1989). Rettig 
(1991) opines that people try things out, think them through and try to relate what they already 
know to what is going on. They do not read abstract manuals; instead, they apply their previous 
experience to a problem. Wickens and Seidler (1995) suggest that familiarity is a good reason 
for design decisions, and Wickens et al. (1998) recommend designing interfaces to be consistent 
with experience, stating that old habits die hard and transfer positively to new products or 
systems. Fischer (1991) also recommends that designers should exploit what people already 
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know, and use familiar representations which are based on previous knowledge and analogous 
to known situations. 
 
Weiss (2002) recommends that designers borrow from well-designed applications when user 
interface standards are not available or not adequately developed. Designers should not invent 
new interfaces when one of the existing ones will do the job well, but should be consistent and 
use existing icons as much as possible. New icons for old concepts will confuse users.  
 
Pearson and van Schaik (2003) investigated the role of prior experience in website navigation. 
They found that, although using blue hyperlinks may be wrong according to some studies (red 
should be more readily perceivable), they are familiar, and time saved by knowing what to do is 
probably much greater than time saved by having a word in a colour that is quicker to read (this 
may be partly because users do not need to read most links in detail anyway). An automatic 
attention response is formed if a user consistently searches the same environment for the same 
information and the information is always represented in the same way (Pearson & van Schaik, 
2003). Blue links resulted in fewer errors and faster correct responses. Also, in the more 
realistic of the search tasks, blue links were found to be significantly quicker to use. Pearson 
and van Schaik (2003) also found that the most preferred locations for the navigation bar were 
firstly on the left (most common on existing sites) and then at the top (another common position 
on current sites). 
 
Smart, Whiting and DeTienne (2001) discuss user tests in which users who lacked awareness of 
the system and of the online help facility could not complete the task. However, users familiar 
with several software applications frequently applied what they knew from other applications 
when they encountered a problem or used the help menu. These users had problems when an 
application’s conventions differed from those that they had previously experienced.  
 
Bocker and Suwita (1999) tested complex mobile phone prototypes and found that Windows-
experienced participants needed less time and fewer attempts to do the tasks, consulted the 
manual less frequently, and indicated less frequently that the next step was unclear. Windows 
users agreed that the phones were easy to use and understand, were familiar, and did not require 
much thinking. They were significantly more pleased with the phones than Windows novices, 
and were able to transfer computer-based skills to a handheld device. Owners of mobile phones 
also drew on their experience with their own phones, some of which had different procedures 
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for particular tasks, and for some tasks, mobile phone owners consulted the manual more often 
than non-owners (a case of negative transfer). However, mobile phone owners rated the 
prototypes more frequently as user friendly and fun to use, and they indicated more frequently 
than non-owners that they would use them themselves. There were no significant differences 
between the two interface types (icon and text) that were tested, so familiarity was more 
important than icon or interface type. 
 
Since the work reported in Chapters 6-10 was completed, Langdon, Lewis, & Clarkson (2007) 
and Lewis, Langdon and Clarkson (2008) have undertaken empirical research on the effects of 
prior knowledge on the use of consumer products (digital cameras, cars and microwaves). They 
found that relevant prior experience led to significantly faster times and fewer errors on set 
tasks. 
 
Van Rompay, Hekkert and Muller (2005) made an exploratory attempt to apply experientialism 
to design. Using the image schema ideas put forward by Johnson (1987), they argue that 
artefacts can make reference to structural properties of image schemata, resulting in a particular 
experience-related expression. They asked students to demonstrate (on a scale) to what extent a 
series of terms described a selection of chairs. The terms were based on the four main image 
schemata: container, back/front, balance and size. They found that many of the terms indeed 
seemed to relate to the relevant schema. However, the way in which they have linked the chairs 
and the schemata through linguistic terms seems to be one step removed, and translating bodily 
experience through language may not be the best way to investigate this issue. Assuming that 
this kind of knowledge may be non-conscious and that linguistic terms may have all sorts of 
other meanings (unrelated to the schemata) for different people, observation of real interaction 
would be more useful. Van Rompay et al. (2005), while acknowledging that their work is 
speculative and that more needs to be done, claim that their findings point towards a schema-
based structuring of product form expression, and that products may be understood as 
expressing characteristics related to bodily experiences. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, intuition and intuitive interaction rely on previous experience. This 
review has shown that prior experience does seem to lead to faster interaction with fewer errors. 
Also, the concept of prior experience has been accepted and successfully applied to interface 
design, although in some cases it may have been done in a rather ad-hoc way.  
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5.2 Usability 
 
The official definition of usability is “...the effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction with which 
specified users can achieve specified goals in particular environments” (ISO DIS 9241-11, in 
Jordan, 1998, p5). 
 
Working from the International Standards Organisation (ISO) definition, Jordan (1998) explains 
his model of usability, developed to take into account three levels of task performance: 
guessability, learnability and experienced user performance (EUP). “Guessability” involves 
using a product to perform a new task for the first time, and is important for products that have 
a high proportion of one-off users (Jordan, 1998). Jordan defines “learnability” as the ease with 
which users reach some competent level of performance with a task, but excluding the special 
difficulties involved with doing it for the first time. “Experienced user performance” refers to 
the relatively consistent performance of someone who has used a product many times before to 
perform particular tasks. Jordan also added two extra components of usability: system potential 
(the upper level of EUP) and re-usability (which refers to how easily users can get back into 
using a product after a comparatively long period away from it). 
 
Nielsen (1993) splits usability into five measurable attributes: learnability, efficiency, 
memorability, errors and satisfaction. “Learnability” applies to novice users and incorporates 
what Jordan calls guessability. “Efficiency” refers to the ease and speed with which experienced 
users use a system and is equivalent to Jordan’s experienced user performance. “Memorability” 
(equivalent to Jordan’s re-usability) mainly applies to casual or occasional users. To a great 
extent, good learnability will tend to contribute to good memorability (Nielsen, 1993). Stanton 
and Baber (1996) split usability into eight factors: learnability, effectiveness, attitude, 
flexibility, perceived usefulness or utility of the product, task match, task characteristics and 
user characteristics. They argue that ISO 9241 falls short of a comprehensive definition and that 
usability has been defined simply by what can be measured. 
 
To be usable, an interface must provide access to the functions and features of an application in 
a way that reflects users’ ways of thinking about the tasks they use it for. This requires that they 
must be able to interact with an application in ways that are intuitive and natural (Wood, 1998). 
However, prior to this work, no other authors had suggested how intuitive interaction fits into 
usability. It would appear that the concepts of learnability (Jordan, 1998; Nielsen, 1993; Stanton 
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& Baber, 1996) and guessability (Jordan, 1998), as components of usability, are the most 
relevant to intuitive usability. Learnability has been linked to intuition (Thomas, 1996; Weiss, 
2002). Memorability (Nielsen, 1993; Stanton & Baber, 1996) or re-usability (Jordan, 1998) has 
been linked with learnability (Nielsen, 1993; Stanton & Baber, 1996), so may also have some 
applicability for intuitive interaction. Memorability is most important during the first use and 
the few subsequent uses that occur before the user has become reasonably familiar with the 
product, or when a user has become unfamiliar with the product through lack of use. One could 
say that the point of intuitive usability is to reduce the gap between guessability and 
experienced user performance, both stages of usability theorised by Jordan (1998). The 
relationship between usability and intuitive interaction has also recently been tackled by 
(Hurtienne & Blessing, 2007). 
 
Therefore, intuitive interaction is important for aspects of usability that relate to initial and 
occasional uses of products. It could have particular impact for products or interfaces that have 
many one-off or occasional users, but could also make all sorts of products easier to learn and 
provide more positive first time experiences of them. 
 
5.3 The Ecological Approach 
 
A consequence of the computer metaphor of information processing (eg, Bailey, 1996; Wickens 
et al., 1998) is that context or background can be ignored or conveniently boxed to fit within the 
type of flow diagrams prevalent (Hayes, 1995). This leads to limited understanding of what 
people say and do to one another, and how they interact with the world. Traditionally, Hayes 
claims, cognitive psychologists see people’s thinking as independent of their social, cultural and 
biological context. Winograd and Flores (1986) concur that a more holistic approach (where the 
environment is taken into account) is needed.  
 
First mooted by Gibson (1977), the ecological theory of perception is based on the fact that the 
human perceptual system is designed to operate in the environment and, therefore, the study of 
perception should begin with analysis of this environment and the information it makes 
available (Neisser, 1987). One of the fundamental commitments of the ecological approach is 
that it is not possible to understand human behaviour without simultaneously understanding the 
context or environment in which people are acting (Hayes, 1995; Vicente, 1997).  
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In light of the proposition that cognition is embodied (Section 2.3), Gibson’s ideas have been 
given new perspective. Many theorists in various fields share the idea that perception, action 
and cognitive systems cannot be considered as separated, and defend the claim that cognition is 
deeply grounded in sensory-motor processes (Clark, 1997; Damasio, 1994; Johnson, 1987; 
Varela et al., 1991). An implication of this view is that knowledge is anchored in experience 
and cannot be separated from perception and action.  
 
5.3.1 Defining Affordances 
 
Affordances are a central tenet of the ecological approach. Gibson (1977) defines them thus: 
“the affordances of the environment are what it offers animals, what it provides or furnishes, for 
good or ill” (p68). For example, he says that “if a surface is raised approximately to the height 
of a biped’s knees then it affords sitting on – whether it is a manufactured chair, a log or ledge, 
the affordance is the same” (Gibson, 1977, p68). The Gestalt psychologists called the 
affordance the “demand character” of an object (Bruce & Green, 1990; Gibson, 1977). It has 
also been called “invitation character” and “valence” (Gibson, 1977). Other definitions include: 
 
…the perceived and actual properties of the thing, primarily those 
fundamental properties that determine just how the thing could possibly 
be used (Norman, 1988, p9).  
 
…what some object or surface offers the perceiver (Bruce & Green, 
1990).  
 
…a specific combination of its substances and surfaces taken in 
reference to an individual (Zaff, 1995, p240).  
 
A particular environment has a given affordance if and only if it makes 
a kind of action possible… (Neisser, 1987, p21). 
 
…some intuitive way of using an artifact (Wright et al., 2000, p15). 
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5.3.2 Direct Perception and Mediation 
 
Whereas the value of something is assumed to change as the need of the observer changes, 
Gibson argues that the affordance of something does not.  Whether or not the affordance is 
perceived will change as the need of the observer changes but, being invariant, it is always there 
to be perceived (Gibson, 1977). Now, this is no longer true as digital products and computers 
can display different affordances depending on their state and the needs and wants of the user 
(Norman, 1993). This further demonstrates the division of control. 
 
One of Gibson’s (1977) hypotheses is that “the visual system of a mature observer can pick up 
this information [by direct perception] or else can be altered by perceptual learning so that it is 
picked up” (p80). However, he goes on to discuss how hidden affordances (which can be seen 
as equivalent to the division of control) have made this more problematic and it has become 
more necessary to learn rather than directly perceive. Nevertheless, Gibson (1977) concludes 
that (despite hidden affordances) “the basic affordances of the terrestrial environment are 
perceivable, and are usually perceivable directly, without an excessive amount of learning” 
(p82). Maybe basic is the operative word here. Microchip-based products are not basic any 
more, so affordances generally need to be things that have been previously learned.  
 
Mediation is the alternative to direct perception. The mediational account assumes that one 
must use inference, prior experience, expectancies or calculations to translate the affordance 
(Zaff, 1995). Vera and Simon (1993) claim, contrary to Gibson (1977), that the thing that 
corresponds to an affordance is stored in memory. This makes the understanding of affordances 
intuitive, not innate as some proponents of direct perception have seemed to suggest. 
 
5.3.3 Affordances and Intuitive Interaction 
 
Norman (1988) asserts that the thoughtful use of affordances and constraints in designs allows 
users to determine the proper course of action, even in a novel situation. Affordances have been 
much popularised and have been used to describe both physical and virtual interface objects 
(Preece et al., 2002). Norman (2004a) admits that, by popularising the use of the term 
“affordance” in the design community, he deviated from Gibson’s (1977) original definition. He 
has generalised the term to include emotional, social, and cultural affordances.  
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However, Norman (2004b) has recently tried to clarify the situation by talking about perceived 
and real affordances. Physical objects have real affordances – such as grasping – that are 
perceptually obvious and do not have to be learned. A physical object such as a door handle 
affords actions because it uses constraints; its physical properties constrain what can be done 
with it in relation to the person and the environment. However, a virtual object such as an icon 
button invites pushing or clicking because a user has learned initially that that is what it does. 
User interfaces that are screen-based do not have real affordances; they have perceived 
affordances, which are essentially learned conventions. Despite the slight confusion due to the 
use of the word “perceived”, and the potential for misunderstanding with Gibson’s idea of 
direct perception, this is a useful distinction – between “real” physical affordances that do not 
require learning beyond experience of being in the human body, and “perceived” affordances 
which are based on prior experience with similar things.  
 
The concept of affordance suggests a route to intuitive use. If physical affordances are applied 
to products then, according to the direct perception account, people should be able to use them 
successfully, and without difficulty, when first introduced to them. However, for more complex 
products, perceived affordances seem to be based on previous experience (Norman, 2004b), as 
maintained by the mediational account. It seems likely that physical affordances which are 
based on basic constraints that are dictated by the human body, can indeed be picked up directly 
by anyone with a normal physique, and could be archetypical. They are related to the body and 
what can be done with it, and the experience required to use them is limited to experience 
gained through being embodied in the world; there is no cultural knowledge of, or even 
experience with, similar things necessarily required here. It is possible that these types of 
affordances could be “picked up” directly as they are so simple and so directly related to the 
physical form. However, perceived affordances can be understood only by those who have 
experienced something similar that they can apply. Within many modern digital interfaces, 
affordances are not based on basic physical characteristics, and may even have no physical 
existence at all. Thus, they require prior experience.  
 
5.4 Activity Theory and Situated Action 
 
Activity Theory originated in USSR psychology in the 1920s. Its object is to understand the 
unity of consciousness and activity. Activity theorists believe that people are what they do, and 
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what they do is embedded in the social matrix, which is composed of people and artefacts 
(ranging from physical tools to language). 
 
An “activity” is a human action plus a “minimal, meaningful context” (Kuutti, 1996). The 
activity is the basic unit of analysis, although of course a person usually participates in several 
activities at once. Activities are not static and are undergoing constant change. An activity has 
its own history and always contains various artefacts (from products to laws or methods). 
Activities can be broken down into shorter-term steps of actions and operations (Kuutti, 1996). 
Chains or networks of actions and/or operations are linked by overall object and motive. 
Operations are well-defined and habitual routines used as answers to conditions during an 
action. Each operation starts off as an action; however, when a good model has been developed 
and the action has been practised enough, it becomes an operation, and a new action with 
broader scope is created (Kuutti, 1996). An operation can return to being an action if conditions 
change (action–operation dynamics). The border between action and activity is similarly 
flexible (Kuutti, 1996).  
 
Activity theorists believe that the internal side of an activity cannot exist without the external 
one. Cognitive processes develop or occur within the context of activities (Kuutti, 1996). The 
use of culture-specific tools shapes the way people act and, through internalisation, influences 
mental development. Tools are thus carriers of cultural and social experience (Kaptelinin, 
1996a). These artefacts have a mediating role between the actor (or subject) and the object of 
doing (Kuutti, 1996). Tools mediation is a way of transmitting cultural knowledge (Kaptelinin, 
1996b), and “all human experience is shaped by the tools and sign systems we use” (Nardi, 
1996, p10). This seems to be implicit learning using objects, where the object is the mediator in 
the learning process and the knowledge gained is often non-conscious.  
 
These ideas have some similarities to experientialism and embodiment. They also offer support 
for the idea that knowledge applied during intuitive interaction can be gained from using other 
tools. Activity theory helps to position intuitive interaction within the other types of cognitive 
processing that may occur during product interaction. Intuitive use could be seen as being less 
automated than the operation, and less conscious than the action. The amount of relevant 
experience a person has will determine at which level s/he is processing.  
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The central claim of Situated Action (SA), or situativity, is that cognitive activities should be 
understood as interactions between agents, physical systems and other people (Greeno & 
Moore, 1993). The term “situated action” was introduced by Suchman (1987), and underscores 
the view that every course of action depends on its material and social circumstances. Situated 
Action proponents also believe that once a task has become automatic, the tools or equipment 
effectively disappear. The user is no longer consciously solving a problem or planning; he or 
she is simply doing. The task is now a matter of detecting cues and responding to them with 
previously learned responses. Of course, the user still has the representation of the product that 
s/he made during the learning process, but at the highest level of functionality, the user is 
simply aware that s/he is performing a task (e.g. driving along a road), not how s/he is doing it.  
 
Vera and Simon (1993), Baber and Baumann (2002) and Norman (1993) all agree that tools 
should stay in the background, allowing the user to directly engage with the task. For example, 
“the most profound technologies are those that disappear. They weave themselves into the 
fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it" (Weiser, 1991, in Baber and 
Bauman, 2002, p285). However, when there is a problem, people become conscious of the 
activity and may try to formulate procedures or rules (Suchman, 1987). This has also been 
called breakdown, which Winograd and Flores (1986) explain as the moment when the 
properties of an artefact suddenly become apparent because of a problem. Until a system stops 
working, people are not consciously aware of the properties of the artefacts with which they are 
interacting; they are transparent. As with the activity theorists’ concept of action-operation 
dynamics, if there is a breakdown – such as a malfunction or an unfamiliar task or feature – the 
user can rely on the more detailed representations s/he learned to start with in order to solve the 
problem (Winograd & Flores, 1986).  
 
Breakdown could be seen as equivalent to the concept of using knowledge-based processing in 
the SRK model, and is mentioned by Baars in relation to consciousness. If there is a problem 
that cannot be dealt with unconsciously because there is not enough prior experience to go on, a 
person has to use knowledge-based processing to get through it. At this point the task becomes 
more conscious, and generally slower (Baars, 1988).  
 
Richards and Compton (1998) claim that breakdown can be minimised by providing an intuitive 
environment. It seems that artefacts which appear transparent and are used without much 
conscious awareness are used intuitively, and those used with no conscious awareness at all are 
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those used automatically. The ecological approach, activity theory and Situated Action are all 
based on studying people in the context of, and in interaction with, their environments. Action–
operation dynamics and breakdown appear to be equivalent processes and have similarities with 
the SRK model. The role of tools as mediators is also an important aspect that these types of 
approach have in common. Table 5.1 shows a break-down of the various theories, and 
demonstrates how these different ideas might refer to equivalent processes. 
Table 5.1 Dynamics of consciousness and processing according to various paradigms 
 
These approaches help to demonstrate how intuitive interaction may relate to some of the 
current theories of cognition and interaction, and how these processes are always dependent on 
the actor being familiar with the tool or interface with which s/he is interacting. 
 
5.5 Designing with Metaphor 
 
Metaphor was examined in Chapter 3. This section will address the application of metaphor to 
design. Metaphor and metonymy can be embodied visually in a product (Krippendorff, 1990), 
and a physical metaphor can simplify and clarify a system by using more general concepts 
(Smith et al., 1982). Smith (1998) suggests that a user will intuitively understand a metaphor 
from prior experience.  
 
System designers make frequent use of analogues, and tend to look for previous systems (i.e. 
existing products) to serve as analogues (Dent-Read et al., 1994). At present, however, the use 
of metaphor is ad hoc, with different metaphors being used for different parts of displays. 
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Designers do not consciously use guidelines or rules for incorporating metaphor into pictorial 
displays (Dent-Read et al., 1994).  
 
Domains that are well known to both designer and user can be used to coordinate displays and 
the actions the displays support. Designs that are not useful are those that employ topics not 
well known to the user (Dent-Read et al., 1994). Klein (1998) agrees that effective metaphors 
are those that trade on well learned behaviours so that the new task can be preformed smoothly, 
using skills that have been previously developed. Ineffective metaphors do not coordinate 
actions. For example, it is not helpful to apply a metaphor that presents a system in an aircraft 
as “sick”, as pilots do not have well learned reactions to sickness and how to address it. 
Experimental work has shown that it is far easier to make links using metaphors when surface 
features match, than when situations are similar in an abstract way (Bowden, 1997; Klein, 
1998). 
 
Rohlfs (1998) states that a metaphor may be represented through words on a screen (e.g. 
appropriate titles) or pictorially through icons or graphics. A metaphor which works well for 
novices may be considered superfluous for experts and, for a metaphor to be successful, it must 
be consistent with existing metaphors used in the workplace, sustainable throughout the 
interface, and extendible to new tasks. The choice of appropriate metaphors for an application is 
the most challenging and far-reaching decision on any project (Rohlfs, 1998). 
 
Application of experiential knowledge often takes place through the medium of metaphor 
(Benyon & Imaz, 1999; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1981). Rasmussen (1986) claims 
that intuition can be enabled by this sort of transfer.  This is what is required in a product: to 
enable a new part or feature to be reminiscent enough of something familiar so that immediate 
intuition from experience is possible (Rasmussen, 1986). Some designers of systems and 
products (particularly Graphical User Interfaces) have discussed the use of metaphor for 
improving intuitive usability (e.g. Okoye, 1998), although it has not been addressed in enough 
depth to be easily applicable.  
 
Some writers suggest that similarity of surface features is the most important consideration to 
allow transfer of meaning through a metaphor (Bowden, 1997; Klein, 1998; Kolodner, 1993). 
This means that designers can improve an interface (by creating successful interface features) 
without having to change the underlying structure of the system. This makes intuitive use 
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simpler and cheaper to apply to complex products than mental models, although a familiar 
underlying structure where possible will probably bring added benefits. On occasions when 
something already familiar can be applied to an interface, designers need not use a metaphor. 
However, a new type of product or feature may benefit from the application of a metaphor that 
links it to something more familiar, making it intuitive to use. 
 
5.6 Population Stereotypes 
 
Humans have assimilated a large number of arbitrary, unnatural mappings from products that 
were not designed to be usable but that they can use easily because they have learned to use 
them from a young age (Norman 1988, 1993). These are called population stereotypes. 
Population stereotypes define mappings that are more related to experience than any “natural” 
spatial layout (Bonner, 1998; Wickens, 1992), and derive largely from experience of natural 
phenomena or of cultural conventions. They are simply customs, but Smith (1981) claims that 
“expectations based on customary usage can be strongly compelling” (p306). Wu (1997) 
equates human expectations with population stereotypes.  
 
Crozier (1994) argues that population stereotypes should place constraints upon designers and 
indicate the meanings of functional properties of objects. Strong stereotypes are less vulnerable 
to stress, change of body position and use of the non-preferred hand (Loveless, 1963). When 
population stereotypes were conformed to, Asfour, Omachonu, Diaz and Abdel-Moty (1991) 
found that reaction or decision time was shorter; the first control movement the operator made 
was more likely to be correct; the operator could use the control faster and with greater 
precision; and could learn to use the control more rapidly.  
 
Population stereotypes have been studied since the 1950s (Smith, 1981). Many researchers have 
taken the scarcity of new work on this subject (compared to the post-war effort) as an indication 
that all possible research had been done (Simpson & Chan, 1988). However, Simpson and Chan 
(1988) claim that many issues remain unresolved, and many recommendations are still based on 
work done during the 1950s. A lot has changed since then in terms of the population itself and 
the mediating products that produce the stereotypes, so the existing work is by no means 
unequivocal (Simpson & Chan, 1988).  
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Loveless (1963) conducted a review of the work done on population stereotypes during the 
1940s, 1950s and early 1960s. From his review, the most firmly established, dominant and 
unambiguous stereotypes are those such as: up for increase, forward for up, clockwise for right 
and clockwise for up or increase. Also, an operator refers display movements to his/her line of 
sight, and control movements to the orientation of his/her body (Loveless, 1963). These are 
stereotypes that were established through the use of interfaces based on knobs, dials and sliders, 
but which can be transferred to digital interfaces. Loveless (1963), Wu (1997), Smith (1981), 
Simpson and Chan (1988) and Bailey (1996) agree that any proposed solution utilising 
population stereotypes needs to be tested for the appropriate population, as stereotypes will 
differ between user groups.  
 
The idea of population stereotypes seems highly relevant to intuitive usability. If designers can 
make features function in a stereotypical way, they should be familiar and, therefore, intuitive 
to use. However, the lack of recent work in this area means that there are few established 
stereotypes for digital products and interfaces that can be applied to the new products of the 21st 
century. Research is required to establish which of the conventions established over the past 
decades have achieved stereotypical status. 
 
5.7 Mapping and Stimulus–Response Compatibility 
 
Stimulus–response work in cognitive psychology has contributed to the Human Factors field 
and been extended through work on mapping and compatibility. Designers should exploit 
natural mappings, which are the basis of stimulus-response compatibility (Norman, 1988; 
Wickens, 1992; Wickens et al., 1998). Stimulus-response compatibility relates to the spatial 
relationships of controls and the object they are controlling. It is a concept that has been 
investigated since the 1950s (Smith, 1981), and is important because a system with a greater 
degree of compatibility will result in faster learning and response times, fewer errors and a 
lower mental workload (Wickens, 1987; Wu, 1997).  
 
Stimulus-response compatibility has both static elements (where response devices should be 
located to control their respective displays) and dynamic elements (how responses should move 
to control their displays). Wickens (1992) calls these “location” and “movement” compatibility 
respectively. Designers should locate controls next to relevant displays where possible 
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(collocation). When collocation is not possible, two important principles for location 
compatibility are congruence and rules. Congruence is based on the idea that the spatial array of 
controls should be congruent with the spatial array of displays, which contributes to faster and 
more accurate performance (Wickens, 1992). Simple rules seem to be drawn from population 
stereotypes to map the set of stimuli to the set of responses. The fewer rules have to be utilised, 
the faster the response time. Movement compatibility defines the set of expectancies that an 
operator has about how a display will respond to a control activity. Movement compatibility is 
largely based on the principle of the moving part (Roscoe, 1968, cited in Wickens et al., 1998). 
Movement should be analogous to the mental model of the displayed variable (Wickens, 1992).  
 
Proctor, Lu, Wang and Dutta (1995) claim that the relative compatibility of alternative S-R 
(stimulus response) mappings for a variety of stimulus and response sets can be predicted on the 
basis of the difficulty of the translation required to determine which response to make to a 
displayed stimulus. Less translation is required, and therefore responses are faster, when the 
structural features of stimulus and response sets correspond and the S-R mappings can be 
characterised by rules. Wickens (1992), Barker and Schaik (2000) and Norman (1993) concur 
that more compatible mappings require fewer mental transformations from display to response.  
 
Ravden and Johnson (1989) provide a checklist for compatibility which includes such aspects 
as colour, abbreviations, jargon and acronyms, icons and symbols, format of data, directional 
movement, similarity with other familiar systems, sequences of activities and expectation of 
system architecture. Here they relate compatibility not just to movement or location of control 
and display components, but to similarity of the interface with other familiar systems and with 
users’ expectations and mental models of the system. This highlights the fact that mappings are 
all learned conventions and rely on past experience (although some may be very basic and 
based more on embodied knowledge). Consequently, like population stereotypes, they can be 
applied to intuitive interaction. 
 
5.8 Consistency 
 
Consistency is assumed to enhance the possibility that the user can transfer skills from one 
system to another; this makes new systems easier to use (Nielsen, 1989; Preece et al., 2002; 
Thimbleby, 1991). It improves users’ productivity because they can predict what a system will 
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do in a given situation and can rely on a few rules to govern their use of the system (Nielsen, 
1989).  
 
Kellogg’s (1989) framework distinguishes between internal and external sources of consistency. 
Internal consistency is consistency within the system. External consistency is the consistency of 
the system with things outside the system; for example, metaphors, user knowledge, the work 
domain and other systems  (Kellogg, 1987). 
 
Nielsen (1989) argues that the consistency of a device with users’ expectations is important, 
whether those expectations have come from a similar system or something different. The Apple 
company principles for consistency include using metaphors from the real world (Tognazzini, 
1989); that is, external consistency. Koritzinsky (1989) states that a consistent interface would 
be predictable, habit-forming, transferable and natural (consistent with the user’s 
understanding). The main point of consistency is to establish a behaviour pattern; similar 
physical actions in similar situations can establish habits and teach the end user what to expect 
(Koritzinsky, 1989). Consequently, Koritzinsky (1989) recommends that the same commands 
should be used across applications. Dayton, McFarland and Kramer (1998) agree, while Bonner 
(1998) argues that, to conform to user expectations, a system should be consistent with the 
user’s mental models of the product and with population stereotypes. 
 
Ravden and Johnson (1989) state that consistency is concerned with creating and reinforcing 
user expectations by maintaining predictability across the interface. If users can predict what the 
system will do, or what information will appear when and where, then they can learn more 
quickly and effectively. Further, their confusion is reduced as they are not surprised by the 
unexpected, search and response times are likely to be reduced, they learn quickly what actions 
are required, can generalise across the system and are less likely to make errors (Ravden & 
Johnson, 1989). 
 
Kellogg (1987) describes her research in testing consistent and inconsistent software and 
concludes that users of an inconsistent system do not have a clear idea of how to perform 
simple, routine tasks. Intermittent users, or users attempting to carry out new tasks, would 
continue to have problems with an inconsistent interface (Kellogg, 1987). Users tended to see 
the inconsistent system as undependable and unfriendly, whereas users of the consistent system 
performed the tasks more quickly, had near perfect recall of procedures, were able to infer 
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correct procedures for tasks they had not attempted, and had greater confidence (Kellogg, 
1987). 
 
In order to get consistency throughout the Star system, Smith et al. (1982) used several 
paradigms for operations. The paradigms they used were editing, information retrieval and 
copying. These paradigms changed the way users of GUIs think, and led to new habits and 
models of behaviour that are more powerful and productive. 
 
Intuitive interaction depends upon consistency, especially external consistency, with things 
outside the system (for example, user knowledge, the work domain and other systems). External 
consistency relies on experiential knowledge of, or familiarity with, similar systems, and it is 
prior experience which allows intuition to function. Internal consistency is also important 
because a system which is not internally consistent could be detrimental to intuitive use. If 
different features or metaphors were applied for different parts of a system, the benefit of 
applying prior experience could be reduced as users would become confused. As Rohlfs (1998) 
states, a metaphor must be consistent with existing metaphors used in the same context, and 
should be sustainable throughout the interface and extendible to new tasks. 
 
5.9 Product Semantics 
 
Product Semantics was proposed by Krippendorff and Butter, who define it as “the study of the 
symbolic qualities of man-made forms in the context of their use and the application of this 
knowledge to industrial design” (Krippendorff & Butter, 1984, p4). Through product semantics, 
they claimed, designers can demystify complex technology, improve the interaction between 
artefacts and their users and enhance opportunities for self-expression. Krippendorff (1990) 
states that product semantics should be concerned not with the forms or surfaces of artefacts but 
with the understanding that penetrates them.  
 
Burnette (1994) sees product semantics as the capacity of a product to afford meaning through 
its form and use, and Taylor, Roberts and Hall (1999) suggest that product semantics should be 
considered as a central issue in design, since the human context has become a driving force 
behind product design. Now that it is no longer possible to derive the shape and meaning of 
something from its moving elements, the need to understand semantics has been brought to the 
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fore. Product volume has lost importance, and size and shape are determined more by user 
interaction than by the works inside (Lannoch, 1989). 
 
Krippendorff (1995) explains that one way to make many different things understandable to 
many different people is to promote a uniform understanding; another way is to build 
redundancy into the operational meanings of things. The former he calls “functionalism” and 
the latter “semantics”. It seems that functionalism can be compared to the metal models 
approach, where all users are expected to have the same model of a device. Semantics 
recognises that individuals differ in several ways; for example, by sensory preferences, 
cognitive models and cultural histories. Unless designed for very homogeneous populations, 
products must allow for these differences.  Using semantics allows users to identify and 
manipulate products through self-evident operation (Krippendorff & Butter, 1984).  
 
Blaich (1986) discusses a workshop on semantics held at Philips. At the seminar, Krippendorff 
argued that product semantics is essential as a study because new classes of products are 
making traditional conceptions of tools obsolete. Two important methods used by the people 
who attended were: shape coding to make operations clear, self-evident, more ergonomic and 
easier to use; and metaphor and analogies to well known objects. For example, one delegate 
said that the obscurity associated with black boxes of electronics can be countered by 
employing metaphoric symbols, which can help consumers derive meaning from technology 
and also satisfy their need for personal expression. In the experience of the people there, 
consideration of semantics sells products. Blaich (1989) gives examples of products that came 
about as a results of the workshop, and which led to economic success for Phillips. However, 
while the main ideas, metaphors or characters of these products were evident, the semantics had 
not been extended to the detail of the interface. 
 
Lannoch (1984) has developed a method which he terms “semantic transfer”. Semantic transfer 
begins with an exploration of words that describe the nature of objects and the orientation and 
action of people in relation to objects. It starts with the semantic analysis of verbal descriptions 
– not an exact definition of words but a wide description of their meanings, including socio-
cultural and metaphorical meanings. Next, designers can transfer the complex verbal imagery 
into a spatial representation.  For example, to express the word “hard”, precise edges and abrupt 
form changes can be used. There is no definite form for a certain word, however. The aim of the 
approach is to bring people’s image of 3D form closer to their verbal understanding of the 
 103 
environment. Lannoch (1984) claims that semantic transfer is a valuable tool for defining how a 
product’s surface can best perform the function of interaction. This approach assumes that the 
user communicates only with the physical surface of an object (which could make it less useful 
for today’s devices), but it is one of the most practical examples of the use of product semantics 
that has been published. Lannoch (1989) also claims that the semantic transfer technique does 
not limit creativity. 
 
However, Richardson (1994) argues that the linguistic model, as used by Lannoch (1984, 1989) 
and also advocated by Buchanan (1989), is inadequate and has the potential to conceal as much 
as it once revealed because it is a dead metaphor. His most significant objection to it is that 
products or objects are not discursive; they do not present themselves in a pre-determined order 
and the designer has very little control over the way users will approach the project (unlike a 
writer who can always set the scene). Products and objects also have much less freedom to 
express novel concepts than language does, as language is a powerful combinatorial medium. 
Also, he claims that the linguistic model fails to reflect the way designers think during the 
design process. Richardson (1994) states that users draw on previous experiences to help define 
the object before them and to assimilate it into their lives. He proposes gestures as an alternative 
model that is more appropriate than the linguistic model. Gestures are seen all at once and are 
not so much based on a sequential communication of information. Projects and gestures are 
both physical, 3D manifestations of concepts; this cannot be said of texts.  
 
Butter (1989) introduced a method for applying semantics that was intended to be inserted into 
the design process. He and his colleagues found that, as an approach, it was general and flexible 
enough to be applied to many product categories, from toys to truck cab interiors. The method 
has eight steps, the unique ones involving: generation of desired attributes; expressing the 
projected semantic performance characteristics; analysis, grouping and ranking of attributes; 
and search for concrete manifestations capable of supporting desired attributes. Butter (1989) 
describes student projects in depth. However, he does not equate semantics with usability or 
ergonomics, and does not mention previous user experience. The semantics applied in these 
projects communicate the character of the product more than hinting about its use (although 
character itself can contain some hints). 
 
McCoy (1989) discusses the use of metaphor to relate a new technology to something familiar. 
He describes this as an attempt to make a product reach out to its users by informing them about 
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how it operates, where it resides and how it fits into their lives. McCoy (1989) states that there 
is a need for the language of design to expand to fulfil people’s desire to understand and intuit 
the artefact environment. In his examples, it can be seen that metaphor has been used to create 
something more familiar. Again, however, this kind of metaphor does not go into the details of 
how a user should interact with the product; it simply gives an overall hint about the nature of 
the product.  
 
Bush (1989) asserts that product semantics expresses some relationship between object and 
user. An object designed in this way may approach becoming an extension of the body because 
of its visual metaphors and imagery. Bush proposes the use of more anthropomorphic signage 
in order to achieve this. He discusses body reflectors: products or parts that resemble or mirror 
the body because they come into close contact with it. Examples include headsets, glasses, 
shoes, gloves and combs. He claims that humans are pre-disposed to perceive body images for 
evolutionary reasons. Damasio (1994) also suggests this with his ideas about primary emotions. 
Therefore, designs which use body images should be more readily perceivable (this idea has 
also been discussed by Norman (2004b) in relation to physical, or real, affordances). Bush 
claims that it is not necessary to be familiar with a body reflector in order to ascertain its 
relation to a person; these forms are self evident in relation to people. Any person would be able 
to make the association whether familiar with similar things or not.  
 
Athavankar (1989) claims that new products that enter the man-made world quickly become 
part of the mental world of people. New product variants will become part of the mental world 
and, in the process, realign or disturb the semantic space. Athavankar (1989) bases his ideas on 
the prototype theory of categorisation (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson and Boyes-Braem, 1976, 
cited in Lakoff, 1987, and Varela et al., 1991), stating that all products have a place in a 
category. For most categories, it is the typical (or prototype) case that is treated as a central 
member for the metonymic representation of a category. All other incarnations of the category 
can be arranged along a gradation more or less like the prototype.  
 
Athavankar (1989) claims that  new product variations bring in new semantic devices and help 
redefine the semantic space. Redefinition involves a shift in the perception of the central 
member or the realignment of boundaries. This happens constantly, with perceptions of the 
central member shifting along the gradation. An innovation can be a bold departure from the 
norm that challenges the category boundary. Such examples extend and redefine the existing 
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accepted notions and enrich the category by adding new shades of meaning. They can also 
cause centrality to shift towards them, but bold departures are unlikely to become central 
members immediately. When new compound products (e.g. camera phones) emerge for the first 
time, the compound concept depends heavily on the visual expressions of the new functional 
features as its semantic devices. If this new product is accepted, it will be treated as a central 
member of a new subcategory (Athavankar, 1989). All the existing categories and all the cues 
used to link these to new products are, of course, based on existing products which are part of 
the past experience of users. 
 
Athavankar (1989) argues that it is difficult to see the strategies illustrated by some authors as 
repeatable approaches because the metaphors used came from the personal perspective of the 
designer. These kinds of personal interpretations can lead to vast variations within the category 
and there may not be a proper central member. Learning about the category through deviant 
members is not an effective way of learning about the world. He claims the essential first step is 
to recognise category identity as a primary and dominant visual expression in design. 
 
Many ideas from various disciplines support this notion. For example, Krippendorff (1990) 
agrees that, in order to recognise artefacts, people approach them with certain ideal types 
(prototypes) in mind. This is also what people do when imputing knowledge; they start off with 
an assumption and adapt it according to the emerging situation (Nickerson, 1999). The notion is 
also supported by Kolodner’s (1993) theory of case-based reasoning. Krippendorff’s (1995) 
idea that users describe forms in relation to their own body, vision or motion accords with the 
ideas of Lakoff and Johnson (1981) and others about the embodiment of metaphor. All these 
ideas and theories suggest that users base their understanding of a product on their previous 
experience, from which they have formed prototypes.  
Burnette (1994) claims that products semantics has remained more a conjecture than a way of 
designing and understanding how meaning becomes associated with products. He states that not 
enough has been done to develop ways to express intent in a product or to investigate whether 
the intent is understood by those who use the product. This seems to be a reasonable claim, as it 
is not easy to apply product semantics theory (as it stands) directly to the design process. More 
work needs to be done to make it possible for designers to apply the theory easily to their work.  
 
It seems likely that physical affordances, which require only the very basic experience of being 
in a normal body, are equivalent to Bush’s (1989) body reflectors. Semantics seems to be a 
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good approach to include these kinds of cues in products, although testing is required to make 
sure signals applied through semantics are understood and responded to correctly (Giard, 1989). 
However, semantics is more about form and surfaces than the detail of features and their 
familiarity. It can provide an overall character for a product, and characters can be used in 
anticipating the behaviour of artefacts. For example, the characteristic “slow” implies that the 
artefact will be slow in all its operations. The process of ascribing characteristics will also tell 
users which of their characteristics should be used when dealing with the artefact (e.g. be 
persistent if the artefact has a slow character), and combined characteristics increase the 
predictive power (Janlert & Stolterman, 1997). A character does not prescribe functions and 
actions on a detailed level, but it can be used as a context for interpreting particulars of 
behaviour and appearance. 
 
Therefore, semantics can be a useful technique for the physical form of a product but does not 
seem to be applicable to the detailed design of complex electronic artefacts and interfaces. 
There appears to be a continuum of intuitive interaction, including (at different points) 
metaphor and real and perceived affordances. The physically based, experiential cues can be 
picked up easily by people who have not seen anything similar before, but these cues tend to be 
more based on form and physicality (body reflectors). More complex cues – such as those in an 
electronic interface – can also be based on past experience but tend to be based less on the 
fundamental physical characteristics and more on actual experience with something similar or 
metaphorical. 
 
5.10 Conclusions 
 
Some rules and techniques have been explored that would allow application of intuitive 
interaction. All these revolve around the central tenet of experiential knowledge. Prior 
knowledge, affordances, population stereotypes, compatible mappings and external consistency 
all depend on previous experience. Experience can be transferred from other products or other 
aspects of life, including the basic knowledge all humans have from being embodied in the 
world, knowledge about how their body will fit with a physical affordance, or knowledge that is 
drawn from an applicable metaphor. Internal consistency is also an important principle as it 
allows users to apply the same knowledge in analogous situations and prevents the application 
of inappropriate metaphors. 
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It seems likely that there may be physical affordances or body reflectors that relate to physical 
characteristics, and are familiar because of embodiment and based on learning that occurs from 
birth. These would be so unconscious that people would rarely consider that some of these 
things have been learned at all. There also seem to be more complex cues and symbols 
(Norman’s perceived affordances) that become familiar through experience of interaction and 
which, in some cases, may even require more explicit learning.  
 
As all of these ideas and principles rely on relevant past experience, the things that humans use 
intuitively are those that employ features which they have encountered before, and encouraging 
users to access their past experience to use a new product, could induce them to use intuitive 
processing. Incorporating familiar features and controls into a product (in a logical way that is 
easy to follow and is consistent with the user’s expectations according to her/his past 
experience), should increase the intuitive usability of that product.  
 
Based on the understanding of intuition detailed in Chapters 2 and 3, and the literature reviewed 
in Chapters 4 and 5, the following definition of intuitive interaction or intuitive was developed: 
 
Intuitive use of products involves utilising knowledge gained through 
other experience/s (e.g. use of another product or something else). 
Intuitive interaction is fast and generally non-conscious, so that people 
would often be unable to explain how they made decisions during 
intuitive interaction. 
 
5.11 Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed further research relevant to the theoretical foundation of this book, 
and has positioned intuitive interaction within other theories of interaction. Intuitive interaction 
is seen as a non-conscious but not totally automated process using prior experience to guide 
interaction with tools that mediate between actor and world. The complex relationships between 
intuitive interaction, semantics and affordances have also been examined, and basic and more 
complex levels of intuitive interaction have been theorised. This chapter has highlighted the 
importance of past experience in intuitive interaction and provided a definition of intuitive 
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interaction that can be tested experimentally. Although the authors discussed here have 
developed related theory, and some have touched on the issue of intuitive use, none has linked 
intuitive interaction to the existing theoretical knowledge base as has been done here. Chapter 6 
will cover the methodology adopted for the empirical investigation of intuitive interaction and 
outline the research plan and experiment design. 
 
 Chapter 6 
 
Research Methodology 
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6.0 Introduction 
 
To re-iterate, the aim of this research was to provide designers with principles and tools which 
they can employ during the design process in order to make their products more intuitive to use. 
In order to achieve this aim it was necessary to base the research on a theoretical foundation 
which includes an understanding of the nature of intuition itself and how it relates to product 
use. This understanding has been explained in Chapters 2 to 5. The next few chapters describe 
the empirical testing of that understanding. This chapter discusses the research tools and 
methods employed. A combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches, methods and 
analyses were necessary in order to achieve the most reliable results possible from a complex 
set of variables. 
 
Firstly, the limited previous experimentation involving intuition is reviewed. Next, the overall 
methodology devised to investigate the issue is covered, the experimental approach used for this 
research is explained and the individual methods and tools chosen are discussed. Lastly, the raw 
data analysis is explained in detail, particularly focussing on the specialist observation software 
used for detailed video observation and analysis. 
 
6.1 Investigating Intuition 
 
The nature of intuition presents certain problems for its study. Few experiments have been 
conducted which specifically target intuition (Bastick, 1982, 2003), so there is no established 
method to follow. There has been very little contemporary research into intuition, partly as a 
result of the division between psychologists on the concept of insight and intuition; notably 
between Gestalt and Behaviourist psychologists.  As a result of this controversy, research into 
intuition was stymied.  Any reference to the concept avoided the term “intuition” and, instead, 
designations such as “preconscious concept formation”, “preverbal concepts”, “instinctive 
knowledge” or “cognitive reorganisation” were used.  Even research under these synonyms 
failed to use operational definitions of intuition embodying the properties commonly attributed 
to it (Bastick, 1982, 2003). Experience, on which intuitive interaction is based, has been 
controlled as a possible confounding variable in many cases (Klein, 1998; Woolhouse & Bayne, 
2000), with tasks often being specially selected so that they will be unfamiliar to participants 
(e.g. artificial grammar and nonsense words are commonly used). 
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Bastick (1982; 2003) gives details of the few experiments that have investigated intuition. All 
of the experiments he mentions took place more than thirty years ago and most of them were 
trying to define an intuitive “type” in line with Jung’s thinking. Most of the tasks used in the 
experiments mentioned by Bastick involved participants guessing numbers or words in 
sequences or associations. Kahneman and Tversky (1973, in Bastick, 1982, 2003) found that 
more consistent information helped participants to complete a probability assessment task. They 
also used a confidence rating as a subjective measure, as did Westcott (1961) during interviews 
after a number guessing task. Confidence is a measure of previous experience in a similar type 
of problem (Bastick, 1982, 2003), so it can conceivably be used to obtain an understanding of 
participants’ use of intuition, although in Westcott’s case, it was used to determine “types”. 
Earle (1972, in Bastick, 1982, 2003) and Thorsland and Novak (1972, in Bastick, 1982, 2003) 
used lack of analytical processing as an indication of intuition, but Bastick criticised this 
approach, saying it was negative and assumed intuition has only one property. Crutchfield 
(1960, in Bastick, 1982, 2003), tested two groups on three spatial puzzles. The experimental 
group worked beforehand on similar puzzles containing spatial cues related to the puzzle 
solution, while the control group worked on similar puzzles without such cues. The 
experimental group did much better than the controls. Crutchfield called this “intuitive use of 
cues”. 
 
Of all of these experiments, only Crutchfield’s had an approach similar to the one adopted here: 
grouping participants by previous real world experience to see what effect that experience 
would have on performance of a relevant task. Those experiments which used a confidence 
rating may also have been measuring past experience indirectly, but could also (or alternatively) 
have been measuring other variables such as general personality traits or current mood. 
However, Woolhouse and Bayne (2000) still used confidence rating as a measure of intuition 
(although their intention was to measure intuition as a personality type rather than intuition as 
based on past experience). 
 
Klein’s (1998) research focuses on intuition of experts. His main research method is semi-
structured interviews of these experts, as well as some observation in the field. Klein uses his 
own version of cognitive task analysis to analyse the data and determine when intuition is used. 
His central conclusion has been that past experience is the main contributor to intuition. 
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Intuitive interaction is most relevant to the concepts of learnability (Jordan, 1998; Nielsen, 
1993; Stanton & Baber, 1996) and/or guessability (Jordan, 1998). Stanton and Baber (1996) 
recommend experimentation and observation for investigating learnability. Thomas (1996) links 
the word intuitive with learnable. He states that the degree to which a product is intuitive and 
learnable can be determined by setting a user a specified task with a product and recording the 
number of attempts made, the time taken to complete the task, any assistance required to 
complete the task, and whether participants can complete the task. Nielsen (1993) stresses that 
learnability is easy to measure as one can simply measure the time it takes novice users to reach 
a specified level of performance; for example, to complete certain tasks successfully or within a 
minimum timeframe. 
 
However, this research was not designed to investigate simply the learnability of a product, but 
to try to establish whether participants are transferring knowledge from other products in order 
to use the various features of a new one – which makes the experiments rather more complex. 
All participants were using a product new to them so, although the users had varying degrees of 
relevant experience, they had not seen this product (or sometimes even this type of product) 
before. This means the experiments were designed to test the most difficult part of the product 
experience – using something new for the first time – and to establish how intuition could play 
a role in that situation. 
 
6.2 Research Approach 
 
The research approach was designed to investigate the thesis that intuitive use of products is 
based on relevant past experience with similar products or other experiences. The approach 
consisted of four stages: three sets of user experiments and a re-design exercise which involved 
making changes to a product based on the findings of the first two experiments. All the 
experiments were conducted in a similar way, although minor modifications were made to the 
design of each one according to the objectives of that experiment and the success or failure of 
the tools used in previous experiments. Each experiment involved participants undertaking set 
tasks with the mediating product while delivering concurrent (talk aloud) protocol. They were 
videorecorded for later detailed analysis. 
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The experiments were designed to use real products and to draw on participants’ real experience 
in order to achieve ecological validity. Other experiments that have looked at transfer of 
knowledge between tasks (e.g. Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Dixon & O'Reilly, 2002) involved 
invented tasks. Often in these cases, in conditions where participants required prior experience, 
they were given practice sessions immediately before the experiment (Sommer & Sommer, 
1997). These kinds of tests took no other type of prior experience into account. This could have 
confounded the experiments if some participants were transferring experience from outside the 
laboratory to the tasks they were asked to do. This research was designed to be more 
ecologically valid in order to prevent these kinds of problems and, also, to allow an easier 
transfer of the results to the real world.  
 
For similar reasons, university staff, friends and family of staff, staff of nearby companies and 
students were used as experimental participants. Those in the workforce form a more 
heterogeneous population than cohorts of students in terms of age, level of education and 
previous experience. However, industrial design staff and students were not accepted as 
participants because of their special knowledge of product interfaces. 
 
6.2.1 Experiment 1 
 
This exploratory experiment was designed to establish whether or not people can use product 
features with which they are familiar in an intuitive way. The experiment’s objectives were to 
establish if relevant past experience of product features increased the speed and/or ease with 
which people could use those features, and to establish if interface knowledge was transferred 
from known products to new ones. A digital camera, as a member of a new product family, was 
used as the test product. This first experiment was also intended to reveal the most effective 
ways of measuring intuitive processing. For example, it was an opportunity to compare the use 
of psycho-physiological recordings, observation, verbal protocol, questionnaires and interviews 
and to decide whether or not some or all of these techniques were useful and should be used in 
further experimentation. 
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6.2.2 Experiment 2 
 
Following the successful first experiment, Experiment 2 employed most of the same methods: 
questionnaire, observation, verbal protocol and interview. The product used (referred to here as 
a “remote”), was a universal remote control (which was chosen for its capacity to be re-
configured in order to allow re-design and further experimentation to take place). The 
objectives of the experiment were: to establish if relevant past experience of the remote control 
features increased the speed and/or intuitiveness with which people could use those features 
and, therefore, the product; to further establish that interface knowledge is transferred from 
known products to new ones; and to gain an understanding of the level of “intuitiveness” of 
features of the remote in order to redesign it. 
 
6.2.3 Redesign 
 
Following Experiment 2, a preliminary set of principles for designing for intuitive interaction 
was developed. A detailed and controlled redesign exercise was undertaken with the remote 
control used for Experiment 2. The design principles developed through Experiments 1 and 2 
were applied to the remote as far as possible (some limitations were imposed by the design of 
the remote itself). Twelve features which were commonly used in Experiment 2 (and which it 
was possible to change) were re-designed. 
 
6.2.4 Experiment 3 
 
Experiment 3 used the same methods and tasks as Experiment 2 to re-test the remote control. 
The objective of this experiment was to test three new designs for the remote control interface 
against the default design, in order to establish if changing the location and/or the appearance of 
the icons on the device would make it more intuitive to use than the default design. This 
experiment was also used to investigate the effects of age on intuitive use. 
 
 116 
6.2.5 Experimental Approach  
 
The approach adopted used real products as mediators to reveal participant knowledge and 
behaviour. Products are mediators of activities and communities (Kuutti, 1996) and can be used 
to allow the study of complex human behaviour (Popovic, 2003). In order to select products as 
the mediators to be used in the experiments, the devices and accompanying documentation were 
thoroughly evaluated. Products were located through web searches and magazine reviews, and 
dealers and distributors were visited in order for the researcher to be able to actually use all the 
potential products (which it is often not possible for consumers to do on a shop floor).   
 
There were several criteria used in the selection process. Firstly, it was important to get a 
variety and mix of common (familiar) and uncommon (unfamiliar) features in order to be able 
to design an experiment that allowed comparison of how easily people can use familiar and 
unfamiliar features. Secondly, new product types that would require transfer of existing 
knowledge from elsewhere were favoured. This would make it easier to find participants who 
had not used the product type before and also allow the experiment to test whether or not 
familiar features from other product types could or could not be transferred. Thirdly, 
availability of the product within the country and within a reasonable timeframe was important. 
Finally, price was a factor – the budget allowed about $AU1000 for each product. 
 
The approach of using real, contemporary, finished products was intended to ensure that the 
experiments were ecologically valid. A person draws on the resources of mind, body and world 
in order to accomplish tasks (Clark, 1997; Varela et al., 1991). Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that the real body, real world set-up of many tasks will deeply influence the nature of 
the problems participants encounter when tackling them. 
 
As has been discussed in Chapter 5, various levels of processing can work together to perform 
complex tasks (Berry & Broadbent, 1988). The experimental method employed for this research 
assumes that various levels of processing occur during one task, and attempts to distinguish 
intuitive processing from the other processes (such as automatic and conscious processes). 
 
When research is being conducted into the intuitive interaction of users with products, it is the 
use of individual product features that is important, rather than use of the product as a whole. 
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This is because it is not the product, but its features, with which users have relevant past 
experience. This is especially relevant when so many new products and product types are 
appearing on the market. Often the most advanced products draw their functionality and 
interface predominantly from computers and software, rather than more traditional products. 
The definition of a “feature”, as the term is used here, is a function of a product that is discrete 
from others, has its own function, location and appearance and can be designed as a separate 
entity. A shutter button on a camera, a print icon on software or an earpiece on a stereo are all 
examples of features. 
 
From observations made during pilot studies and product reviews, it appeared that there were 
three factors of intuitive use for each feature on a product: location of the feature, appearance of 
the feature and function of the feature. Each of these factors either could or could not be 
intuitive, without precluding the intuitiveness of other factors of the same feature. These factors 
were investigated in depth during the experiments. 
 
6.3 Data Collection Methods and Techniques 
 
This research utilised the triangulation of multiple methods. These were questionnaires, 
observation during set tasks, verbal protocol, rating scales and interviews. Further details of 
these methods in relation to their applicability for this research are available in Blackler, 
Popovic, and Mahar (2004b). 
 
6.3.1 Observation during Set Tasks 
 
As product features are the mediators of this research, looking at each feature use individually is 
the only way that this issue can be studied in the depth required to formulate theory. It was 
therefore necessary to observe participants in great detail. Video recordings were used, as they 
allow a much more detailed analysis than live observation. However, observation alone often 
provides insufficient data for meaningful conclusions to be drawn. What is observable might 
not reveal details such as the decisions being made, or the alternatives not selected (Stanton & 
Baber, 1996). Observation of real people using a real product is the only way to understand if 
the features can be used intuitively. However, a verbal protocol is needed to capture the 
unobservable information (Bainbridge & Sanderson, 1992). 
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Tasks in user trials can be seen as substitutes for real user goals. It is important that selected 
tasks are realistic, as unrealistic tasks provide unrealistic goals which may lead to unrealistic 
behaviour (Vermeeren, 1999). Thus, correct selection of tasks is vital to the success of a user 
trial. Tasks must involve the use of all features that are under investigation, must accurately 
simulate real product use and must be relevant to the user (McClelland, 1995). McMullen 
(2001) attempted to observe real but non-uniform tasks selected by participants and found this 
unsuccessful as each person had completed a different task and it was therefore impossible to 
compare results.  
 
Most importantly for this project, “…with tasks one can make people use functions that they 
otherwise would not use” (Vermeeren, 1999, p54). Therefore, participants were required to use 
the features of the product that were most likely to yield results about intuitive use.  This was 
essential for this study as the features of the product were studied in depth, contrary to usability 
testing when it is the whole product that is under test. 
 
6.3.2 Verbal Protocols 
 
For this research, participants were delivering concurrent protocols (also known as “think 
aloud” or sometimes “talk aloud” procedures). The think aloud protocol has been found to be 
very useful for studying interface design (Jorgensen, 1990) and has been used in different 
studies in human–computer interaction (Hewett & Scott, 1987)  and design (Dorst & Cross, 
2001; Gero, 1998) 
 
This protocol method was chosen because it eliminates the problems involved with people 
forgetting the details when using retrospective protocol. Conscious events may decay after a 
few milliseconds so immediate report is essential (Baars, 1988), and Kleinmuntz (1987) 
recommends unprompted concurrent protocol to avoid users giving inaccurate reports in 
retrospect. Recognition is one thing that is often forgotten and omitted from a retrospective 
protocol (Ericsson & Simon, 1984); recognition is particularly important for this research where 
the emphasis is on users recognising familiar features.  
 
Intuition, being non-conscious, utilises memories and learning without the conscious mind 
being aware of it. The non-conscious aspect of intuition has been used in experiments as a 
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criterion for the involvement of intuition or insight (Bastick, 2003). Conscious experience is 
difficult to observe in a straightforward way. Non-conscious processes can only be inferred, 
based on experience and observation (Baars, 1988). The conscious/non-conscious distinction is 
generally determined by verbal reportability in experimental situations (Baars, 1988; Schooler, 
2002), and the terms “reportable” and “unreportable” are operational definitions of “conscious” 
and “unconscious”, respectively (Bowden, 1997). The use of reportable to refer to events which 
do reach consciousness is non-controversial (Baars, 1988; Baars & Franklin, 2003). That is, 
one must be conscious of an event to be able to report it accurately. 
 
In contrast, the use of "unreportable" to refer to events which do not reach consciousness is 
more controversial (Bowden, 1997). Unreportable may not be equivalent to “unconscious” 
because one may be unable (or unwilling) to report certain events which do reach 
consciousness. However, because there is currently no operational definition of unconscious 
which is without critics, many researchers [such as Bowden (1997)] use the term unreportable. 
The same operationalisation has been used for this research. In a concurrent protocol, the 
intuitive process is conspicuous by the absence of detail and logical thinking steps in the 
commentary, as the commentary is generated in the conscious mind, which does not have 
access to the intuitive process. 
 
Schooler, Ohlsson and Brooks (1993) argue that both retrospective and concurrent verbalisation 
interferes with the successful solution of insight problems, and their experiments supported this 
hypothesis. This interference does not occur with non-insight problems. Schooler et al. (1993) 
hypothesise that verbalisation disrupts the non-reportable processes associated with this type of 
problem solving; possibly, the unreportable processes become overshadowed as the focus of 
concentration/attention is on reportable processes during verbalisation. One such component 
that is unreportable is memory retrieval and, in particular, the spreading activation process 
(Bainbridge & Sanderson, 1992; Schooler et al., 1993). In problem solving situations, many 
things quickly pass through the mind and are forgotten before there is time to report them, so 
people may not mention everything in this situation (Bainbridge & Sanderson, 1992).  
 
This was a potential problem for this research. Schooler et al. (1993) recommend that 
researchers should consider using silent control groups if they are using verbal protocols to 
assess non-reportable cognitive processes. This would establish if verbalisation is influencing 
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performance. However, this is not possible in this case as one cannot assess performance 
without the protocol.  
 
Therefore, the problem was addressed by not pushing for protocol unless participants were 
absolutely silent. This lack of requirement to verbalise every single thought meant that the 
protocol could be used to decide when participants were processing unconsciously, as the 
unconscious processing was unreportable. When participants did not verbalise in detail because 
the detail was not consciously available, they were very likely processing unconsciously and so 
could be using intuition. This is discussed in depth in Section 6.5.3. 
 
6.3.3 Questionnaires 
 
Questionnaires were used during this research as a recruitment and screening tool. Screening 
participants for a trait involves writing questions that will identify those for whom the trait is 
evident and eliminate those for whom it is absent (Weiss, 2002). For example, “early adopters” 
can be defined by their possessions and how frequently they use them (Weiss, 2002). The 
questionnaires used in this instance asked volunteers for demographic information and. in the 
cases of Experiments 2 and 3, also asked for details about their experience with certain products 
(Appendices A and B). The technology familiarity questionnaires (Appendix B) were developed 
specifically to establish a technology familiarity score for each participant in order to be able to 
sort participants into experimental groups. Appendix C contains an example of a completed 
questionnaire showing how the technology familiarity (TF) score was calculated. These 
questionnaires were sent by email or given out as hard copies to potential participants. 
 
6.3.4 Interviews 
 
Interviews were used after the users had completed the tasks in order to get information about 
how familiar each feature was to the user and how the function, location and appearance of each 
feature accorded to their expectations. These were complex issues that required constant 
explanation and demonstration and it was not possible to get this sort of detailed information in 
any other way. The interviews were structured and the researcher used an identical proforma for 
each one (Appendix D), so that all participants were treated in the same way and the potential 
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for bias was reduced. Filter questions and careful wording were also used so that answers that 
could be seen as low-prestige answers appeared equally as acceptable as high prestige ones 
(Sinclair, 1990). The structure also enabled quantitative data to be generated and compared 
between participants (Sommer & Sommer, 1997). 
 
6.3.5 Rating Scales 
 
Simple rating scales, with the addition of intermediate labels in the form of numbers, were used 
in this research as part of the structured interview to rate the expectedness of the function, the 
location and the appearance of each feature (Appendix D). Labels were kept consistent and 
were explained clearly by the researcher prior to the participant completing the scales. This 
followed Sinclair’s (1990) recommendation that researchers take care about the meanings for 
the scale anchor points and the labels used along it. To avoid the leniency effect, where 
respondents are unwilling to be critical (Sinclair, 1990), the scale used in this research had no 
middle point so that respondents could not simply remain neutral; they had to make a 
judgement as to whether their answer should go in the top or bottom half of the scale. Even so, 
the data show a tendency towards leniency on the part of most participants. 
 
6.4 Data Analysis  
 
This research takes an essentially quantitative approach. The main reason for this is that the 
most successful way to investigate such rich and complex data was believed to be through 
statistical analysis. Also, due to the novel nature of this research, it was felt that quantitative 
measures would be required to support the claims made. 
 
The performance parameters common to all the experiments were: time on tasks, number or 
percentage of intuitive uses, intuitive first uses, and subjective measures of familiarity and 
expectedness of product features. Time on task is relevant as intuitive processing is assumed to 
be faster than more conscious types of processing (Agor, 1986; Bastick, 2003; Salk, 1983); in 
other words, participants interacting intuitively with the product should be able to complete 
tasks more quickly.  
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However, it cannot be assumed that completing the task quickly is always the same as 
completing it intuitively; there also needs to be a measure of intuition or intuitive uses. Number 
or percentage of intuitive uses and intuitive first uses are problematic variables to measure, but 
are also the most direct way of quantifying intuitive interactions. The way in which intuitive 
uses were extracted from the data and coded is discussed in detail below (Section 6.5.3).  
 
Ratings of expectedness are relevant because intuition has been equated with users’ 
expectations and expectations are associated with remembered situations (Dreyfus et al., 1986; 
Klein, 1998). Further, adhering to users’ expectations is acknowledged as desirable for ease of 
use and consistency (Nielsen, 1989). Okoye (1998) also used time on tasks and subjective 
ratings of satisfaction to investigate intuitive interaction.  
 
The challenge was to find ways of coding the observations so that this level of detail could be 
extracted from the observations. These issues were addressed by using the Noldus Observer 
software to analyse video data of observations in conjunction with the concurrent protocol. 
Noldus Observer is a complete manual event recorder for collecting, managing and analysing 
observational data (Noldus, 2002). It captures a level of detail not possible in live situations, 
and which cannot be analysed easily without an automated system. The process of using the 
program consists of the three stages of configuration, observation and analysis. 
 
6.4.1 Configuration 
 
This is the set-up stage and must be completed before data can be entered or analysed. For this 
research, three parameters were entered into the configuration: independent variables, 
behavioural classes and modifier classes. Table 6.1 shows part of the configuration designed for 
Experiment 2. 
 
Each behavioural class can contain several behaviours, and can have up to two modifier classes 
attached to it. This allows analysis of complex procedures such as intuitive use of products. A 
behaviour can be an event or a state. An event (such as one use of one feature) may take a 
second or two, while a state (such as performing operation one) continues for a longer period of 
time. Events can occur within states. The behavioural class shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 is 
called “features.” There are 21 behaviours (which are simply uses of the features named) and 
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two modifiers (correctness of use and type of use). The most commonly used features on the 
mediating products were the ones counted and coded on Observer and included in the interview. 
Table 6.1 Configuration for Experiment 2 
Behaviour name Code Type Modifier 1  Modifier 2 
On on Event Correctness Type 
TV on/off tv Event Correctness Type 
VCR on/off vc Event Correctness Type 
Windows wi Event Correctness Type 
Back/ahead ba Event Correctness Type 
Home ho Event Correctness Type 
Touch screen to Event Correctness Type 
Play pl Event Correctness Type 
4-way 4w Event Correctness Type 
Forward/rewind fw Event Correctness Type 
Skip/index sk Event Correctness Type 
Number pads nu Event Correctness Type 
Navigation na Event Correctness Type 
Volume/channel vo Event Correctness Type 
AV function av Event Correctness Type 
Menu me Event Correctness Type 
Stop st Event Correctness Type 
Enter en Event Correctness Type 
Other ot Event Correctness Type 
 
6.4.2 Observation 
 
The observation module is where the coding of the raw audiovisual data takes place (Figure 
6.1), using the coding system set up as part of the configuration. Observer was used to log 
participants’ time on each operation, to code the video footage and to produce quantitative data. 
For the behavioural class “features,” the configuration shown in Table 6.1 was applied to the 
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audiovisual data coding, as shown in Table 6.2. Section 6.4.3 explains the heuristics used to 
apply these codes during the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Observer 5 observation module 
 
Table 6.2 Data coding for behavioural class “features” 
Behaviours Modifiers Categories within modifier 
Correctness of each use  
 
Correct 
Correct for feature but in-
appropriate for task 
Incorrect 
Attempted 
Feature used   
 
18 for camera 
19 for remote  
 
  Type of each use  
  
Intuitive use 
Quick use 
Use by trial and error 
Logical reasoning use 
Getting help during use 
Mistaken use 
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6.4.3 Coding Heuristics 
 
Analysis categories must be repeatedly refined by using and trialling them, and then adapting 
them (Bainbridge & Sanderson, 1992). These categories were conceived from the literature 
reported in Chapters 2-5 and from observation of the participants while recording the 
audiovisual data, and developed through pilot experimentation. One test of the suitability of 
categories is whether they can be meaningfully applied to other data (Bainbridge & Sanderson, 
1992). The categories developed for Experiment 1 were successfully applied to Experiments 2 
and 3, and have also been applied in further research, discussed in Chapter 11. This consistently 
successful application supports the suitability of these categories.  
 
Overall time and duration of each operation were coded using the state facility of the program. 
Occasions when a participant consulted a manual or received verbal assistance from the 
experimenter were also coded. These categories are simple and their application during the 
observation of the video data is self-evident. The correctness of use and type of use categories 
are more complex and require further explanation. 
 
Correctness 
 
A “correct” use was taken to be one that was the right use of the right feature at the right time; 
in other words, it was correct for the feature and also correct for the task or subtask at the 
moment of use. A “correct-but-inappropriate” use was one that was correct for the feature but 
not for the task or subtask. In other words, users knew what they wanted to do and used the 
right feature to do it, but it was the wrong thing to do at that moment. “Incorrect” uses were 
wrong for both the feature and the task or subtask, and “attempts” were uses that did not register 
with the product; for example, due to failure to activate a button on the touch screen.  
 
Intuition is defined by some writers as necessarily correct (some researchers have even 
operationalised intuition as a correct answer), whereas most say it is only a useful guide that 
rarely misleads (Bastick, 1982, 2003). Bastick maintains that intuition is always considered to 
be subjectively correct but where there is an accepted answer for comparison (as in this case), 
intuition may not always completely agree. It was possible to have an incorrect intuitive use 
where a participant was using intuition but still did the wrong thing. This occurred only rarely, 
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and when it did, it was usually because the feature was similar in appearance but worked in a 
very different way from one the participant was familiar with. Therefore, during the coding of 
feature uses, a few incorrect uses were coded as intuitive. For example, in Experiment 1, several 
people tried to use the shutter as a confirm or OK button and, although this was incorrect, it was 
affirmed during the interviews that they had felt that that was the right thing to do as it was a 
confirm button for capturing an image. This supports Bastick’s (1982, 2003) contention that 
intuition is generally correct but not infallible. 
 
When calculating the statistics relating to intuitive uses and intuitive first uses, only correct or 
correct-but-inappropriate uses were counted, because incorrect intuitive uses (of which there 
were very few) do not contribute to the successful operation of the product. Correct-but-
inappropriate uses are relevant as these experiments were focusing on the features of the 
products, and these uses were correct uses of the particular features even though they were not 
correct for the relevant task or subtask.  
 
Type of use 
 
The possible types of use ranged from intuitive (fast decision with no evident reasoning), 
through quick use (enough reasoning to verbalise a couple of words) and trial and error (random 
playing with buttons or exploratory behaviour), to logical reasoning use (thorough reasoning 
evident), mistaken use (feature used by genuine mistake) and, finally, getting help (relevant past 
experience masked). The definition of intuitive use formulated for the purposes of this study 
states (Chapter 5) that intuitive use involves utilising knowledge gained through other 
experience(s), is fast, and generally non-conscious. The coding heuristics used to determine 
which uses were intuitive were based on this definition and the literature discussed in Chapters 
2-5. The main indicators of intuitive uses that were employed to make the decisions about types 
of use during the coding process are explained below. 
 
Evidence of conscious reasoning  
Since intuitive processing does not involve conscious reasoning or analysis (Agor, 1986; 
Bastick, 1982; Fischbein, 1987; Hammond, 1993; Noddings & Shore, 1984), the less reasoning 
that was evident for each use, the more likely it was that intuitive processing was happening. 
Accurate report is the standard operational index of consciousness used in psychological 
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experiments (Baars, 1988; Baars & Franklin, 2003; Eysenck, 1995; Schooler et al., 1993). 
Based on this accepted method, Bowden (1997) uses the term “unreportable” to operationalise 
non-conscious reasoning. This same operationalisation was used for these experiments. 
 
Commonly, participants processing intuitively would not verbalise the details of their 
reasoning. They may briefly verbalise a whole sub-task rather than all the steps involved, even 
though they did perform all the steps; or they would start to press a button and then stop to 
explain what they were about to do; or perform the function and then explain it afterwards. 
Their verbalisation was not in time with their actions if they were processing unconsciously 
while trying to verbalise consciously. Table 6.3 shows examples of an intuitive use and a 
reasoning use of the four-way feature (Experiment 2), with times for each use shown. Both 
were correct uses on the first encounter of this function. 
Table 6.3 Intuitive and reasoning uses 
Reasoning 
21 seconds 
I’ll just experiment …I’m not sure. This changes the screen so I’ll 
change…this is an arrow up so I’ll change …ahh …demonstration 
…ah …language ...clock set. I’ve reached the dot by clock set so 
that’s the point of that dot there. OK, so it looks as though I’m 
getting there. 
Intuitive 
5 seconds 
Aha! OK here we go and I want to go to clock set. OK. 
 
These examples show quite clearly how, although both participants were completing the same 
action, the level of reasoning is different for each. The intuitive use lacks the detail of the 
reasoning process and is, therefore, much faster. This is obvious from the protocol combined 
with the observation. 
 
Expectation 
Intuition is based on prior experience and, therefore, linked to expectations. If a participant 
clearly had an established expectation that a feature would perform a certain function when they 
activated it, they could be using intuition. 
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Subjective certainty of correctness 
Researchers have suggested that intuition is accompanied by confidence in a decision or 
certainty of correctness (Bastick, 1982, 2003; Hammond, 1993), and intuition is a useful guide 
that rarely misleads (Bastick, 1982, 2003). Degree of confidence has been used in some 
experimental situations as an index of intuition (Eysenck, 1995; Westcott, 1961). Those uses 
coded as “intuitive” were those that participants seemed certain about (although they were not 
always correct), not those where they were just trying a feature out.   
 
Latency  
When users were able to correctly locate and use a feature reasonably quickly, it could be coded 
as intuitive. In problem solving research, time to make a move can be used to measure thinking 
time required (Cockayne et al., 1999), and longer thinking time would indicate more conscious 
reasoning (Baars, 1988). If a participant had already spent some time exploring other features 
before hitting upon the correct one, that use was unlikely to be intuitive as intuition is generally 
fast (Agor, 1986; Bastick, 1982, 2003; Hammond, 1993; Salk, 1983), and is associated with 
subjective certainty (Bastick, 1982, 2003). Those uses coded as “intuitive” involved the 
participants using the right feature with no more than five seconds hesitation, and often much 
less, commonly closer to one or two seconds. Table 6.3 shows this quite clearly; the reasoning 
use took longer than the intuitive use.  
 
Relevant past experience  
Participants would sometimes mention that a feature was like their remote at home, or that they 
had seen a feature before, showing evidence of their existing knowledge. One can infer from 
verbal protocol that knowledge exists even though there may be very little direct evidence in the 
protocol about its structure and use (Bainbridge & Sanderson, 1992). 
 
“Intuitive use” codes were applied cautiously: only when the use showed two or more of these 
characteristics and the researcher was certain about the type of use. Any uses about which there 
was doubt were coded as “quick comment” rather than “intuitive”. All recordings were double-
checked to make sure codes were correct. One researcher did all the coding (due to the lack of 
suitable second coders). The researcher checked all the coding at least twice for every 
observation to make sure the code assigned was not a mistake and was a fair decision according 
to the heuristics described. Between the first and second sessions of coding, the researcher took 
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a break of at least a week in every case. This ensured that coding was approached with a fresh 
mind for all sessions. 
 
6.4.4 Analysis 
 
Every feature use for all participants was coded. The result of this exercise is a time-event log, 
showing all the behaviours in chronological order, with a time stamp in seconds and their 
appropriate modifiers. Table 6.4 shows an example of part of a time-event log.  
Table 6.4 Time-event log 
Start time (secs) Behavioural class Behaviour 
 3.08 Time on task Start 1   
18.60 Features On correct use trial and error 
23.48 Features Navigation correct use intuitive 
30.32 Features TV on/off correct use intuitive 
41.00 Features Volume/channel correct use intuitive 
48.96 Features Windows inappropriate use intuitive 
56.88 Features Navigation correct use quick comment 
58.92 Features Navigation correct use intuitive 
67.36 Features Play correct use intuitive 
73.64 Features Navigation correct use intuitive 
80.80 Features Navigation correct use intuitive 
 
This raw data was used within Observer to generate basic descriptive statistics such as total 
numbers of each type of use (which allowed calculation of percentages of different types of 
uses and amount and type of help received), latency of each use (which allowed calculation of 
intuitive first uses), time on each task, and duration of each event. These basic results were then 
exported to an Excel spreadsheet for further manipulation (e.g. weeding out intuitive uses from 
other uses and calculating percentages) and then into SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences) for full statistical analysis. 
 
6.5 Summary 
 
The methodology described here was devised to allow a converging investigation as knowledge 
about intuitive use of products was generated and built upon. The multi-method approach of the 
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experimentation borrowed methods commonly employed in user trials, but was designed to 
allow detailed study of a complex and little-understood topic by more detailed analysis of the 
data than is usual for usability and similar studies.  
 
The methods used were very successful in extracting the important detail from a lot of complex 
data and obtaining useful results. The Observer software allows organisation and thorough 
analysis of very rich and complex raw data. Although data coding is a time-consuming process, 
it is a necessary step in generating the sort of detailed knowledge required for statistical analysis 
and theory building. The fact that the results from all three experiments largely agree, suggests 
that the method has reliably extracted the facts from all the raw data. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 will 
describe the experiments and the re-design process, and explain the results and their 
implications in detail. 
  
Chapter 7 
 
Experiment 1 
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7.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter covers the first experiment, which was undertaken to investigate the initial 
hypothesis that intuitive interaction is based on past experience. Experiment 1 was planned with 
three objectives: firstly, to establish if past experience of product features increases the speed 
and/or intuitiveness with which people can use those features and, therefore, the product; 
secondly, to establish if interface knowledge is transferred from known products to new ones; 
and thirdly, to establish if psychophysiological measures of anxiety can be useful in measuring 
intuition during product use. If the participants with past experience with the different features 
showed faster and/or more intuitive use of those features, and also exhibited less anxiety, then it 
could be concluded that past experience was a contributing factor. This experiment has also 
been reported by Blackler, Popovic and Mahar (2002; 2003b; 2007b) 
 
7.1 Method 
 
7.1.1 Participants and Experiment Design 
 
This was a between-groups, matched-subjects experimental design. Queensland University of 
Technology staff members were asked if they could volunteer to take part in the study. Of these 
volunteers, twenty people were recruited for the experiment. As this was an exploratory 
experiment, partially designed to investigate the efficacy of the measurements and tools used, 
twenty people was felt to be a suitable number. None of the participants had encountered the 
camera used in the experiment before it began, and all participants were volunteers who 
received no payment in return for their participation.  
 
The levels of experience, motivation and skills of users of digital or smart products vary 
considerably (Sade, 1999). The participants were chosen from the pool of volunteers to 
represent the range of levels of expertise, as level of expertise was the independent variable 
(IV). The levels of the IV were classified as expert, intermediate, novice and naïve with respect 
to digital cameras. The participants were matched as shown in Table 7.1 so that there was a 
realistic distribution of gender and age groups throughout the four experimental groups. All of 
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this information was collected at the recruitment stage, using a very simple survey instrument 
(Appendix A).  
Table 7.1 Experiment 1: grouping of participants 
Expertise (IV) Age group Male Female Total 
Expert 1  (<25) 
2  (25–35) 
3  (35–45) 
4  (45–55) 
5  (55+) 
Total 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
4 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
5 
Intermediate 1  (<25) 
2  (25–35) 
3  (35–45) 
4  (45–55) 
5  (55+) 
Total 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
3 
 
2 
 
 
 
2 
 
3 
1 
1 
 
5 
Novice 1  (<25) 
2  (25–35) 
3  (35–45) 
4  (45–55) 
5  (55+) 
Total 
 
1 
1 
 
 
2 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
3 
 
2 
2 
1 
 
5 
Naive 1  (<25) 
2  (25–35) 
3  (35–45) 
4  (45–55) 
5  (55+) 
Total 
 
 
1 
 
1 
2 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
2 
1 
1 
5 
Total  8 12 20 
 
7.1.2 Apparatus and Measures 
 
The Fuji 4700 zoom digital camera (Figures 7.1 and 7.2) was chosen for use in this experiment. 
This particular product was selected as it has a mix of features, some of which are unique to this 
model and others of which should be familiar to some users as they have been employed in 
other cameras, other digital cameras, and other products. The features that the tasks were 
designed to investigate are shown in Table 7.2. 
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Table 7.2 Camera features investigated in Experiment 1 
Features common to many digital 
devices 
Features common to many cameras 
of various types 
  Execute or OK button 
  Nested menu 
  Four direction button for navigation 
  Cancel/back button 
  Play icons 
  Power button 
  Zoom function 
  Shutter button 
  Mode dial 
  Camera icon 
Features common to many digital 
cameras 
Fuji camera specific features 
  Playback icon for viewing pictures 
  Colour LCD screen  
  DISP button 
  Small lever for playback or photo 
modes 
   Greyscale LCD screen which 
provides directions for 4-way 
button  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1  Fuji 4700 front       Figure 7.2  Fuji 4700 back (Blackler et al., 2003b) 
 
Two digital video cameras were used to record the activity. As per Bocker and Suwita (1999) 
and Vermeeren (1999), one was trained on the participants’ hands as they operated the Fuji 
camera, and the other recorded the whole scene. These images were synchronously mixed and 
recorded, and later used for the analysis. The variables measured through this experiment, and 
the methods and tools used, are shown in Table 7.3.  
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Table 7.3 Variables, methods and measurement tools 
Dependent variables Methods and measurement tools 
Time to complete operations Observation using Observer Video Pro  
Correct, inappropriate and incorrect 
uses of camera features 
Observation using Observer Video Pro  
Type of each use Observation using Observer Video Pro  
Concurrent protocol 
Percentage of first or only uses of 
features per participant that were 
intuitive  
Observation using Observer Video Pro  
Concurrent protocol 
Percentage of uses of each feature that 
were intuitive 
Observation using Observer Video Pro  
Concurrent protocol 
Participants’ level of technological 
familiarity 
Technology familiarity questionnaire 
Familiarity of each feature  Structured follow up interview  
Intuitiveness of each factor of each 
feature, based on user expectations 
Structured follow up interview (rating 
scales) 
Tendency to use experience of previous 
products when encountering a new one 
Structured follow up interview 
Heart rate Plethysmograph 
Bioview software 
Skin conductance Electro-dermal activity (EDA) monitor 
Bioview software 
 
The technology familiarity (TF) questionnaire (example in Appendix B) was designed to reveal 
information about the participants’ experience and behaviour with products related to digital 
cameras. The products mentioned in the technology familiarity questionnaire were chosen as 
they were examples of common consumer electronic products that employed features and 
devices similar to those of the camera used in the study. The questionnaire asked participants 
about whether and how often they used certain products, and how much of the functionality of 
those products they used. The technology familiarity questionnaire was used to calculate the 
technology familiarity (TF) score for each participant (example in Appendix C). A higher level 
of exposure to, and depth of knowledge of, the various products in the questionnaire produced a 
higher technology familiarity score. The maximum possible score on this questionnaire was 
100, and the hypothetical minimum was 0.  
 
During the interview (Appendix D), participants were asked to rate (from 1 to 6) how familiar 
each feature was, based on other products or situations they had encountered. This question was 
designed to establish whether or not relevant past experience is transferable between contexts. 
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Participants were also asked to assess how the location, function and appearance of each feature 
they used on the camera conformed to their expectations, using simple rating scales (scale from 
1 to 6). This exercise was designed to reveal how each of the three factors of the features 
compared with each other in terms of their intuitiveness, based on users’ expectations from their 
past experience.  
 
Simonton (1980) claims that intuition is more effective than analysis at low arousal levels, and 
Hammond (1993) states that intuitive processes are characterised by low control and low 
conscious awareness, rapid processing and high confidence in the answer. Laughlin (1997) 
notes that intuition seems to perform best on an inverted “U” curve between no stimulation and 
extreme stress. He relates this to play and the conditions under which it occurs: “The 
neurocognitive growth facilitated by play involves intuitive learning, and intuitive insights 
frequently arise as a result of ‘playing around’ with a problem.” (Laughlin, 1997, p28). There is 
good evidence that high cortical arousal (typical of conscious problem solving) narrows the 
associative field and suppresses remote association. This would limit the connections to past 
experiences that can be made by the brain. A lower degree of cortical arousal allows remote and 
unusual associations to emerge (Eysenck, 1995). Bastick (1982, 2003) describes fluctuating 
anxiety during intuitive processing as related to emotional sets, and claims that these 
fluctuations can be physiologically monitored. As emotional sets are combined and answers 
found, anxiety decreases.  
 
It was therefore hypothesised that participants showing low levels of anxiety and arousal during 
product use could be using intuition, and it seemed possible that measuring arousal could be 
used to assess whether participants were processing intuitively during the different stages of the 
tasks. Psychophysiological measures of heart rate and electrodermal activity were taken during 
this experiment. It was hoped that the data from these measures would correlate with actions 
that were undertaken intuitively during the operations, and thus form a link between 
psychophysiological measurements and observations. 
 
Heart rate and skin conductance are suitable variables to choose for monitoring 
psychophysiological experiments on intuition (Bastick, 1982, 2003). Heart rate is defined as the 
number of beats per time period (i.e. minutes). The ecrine sweat glands used in electrodermal 
activity (EDA) are concentrated on the palms of the hands and soles of the feet. They respond 
primarily to a “psychic” stimulation, whereas other sweat glands respond more to increases in 
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temperature (Stern, Ray, & Davis, 1980). The psychophysiological measuring equipment 
consisted of an EDA monitor that was attached to the finger (using a Velcro strap), and a heart 
rate monitor that clipped onto the ear. 
  
7.1.3 Procedure 
 
Situational variables were minimised as much as possible. All experiments took place in an air-
conditioned room with the same level of artificial light, and the recording equipment was 
positioned in the same way for each participant. The set-up of the laboratory during 
Experiments 1, 2 and 3 is illustrated in Figure 7.3. The video camera in view is the one focussed 
(by the experimenter) on the participant’s hands. The second camera was positioned 
approximately two metres to the left of the participant’s right shoulder. 
 
Figure 7.3 Laboratory set-up during experiments 
 
Participants were first welcomed to the room and were given an information package and 
consent form to read and sign (Appendix E). Then all the equipment to be used and the tasks to 
be performed were explained clearly using a pre-determined script (Appendix F). Intuition has 
been shown to be vulnerable to anxiety (Bastick, 1982, 2003; Laughlin, 1997). Thus, a calm and 
“permissive” environment should be provided for experiments concerned with intuition 
(Bastick, 1982, 2003). Participants were encouraged not to worry about the experiment or their 
performance, and were reminded that they themselves were not being tested – a procedure 
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recommended by Allen and Buie (2002). They were then talked through the tasks that they 
would be asked to perform and the researcher made sure they were clear about what they had to 
do before they commenced the tasks, as recommended by McClelland (1995). 
 
The psychophysiological measuring equipment was attached to the participant. The participants 
were asked to wipe their hands with an alcohol swab before attaching the EDA monitor (for 
EDA to be measured reliably, the skin must be cleaned before attaching electrodes). Both of 
these sensors were attached to a PC via an RS232 cable. The Bioview software was initiated on 
the PC a couple of minutes before the experiment started in order that problems (such as 
incorrect attachments of sensors) or irregularities could be fixed before the experiment began, 
and to establish a stable baseline before interaction with the product began. At the moment 
when the video recording was started, the Bioview software was set to start recording the EDA 
and heart-rate output. The monitor displaying the results was kept out of view of the 
participants to prevent possible biofeedback.  
 
The participants were asked to complete two operations, each of which consisted of a number of 
tasks, and which (between them) involved use of most of the functions and features of the 
camera (Table 7.4). Participants were delivering concurrent protocol while they performed the 
tasks. 
Table 7.4 Operations 
1 Use the camera to take a photograph in auto-focus mode using the zoom 
function.  
2 Find the picture you took. Erase your picture. Search through the other 
images stored in the camera to find (a specified image). Zoom in on the 
image so that the details become larger.   
 
People differ in the way they explore their worlds, in the errors they are willing to risk when 
trying out a new practice, and in the amount of feedback they feel is needed before they act 
(Krippendorff, 1990). Consequently, some people will be inclined to look at the manual earlier 
than others. The manual for the camera was available only on request, and participants were 
asked to try to work out the operations for themselves. Reference to the manual would mask use 
of relevant past experience. The experimenter answered questions (where the answer did not 
give too much information as to how to proceed) and reminded participants to think aloud, but 
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otherwise did not intervene during the operations. Where the researcher was asked for more 
concrete advice, it was coded as assistance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Conducting the interview (Blackler et al., 2003b) 
 
Immediately after completion of the operations, the technology familiarity questionnaire was 
completed and the structured interview conducted (Figure 7.4). As part of the interview, 
participants were asked if they had been anxious during the test, either because of the presence 
of the experimenter, the video cameras and other equipment, or for any other reasons. None of 
the participants reported that they were especially anxious, so it can be assumed that intuition 
was not inhibited by anxiety during any of the tests.  
 
7.2 Results 
 
The Noldus Observer software was used to code the video footage as explained in Chapter 6. 
For Experiment 1 the coding differed slightly from the example given in Table 6.2 in that the 
codes attempted and mistaken were not used. Table 7.5 shows the mean and standard deviation 
for the variables time to complete operations (Time) and technology familiarity (TF), both 
overall and for each level of expertise.  
 
Table 7.5 Means and standard deviations for time and technology familiarity scores (Blackler et 
al., 2003b) 
Variable Expert 
Mean    SD 
Intermediate 
Mean    SD 
Novice 
Mean    SD 
Naïve 
Mean    SD 
Total 
Mean    SD 
TF (%) 43.4 7.5 50.2 6.6 43.2 5.2 36.8 11.1 43.4 8.7 
Time (secs) 573 564.6 657 216.9 581 386.5 1031 638.9 710.5 481.2 
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Figure 7.5 Time to complete operations plotted against level of expertise (NB. All error bars are 
standard error of the mean x1) 
 
Figure 7.5 presents means of time to complete the operations as a function of level of expertise. 
These data suggest that no strong relationship exists between time and level of expertise, and a 
one-way ANOVA reveals no significant differences between the times of the participants in the 
four groups, F(3, 16) = 1.033, p > .05. However, the power is low for this calculation (.23) and 
the effect size relatively high (E2 = .16), so there is a possibility of a Type II error here, and the 
effect could be obscured by the low power. Nevertheless, despite the relatively large effect size 
and low power, there is still no systematic pattern of decrease in time with increase in level of 
expertise.  
 
Figure 7.6 presents the relationship between time to complete the operations and the technology 
familiarity (TF) score, and shows the strong negative correlation between these two variables, 
r(18) = –0.69, p < .01 (NB: all correlations are Pearson’s product moment correlation 
coefficients).  The level of expertise of each participant is also shown.1  
                                                 
1
 This data set was also tested after removal of the outlier evident at 1995 seconds in Figure 7.6 and the result was 
still a significant negative correlation, r(17) = –0.56, p < .05 
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Figure 7.6 Time to complete operations plotted against technology familiarity score (Blackler et 
al., 2003b) 
 
Table 7.6 shows the percentages of correct, correct-but-inappropriate and incorrect uses for 
each type of use. The majority of intuitive, quick comment and reasoning uses were correct, 
while the majority of trial-and-error uses were incorrect. It must be remembered that these 
numbers represent all feature uses, including re-uses.  
Table 7.6 Type of processing and level of correctness for all feature uses (Blackler et al., 
2003b) 
 Intuitive Quick  Trial & 
error 
Reasoning Using 
manual 
Total 
Correct 64.5% 62.5% 9.6% 79% 46.2% 46% 
Inappropriate 31% 12.9% 7.9% 5.3% 23% 19.3% 
Incorrect 4.5% 24.6% 82.5% 15.7% 30.8% 34.7% 
 
There was a strong positive correlation between the percentage of intuitive first or only uses 
(correct and correct-but-inappropriate) throughout the operations and the technology familiarity 
score, r(18) = 0.643, p < .01, and a strong negative correlation between the percentage of 
intuitive first or only uses (correct and correct-but-inappropriate) and the time on the tasks, 
r(18) = –0.465, p < .05. Therefore, participants who had a higher level of technology familiarity 
were able to use more of the features intuitively the first time and were quicker at doing the 
tasks. This trend can be clearly seen in Figures 7.7 and 7.8. 
Time to complete operations (secs) 
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Figure 7.7 Technology familiarity score plotted against percentage of intuitive first or only uses 
(correct and correct-but-inappropriate) 
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Figure 7.8 Time to complete operations plotted against percentage of intuitive first or only uses 
(correct and correct-but-inappropriate)  
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The total percentage of intuitive uses of the features (correct and correct-but-inappropriate) was 
compared with the familiarity of the features. It was found that the mean familiarity of the 
features correlated strongly and positively with the mean of the percentage of intuitive uses of 
the features, r(18) = 0.523, p < .05. This is shown in Figure 7.9.  
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Figure 7.9 Mean familiarity of features plotted against mean percentage of intuitive uses of 
features (correct and correct-but-inappropriate) 
 
Thus, features that were more familiar were intuitively used more often. For example, the 
power button showed a high level of familiarity and a high percentage of intuitive uses. The 
navigate function of the menu also achieved a high percentage of intuitive uses and a high level 
of familiarity. The DISP function, which controls the displays on the LCD screen, showed a 
very low level of familiarity and a correspondingly low percentage of intuitive uses. Only 
experts who had used similar digital cameras picked up this function easily. 
 
During the interview, participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with two 
statements. Statement 1 was: “I use my knowledge of products that I am familiar with to guide 
me in using a new product of the same type.” A total of 65% agreed strongly with this statement 
and 35% agreed (none disagreed). Statement 2 was: “I use my knowledge of products that I am 
familiar with to guide me in using a new product of a different type.” A total of 55% agreed 
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strongly with this statement, 35% agreed and 10% disagreed. Figure 7.10 shows these 
relationships, and demonstrates that those who agreed less strongly with the statements took 
more time to complete the operations.  
 
Figure 7.10 Time to complete operations against responses to Statements 1 and 2 
 
A t test for Statement 1 showed a significant difference in time taken between those who agreed 
and those who strongly agreed, t(18) = –2.671, p < .05. There was also a significant difference 
in time between those who agreed with Statement 2 and those who strongly agreed, t(16) = –
2.73, p < .05. In both cases, those who strongly agreed were significantly faster at completing 
the operations than those who only agreed. 
 
When asked about the intuitiveness (based on expectations) of the three factors of each feature 
(function, location and appearance), some participants rated one factor of a feature at one end of 
the scale and another factor of the same feature at the other end. Ratings ranged from 1 (low, 
unexpected factor) to 6 (high, very familiar and expected factor) For example, the camera icon 
had high means of 4.00 for function and 4.20 for appearance, but a lower mean of 2.95 for 
location. This icon is located in an ambiguous position (Figure 7.11) so it could be a label for 
one of two or three different buttons on the interface. The power button had a high mean of 5.15 
for function, but lower means of 4.10 for appearance and 3.10 for location. The power button is 
located inside the mode switch (Figure 7.11), and is neither colour-coded nor clearly labelled. 
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This made it difficult for many participants to find, although all knew they had to find a power 
button or switch of some kind as the first step.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.11 Detail of camera icon and power button  
 
An ANOVA showed that the difference in heart rate between the start and end of the operations 
was significant, F(3,16) = 7.324, p < .01. A Tukey HSD post hoc test revealed that the expert 
group was significantly different from the naïve (p =.027) and intermediate (p = .002) groups, 
but not the novice group (p = .18). The experts all showed an increase in heart rate during the 
test, rather than the decrease that may be expected if the experts were more relaxed. For 
electrodermal activity, the ANOVA was not significant, F(3,16) = 1.337, p > .05 (power = .288, 
Ε2 = .2). As the effect size is large and the power low, it is possible that any differences were 
masked by the low power. However, only 3 of the 20 participants showed a decrease in EDA 
over the experiment, so the expected decrease in anxiety for those with a higher level of 
expertise did not occur. Correlations between TF score and differences in both heart rate, r(18) 
= –.186, p > .05, and EDA, r(18) = –.886, p > .05, were not significant. It was not possible 
either to draw out specific instances of increases or decreases in EDA or heart rate and map 
them to particular uses during the operations, as the Bioview data showed no relation to the 
sequence of events during the operations.  
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7.3 Discussion 
 
These results suggest that prior exposure to products employing similar features helped 
participants to complete the operations more quickly and intuitively. The Fuji camera borrows, 
or transfers, features from other digital products. Thus, even expert users of digital cameras who 
had limited experience with other digital products completed the tasks more slowly and 
effortfully than novices with digital cameras who did have experience with the features 
employed in the camera from using other products. This is shown in the strong negative 
correlation between time and TF score.  
 
The fact that there is no correlation between time and level of expertise with digital cameras 
also supports this conclusion, and suggests that grouping participants into expert, intermediate, 
novice and naïve with the product seems to be less relevant when investigating intuitive use 
than some other aspects of usability, because intuitive use involves applying knowledge from 
other contexts and other products. A grouping based on a technology familiarity (TF) score may 
be more relevant in this situation. 
 
Participants who had little or no experience with digital cameras but who had used other digital 
devices seemed to be able to use familiar features intuitively. This conclusion is supported by 
the correlations between familiarity of features and percentage of intuitive uses, and intuitive 
first uses (correct and correct-but-inappropriate) and technology familiarity scores. The first 
uses results are particularly important as the participants had not yet had the opportunity to 
learn about the feature but used it either correctly or correctly-but-inappropriately the first time 
they encountered it. They could base their actions only on relevant past experience of similar 
features or objects, so this result offers strong support for the idea that including familiar 
features in a product will allow people to use them intuitively the first time. The high 
percentage of intuitive uses that were correct seems to confirm Bastick’s (1982; 2003) 
statement that intuition is generally correct but not infallible. 
 
The close association between level of agreement by participants that they use knowledge 
gained from the use of one product to help them learn about another and their time to complete 
the operations, could also be seen as support for the hypothesis that intuitive use is governed by 
past experience.  People who took longer to complete tasks because they did not use their 
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existing knowledge of other products were less likely to transfer knowledge from other products 
and apply it to the use of the camera. The camera borrowed many features from other digital 
products (not primarily from cameras), so transferring knowledge from other types of products 
was necessary in order to complete the tasks quickly and intuitively. 
 
Through the interview process, it has been confirmed that location, function and appearance of 
features on the product are factors that need to be separated for the purpose of this type of 
analysis. Also, this differentiation can show quite clearly which factor of a feature may be 
responsible for problems that people have with using that feature. This would allow designers to 
correct the right problem (e.g. location of the power button), not the wrong one (e.g. function of 
the power button). 
 
The results from the psychophysiological data were disappointing. However, it has proved 
extremely difficult to mark a clear cut difference or sudden shift between conscious and 
unconscious thought (Eysenck, 1995). Bastick (1982; 2003) claims that the resolution of 
discordant requirements results in the most awesome of intuitions: the Eureka experience. 
However, the most mundane intuitive judgement of suitability occurs where the simultaneously 
perceived novel requirements are concordant with the current emotional set because of their 
shared attributes with the stimuli evoking the emotional set. Few new associations have been 
created to obtain this structure, and little satisfaction and reduction of anxiety accompanies the 
small increase in redundancy. This could explain the lack of coherent results from the 
psychophysiological measurements; the small successes that the participants had when they 
used a feature intuitively were too close together to be distinguishable and not large enough to 
affect the level of arousal.  
 
Also, EDA can be affected by other variables such as age, gender, menstrual cycle, race, 
temperature, humidity, time of day, day of week and season. Sometimes even a deep breath will 
produce a response, and Stern et al. (1980) suggest discounting responses for 20 seconds after 
such a disturbance. The latency of EDA is the time from stimulus to onset of the electrodermal 
response, which is usually 1.3 to 2.5 seconds. In this case, the latency of EDA could not keep 
up with the rate at which some participants were using the product, and stopping the experiment 
after a deep breath was not possible as it would have interfered with the measurement of other 
performance parameters and may have affected performance itself. Therefore, it is not really a 
suitable measure for this type of experiment.  
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7.4 Summary 
 
Experiment 1 was conducted in order to test the thesis that intuitive interaction involves 
utilising knowledge gained through other products or experience(s). Participants were video-
recorded using a digital camera, while delivering concurrent protocol. Subsequently, 
participants were asked how familiar each feature was to them and they completed a technology 
familiarity questionnaire. In the questionnaire, participants indicated how often they used 
common consumer electronics products, and how much of the functionality of those products 
they used. This questionnaire was used to calculate each participant’s technology familiarity 
(TF) score.  
 
The results suggested that prior exposure to products employing similar features helped 
participants to complete the operations more quickly and intuitively, and more familiar features 
were intuitively used more often. The camera borrowed features from other digital products, so 
expert users of digital cameras who had low technology familiarity completed the tasks more 
slowly and effortfully than digital camera novices who had higher technology familiarity.  
 
Chapter 8 will detail the second experiment, which was based on Experiment 1. A different 
product was used as mediator for Experiment 2, and there was also some adaptation to method 
and measures based on lessons learned from Experiment 1. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Experiment 2 
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8.0 Introduction 
 
Experiment 1 established that there was no significant difference between the time taken to 
perform the tasks for the different levels of experience with a particular product type if the 
product transferred features from similar products and other things. Instead, the strong 
correlations were between the TF score and fast, intuitive use of the product, and between 
familiarity with and intuitive uses of features. Grouping participants into expert, intermediate, 
novice and naïve with the product type seems to be less relevant when investigating intuitive 
use than some other aspects of usability. 
 
Experiment 2 was based on the same method as Experiment 1. However, the 
psychophysiological measurements, which revealed no useful data, were not taken. Also, a 
different product was employed: a universal remote control rather than a camera. The questions 
about whether participants accessed their previous experience when using a new product were 
also not used as they were seen as being more subjective than the rest of the data. 
 
This experiment was designed: to further establish if relevant past experience of remote control 
features increases the speed and/or intuitiveness with which people can use those features and, 
therefore, the product; to further establish that interface knowledge is transferred from known 
products to new ones; and to gain an understanding of the intuitiveness of features of the remote 
control used in the experiment, in order to redesign it for Experiment 3. Experiment 2 has also 
been reported by Blackler, Popovic and Mahar (2003a; 2007b) 
 
8.1 Method 
8.1.1 Participants and Experiment Design 
 
University staff were asked to volunteer to take part in the study. Participants were selected 
from the pool of volunteers. None of the participants had encountered the remote control used 
in the tests before the experiment began, and all participants were volunteers who received no 
payment in return for their participation. 
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Technology familiarity (TF) was the independent variable (IV) used to group the participants. 
This experiment was also a between-groups matched-subjects design, and thirty people in three 
groups (high, medium and low level of technology familiarity) participated (Table 8.1). The 
group splits are as follows: 33rd percentile is at TF score of 56 and the 66th percentile is at 73.6. 
Individual differences were controlled by choosing a cross-section of the community in terms of 
age, level of education and gender for each group. 
Table 8.1 Participant groups for Experiment 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The technology familiarity questionnaire (Appendix B) was used as a recruitment tool in this 
case. It was adapted from the one used for the first experiment to include products with features 
similar to the remote, rather than products with features similar to the camera. The maximum 
TF group Age group Gender Education level 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 
25–35 
25–35 
25–35 
25–35 
<25 
25–35 
25–35 
25–35 
25–35 
<25 
Female 
Female 
Female 
Female 
Female 
Male 
Male 
Male 
Male 
Male 
Postgraduate 
Postgraduate 
Graduate 
Further Education 
School 
Graduate 
School 
Postgraduate 
Graduate 
School 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
25–35 
25–35 
25–35 
35–45 
35–45 
44–55 
44–55 
25–35 
25–35 
35–45 
Female 
Female 
Female 
Female 
Female 
Female 
Female 
Male 
Male 
Male 
Postgraduate 
School 
Graduate 
Postgraduate 
Postgraduate 
Further Education 
Postgraduate 
Graduate 
Postgraduate 
School 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
25–35 
35–45 
44–55 
44–55 
44–55 
55+ 
55+ 
55+ 
55+ 
55+ 
Female 
Female 
Female 
Female 
Female 
Female 
Male 
Male 
Male 
Male 
Postgraduate 
Postgraduate 
Postgraduate 
School 
Further Education 
Further Education 
Postgraduate 
Postgraduate 
Postgraduate 
School 
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possible score for this questionnaire was 110 and the hypothetical minimum was 0. The score 
was calculated as shown in Appendix C. 
8.1.2 Apparatus and Measures 
 
The Marantz RC5000i universal touch screen remote control was programmed to control a 
Panasonic NV SD 220 VCR and NEC Chromovision TV. The operations were designed to 
investigate seventeen of the features of the product (Figures 8.1 to 8.2), some of which are 
common to many digital devices, and others of which are found on most audiovisual (AV) 
equipment and software. The experiment was performed using the default interface on the 
remote control, and the programming involved teaching the remote to control the devices, using 
the remote controls supplied with those devices. The tasks were designed to investigate the 
features of the product detailed in Table 8.2 and representative examples are illustrated in 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2. 
Table 8.2 Remote control features investigated in Experiment 2 
Features common to digital devices and software 
On function 
Tabbed windows or screens 
Back/ahead 
Home  
Home page 
Touch screen/soft keys 
Drop down menu 
Navigation within and between devices 
Scroll arrows 
4-way navigation arrows 
Enter key 
Menu 
Features common to remotes and AV equipment  
TV on/off 
VCR on/off 
Play  
Stop  
Forward/rewind 
Skip/index 
Pause 
Volume control 
Channel selection 
AV function 
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        Figure 8.1 Remote on TV keypad screen   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Figure 8.2 Remote on VCR main screen 
 
As per Experiment 1, two digital video cameras were used to record the activity. These pictures 
were digitally mixed to produce one MPEG file that showed both scenes (Figure 8.3). One 
camera was trained on the participants’ hands as they operated the remote, and the other 
recorded the whole scene which showed especially where they were looking: at the TV and 
VCR, or at the remote. This helped to reveal their expectations of the features. 
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Figure 8.3 Mixed views from both video cameras 
 
The following methods and tools were chosen to measure the dependent variables (Table 8.3). It 
can be seen that these variables and measurement tools are very similar to those in Experiment 
1. 
Table 8.3 Variables, methods and measurement tools 
Dependent variables Methods and measurement tools 
Time to complete operations Observation using Observer  
Number of first or only uses of features 
per participant that were intuitive 
Observation using Observer   
Concurrent protocol 
Assistance received Observation using Observer  
Concurrent Protocol 
Familiarity of each feature  Structured follow up interview  
Intuitiveness of each factor of each 
feature, based on user expectations 
Structured follow up interview  
(rating scales) 
Percentage of uses of each feature that 
were intuitive 
Observation using Observer  
Concurrent protocol 
Mistakes for each feature Observation using Observer  
Concurrent protocol 
Unsuccessful attempts on each feature Observation using Observer  
Concurrent protocol 
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8.1.3 Procedure 
 
The procedure was the same as for Experiment 1, except that the psychophysiological 
equipment was not used, and the remote control was the mediating product instead of the 
camera. The remote control was left on the home screen or panel, the TV and VCR were on the 
same channels, and the videotape in the VCR was left in the same position in the program for 
each experiment.  The tasks that participants were asked to complete were also different 
because of the new product (Table 8.4).  
Table 8.4.Operations 
1 Use the remote control to turn on the television and VCR and start playing 
the tape in the VCR 
2 Go to the start of the current recording (give name of program), play that 
scene for a few seconds and then stop the tape. 
3 Reset the clock on the VCR to 1724 
 
Following completion of these operations, participants were interviewed using a structured 
proforma (Appendix D). During the interview, participants gave ratings for familiarity of each 
feature and the expectedness of the function, the location and the appearance of each feature. 
They were also asked if they had been anxious and, if so, why. The majority of those who felt 
anxious became so because of their frustration with the product, not because they were being 
watched and recorded. It can therefore be assumed that reactive effects from being observed 
were minimal. A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences in numbers of intuitive 
uses between those who were anxious, a little anxious or not at all anxious, F(2, 27) 1.153, p > 
.05.  
 
Noldus Observer was used to code the video footage as explained in Section 6.5. The mistake 
code was added for this experiment as the touch screen had small “buttons” and mistakes were 
relatively common compared to the number made with the camera. Attempted use was also 
added, based on experience with the previous analysis. 
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8.2 Results 
 
The coded data were compared with the answers given during the interview to give two sets of 
results: those concerned with the features of the remote and their performance, and those 
concerned with the participants and their performance. This two-pronged approach was taken in 
order to fulfil all the objectives of the experiment: to learn more about the way people use their 
past experience when using a new product, and to assess the product features with a view to re-
designing them.  
 
8.2.1 Participant Focussed Results 
 
The performance measures used were the same as those employed in Experiment 1: time to 
complete tasks and number of intuitive uses, particularly intuitive first uses. There were no 
significant differences in the time to complete the tasks based on level of education, F(3,26) = 
.84, p > .05 (Ε2 = .088, power = .206), or gender, t(28) = .55, p > .05 (Ε2 = .011, power = .083). 
The ANOVA for anxiety and time showed no significant effect on time to complete operations, 
F(2,27) = 3.42 , p = .048 (Ε2 = .202, power = .592), as the  Levene’s test revealed a breach of 
homogeneity, F(2,27) = 4.90, p < .05, and so a strict alpha level of  .025 was adopted in 
accordance with Keppell’s (1998) recommendation. An ANOVA showed that anxiety, F(2,27) 
= 1.15, p > .05 (Ε2 = .079, power = .23) also did not affect the number of intuitive first uses. 
Level of education had no significant effect on intuitive uses, F(3,26) = 2.03, p > .05 (Ε2 = .19, 
power = .46). A t test revealed that gender also had no significant effect on number of intuitive 
first uses, t(28) = 1.59, p > .05. In these cases, where the power is low to moderate and the 
effect size moderate, there is a possibility of a Type II error and it may be that one or more of 
these variables has an effect on time and/or intuitive uses.  
 
Table 8.5 shows the means and standard deviations for the variable time to complete operations, 
and Figure 8.4 presents the relationship between time to complete the operations and the 
technology familiarity (TF) group. A one-way ANOVA revealed that Levene’s test showed that 
homogeneity was breached, F(2,27) = 10.22, p < .0001. Therefore, again in accordance with 
Keppel (1998), a strict alpha level of .025 has been adopted. The ANOVA showed a significant 
difference in time to complete tasks, F(2,27) = 5.77, p < .008. According to the Tukey HSD 
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test, this difference was between the high TF and low TF groups (p = .006). Therefore, 
participants who had a higher level of technology familiarity were quicker at doing the tasks. 
Table 8.5 Means and standard deviations for time to complete operations 
TF Group Low TF 
Mean     SD 
Medium TF 
Mean     SD 
High TF 
Mean     SD 
Total 
Mean     SD 
Time (secs) 1380.9 834.45 952.4 352.95 554.9 261.88 962.7 627.48 
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Figure 8.4 Time to complete operations for each technology familiarity group (NB: All error 
bars are standard error of the mean x1). 
 
Table 8.6 shows the mean and standard deviations for time to complete tasks for each age 
group. Levene’s test showed a breach of homogeneity , F(3,26) = 8.73, p < .000, so the alpha 
level of 0.25 was adopted. Age group had a significant main effect on time to complete 
operations, F(3,26) = 11.26, p < .0001. This relationship is shown in Figure 8.5. The Tukey post 
hoc test showed that there were significant differences in time to complete tasks between the 
18–34 age group and the 45–54 (p = .005) and > 55 (p = .001) age groups. In addition, there 
was a significant difference between the 35–44 group and the >55 group (p = .015). 
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Table 8.6 Means and standard deviations for time to complete tasks by age groups 
Age Group Age 18–34 
Mean      SD 
Age 35–44 
Mean     SD 
Age 45–54 
Mean    SD 
Age >55 
Mean     SD 
Time (secs) 605.6 257.07 797 283.1 1446 393 1754.6 882.6 
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Figure 8.5 Time to complete tasks by age group 
 
Unfortunately, the recruitment questionnaire asked people for their age group rather than their 
exact age, so it is not possible to re-arrange the groups to give a more even spread of people 
within each group. Also, age was distributed across the technology familiarity groups but was 
not strictly grouped, so the effect of age on performance needed to be investigated further with 
a stricter grouping. This was done through Experiment 3 (Section 9.3). 
 
A one-way ANOVA revealed that TF group had a significant effect on the number of intuitive 
first uses (correct or correct-but-inappropriate), F(2,27) = 8.58, p < .001 (Figure 8.6), with a 
Tukey post hoc test showing that the high TF group had significantly more intuitive first uses 
than the low TF group (p = .001). Therefore, participants who had a higher level of technology 
familiarity were able to use more of the features intuitively the first time they encountered them. 
A one-way ANOVA also showed that age group significantly affected the number of intuitive 
first uses, F(3, 26) = 8.62, p < .0001 (Figure 8.7), with the Tukey post hoc test showing the 
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significant difference between the 18–34 groups and both the 45–54 group (p = .003) and the 
>55 group (p = .002).  
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Figure 8.6 Intuitive first uses (correct and correct-but-inappropriate) by TF group 
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Figure 8.7 Intuitive first uses (correct and correct-but-inappropriate) by age group 
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Those with a lower technology familiarity score, as well as taking more time and using the 
features less intuitively, also required more assistance. There was a strong positive correlation 
between time and number of times help was given, r(28) = .86, p < .0001, and a significant 
negative correlation between TF score and number of times help was given, r(28) = –.53, p < 
.005 (Figure 8.8).2  
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Figure 8.8 Number of occasions help was given plotted against TF score 
 
8.2.2 Feature Focussed Results 
 
Table 8.7 shows the mean familiarity, mean percentage of intuitive uses (correct and correct-
but-inappropriate) and mean percentage of intuitive first uses (correct and correct-but-
inappropriate) per feature. This table highlights the features that needed to be focussed on as 
part of the re-design process. Those nearest the bottom of the table were those that participants 
had the most trouble with (i.e. smaller percentage of intuitive uses and intuitive first uses and 
more mistakes).  
                                                 
2
 This data set was also tested after removal of the two outliers evident in Figure 8.8 and the result remained 
significant, r(26) = –.419, p < .05. 
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Table 8.7 Mean familiarity, mean percentage of intuitive uses and intuitive first uses 
Feature Mean 
familiarity 
Percentage of 
intuitive uses 
Percentage of 
intuitive first uses 
Play 5.87 97.0 100 
Windows 4.92 90.0 80 
Stop 4.90 85.7 73.3 
Home 4.92 85.5 57 
Forward/rewind 5.81 80.2 85 
4-way 4.67 72.0 56.6 
Number pad 5.72 70.5 57 
VCR on/off 4.83 66.6 60.71 
Enter N/A 64.4 50 
Menu 5.05 64.3 60 
Navigation 4.50 57.1 46.67 
Volume/channel 5.82 45.7 73.3 
TV on/off 4.77 40.0 50 
AV function 3.78 36.0 28.57 
Remote on 3.03 36.0 6.67 
Back/ahead 4.80 32.5 11.10 
Skip/index 2.76 6.3 15.38 
 
The percentage of intuitive uses of the features was compared with the familiarity of the 
features. It was found that the mean familiarity of the features correlated strongly and positively 
with the mean of the percentage of intuitive uses of the features (correct and correct-but-
inappropriate), r(n = 17) = .698, p < .002 (Figure 8.9). Mean familiarity of features and intuitive 
uses of features (correct only) did not correlate significantly, r(n = 17) = .38, p > .05. However, 
the correlation is moderate so it is possible that this result was not significant due to low power. 
The percentage of intuitive first uses of features (correct and correct-but-inappropriate) also 
correlated strongly and positively with familiarity, r(15) = .80, p < .0001 (Figure 8.10), as did 
the percentage of intuitive first uses of features (correct only), r(14) = .75, p < .001. 
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Figure 8.9 Mean familiarity of features plotted against mean percentage of intuitive uses of 
feature (correct and correct-but-inappropriate) 
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Figure 8.10 Intuitive first uses of features (correct and correct-but-inappropriate) plotted against 
familiarity of features 
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These data show that features that were more familiar were intuitively used more often. For 
example, the play and forward/rewind functions both had high means from the familiarity 
ratings, and high percentages of intuitive uses. 
 
No clear pattern was evident in the function, location and appearance data and there were no 
correlations between scores on these ratings and percentages of intuitive uses. Table 8.8 has 
been organised with lowest scores nearest the bottom, so it can be seen that some of the same 
features that had lower familiarity and lower percentage of intuitive uses also scored lower on 
these rating scales.  
Table 8.8 Mean function, location and appearance score for each feature 
Feature Mean 
function 
Mean 
location 
Mean 
appearance 
Volume/channel 5.87 5.53 5.67 
Remote on 5.74 5.48 5.48 
Numbers  5.53 5.37 5.37 
Stop     5.43 5.17 4.63 
Touch screen 5.40 5.67 5.10 
VCR on/off 5.30 4.93 4.73 
TV on/off 5.13 4.03 5.03 
4-way     5.00 4.93 5.20 
Play     4.83 3.87 3.40 
Navigation 4.83 5.20 5.40 
Menu     4.70 4.33 4.13 
Forward/rewind  4.68 4.72 4.64 
Windows  4.63 4.53 4.10 
Home     4.43 4.40 5.05 
Back/ahead 4.40 3.84 3.56 
AV function 4.18 3.45 4.18 
Skip/index 3.58 3.47 3.63 
 
This suggests that the data from this exercise are not completely random, but there is no 
evidence of any clear differentiation between function, location and appearance as there was in 
Experiment 1. This may have been because the remote control is a more complex product than 
the camera and it is harder for participants to distinguish the different factors from each other. 
Thus, many participants put similar scores for each factor on most features. Also, they were not 
supervised while completing this section, so it was decided that, for Experiment 3, this rating 
exercise would be more a part of the interview and participants would be supervised and 
assisted where necessary while undertaking it. 
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Other problems with several features have also been revealed by this analysis. For example, 
knowing the number of mistakes and attempts with each feature helped to evaluate button size 
and sensitivity. Incorrect uses for each feature also give an indication of how difficult each one 
was to use. Most mistakes and attempts were due to the size or labelling of the buttons. 
Incorrect uses could be due to lack of familiarity or poor labelling; people were unable to tell 
what a feature did, so used it to try to do something else. Tables 8.9 to 8.11 show those features 
that had mistaken, incorrect and unsuccessful uses. Those features not listed in each table had 
none of that type of use. Again, the poorest performing features are nearest the bottom of the 
tables. 
 Table 8.9 Mistakes per feature 
Feature Percentage of uses that 
were mistakes 
Back/ahead 0.41% 
Windows 0.54% 
Stop 0.5% 
Navigation 0.76% 
Menu 1.3% 
Forward/rewind 2.0% 
 
Table 8.10 Unsuccessful attempts per feature 
Feature Percentage of uses that 
were unsuccessful attempts 
Windows 0.36% 
Play 0.61% 
Navigation 1.52% 
Remote on 4.26% 
Skip/index 9.38% 
Back/ahead 26.83% 
 
During the interview, participants were also asked to nominate the main things they would like 
to see changed on the remote control. This was an optional question and not all participants 
answered it, while some mentioned several points. The answers are summarised in Table 8.12. 
It can be seen that more problems or desired changes were mentioned by low and medium TF 
participants compared to high TF participants, but there were some features that caused 
problems for several of them. Again, these are placed at the bottom of the table. 
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Table 8.11 Incorrect uses per feature 
Feature Percentage of uses that were incorrect 
TV on/off 2.94% 
Number pads 2.94% 
Windows 3.78% 
Forward/rewind 7.69% 
VCR on/off 8.64% 
Stop 8.93% 
Menu 11.04% 
4-way 12.77% 
Back/ahead 19.51% 
Navigation 20.56% 
Enter 23.9% 
AV function 24.0% 
Volume/channel 29.76% 
Skip/index 40.63% 
 
Table 8.12 Main problems mentioned by participants 
Feature or problem Number of times feature or problem  
was mentioned by participants 
 
High TF   Medium TF    Low TF    Total 
AV function  1  1 
TV on/off  1  1 
Home unexpected 1  1 2 
Stop 1  1 2 
Remote on  2  2 
Menu  1 1 2 
Windows unclear  1 2 3 
Help function requested  1 2 3 
Size of buttons 1  3 4 
Navigation 2 1 3 6 
Back/ahead 4 5 2 11 
Total 9 13 15 37 
 
8.3 Discussion 
 
The relationships reported here between time, TF score and intuitive uses of the features 
support the findings of Experiment 1. People seem to use their previous experience with similar 
features in order to use new features intuitively. These results also suggest that the decision to 
use TF score as the independent variable to group participants (rather than level of expertise) 
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was the right one. The TF groups show significant differences between them whereas, in 
Experiment 1, the novice, naïve, intermediate and expert groups did not. Again, the data on 
intuitive first uses are particularly important as they strongly suggest that people are able to use 
a feature intuitively the first time they encounter it if they are already familiar with a similar 
feature.  
 
Lower TF users did not seem to differentiate the hierarchy in the remote; they were not always 
sure if they were in VCR or TV mode, and often did not seem sure where they would end up if 
they went “back”. Higher TF users often were able to infer the hierarchy of the system through 
using it, whereas the very lowest TF users became more confused and made more mistakes the 
longer they tried to work out a task. Towards the end of the sessions they made mistakes even 
with features they had used correctly earlier. This could possibly be an example of anxiety 
interfering with their intuition, or may be indicative of fatigue. These users were also more 
likely to keep on doing the same thing to try to get the remote to “hear” them, rather than trying 
something else. For example, one participant was convinced that she should be able to enter the 
time through the number pads, and she kept trying to do that even though the system never 
responded to her attempts. 
 
The relationship between age and intuitive uses and time on task is an interesting one and needs 
further clarification. Because of the design of the experiment, the results for age can only be 
treated as preliminary at this stage. This issue was addressed for Experiment 3 and will be 
investigated further in Chapter 9. 
 
Features that are less familiar to users have less intuitive uses, more mistaken uses, more 
unsuccessful attempts and more incorrect uses. Therefore, using familiar features in new 
products should be the key to intuitive use. The detailed data on the features obtained from this 
experiment have enabled the re-design of the remote control in a systematic way that is aimed at 
increasing the intuitiveness of the product.  
 
Features that appear near the bottom of Tables 8.6 to 8.11 presented the most problems and 
became the priorities for re-design. They were less familiar to users, and showed less intuitive 
uses, more mistaken uses, more unsuccessful attempts and more incorrect uses. There were 
several that appeared at the bottoms of each of the charts. Therefore the features chosen to focus 
on were: back/ahead, remote on, navigation, 4-way, AV function, menu and skip/index. 
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8.3.1 Redesign Issues  
 
In this discussion, some features will be examined in detail, as examples of features that caused 
particular problems. Further discussion of the usability and re-design issues that were revealed 
by this experiment can be found in Blackler, Popovic and Mahar (2003a). 
 
Back/ahead (Figure 8.1) had 20% incorrect uses, 26.83% unsuccessful attempts, 32.5% intuitive 
uses (correct and correct-but-inappropriate) and only 11.1% intuitive first uses (correct and 
correct-but-inappropriate both 11.1%). However, familiarity was reasonable with a mean of 4.8 
on a 1 to 6 scale. Although the majority of participants were familiar with a feature of this sort, 
mostly from Internet browsers, they performed badly when using it. There are several reasons 
for this. The back/ahead buttons appear to be unlabelled. They are in fact hard keys with soft 
labels, but very few of the participants realised this. Many of the uses were simply frustrated 
attempts to find something to press, especially at the start of the operations when some people 
did not realise that the remote had a touch screen. Most of the unsuccessful attempts occurred 
when people saw the back/ahead labels but did not realise they related to the hard buttons and 
tried to press the labels on the screen instead. 
 
These buttons therefore needed redesigning. The most obvious problem was lack of labelling, 
which indicated that the hard buttons could be labelled with arrows similar to the Internet 
browsers that users were familiar with, and the labels on the screen needed to be made bigger 
and clearer and related more definitely to the physical buttons. 
 
Another factor that was highlighted by this experiment was the lack of consistency in the 
existing design. Consistency is assumed to enhance the user’s possibility for transfer of skill 
from one system to another, and it allows the user to predict what the system will do (Nielsen, 
1989). Consistency in the design should therefore allow more intuitive use. The TV and VCR 
on and off features are a good example (Figures 8.1 and 8.2). The two appliances are generally 
used together, but were not turned on in the same way in the default remote design tested. The 
VCR window had two separate buttons labelled with the words “on” and “off”, while the TV 
window had a single, rather inconspicuous power button with an icon very similar to the 
standard power symbol on it. The VCR on/off buttons were in the “main” window, while the 
TV power button was in the “keypad” window. This confused many of the participants, with 
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some lower TF users saying the VCR buttons were clearer and easier to spot; for them, the 
words on/off were more familiar than the power symbol used for TV on/off. The TV on/off 
feature had only 50% intuitive first uses, while the VCR on/off feature had 60.71%.  
 
The stop and play features (Figure 8.2) also demonstrate this. Stop had only a symbol and not a 
word, whereas the play function used the word “play”. Play had 100% intuitive first uses, 10 
per group. Stop had 10 for the high TF group and only 6 for each of the medium and low groups 
(73% overall). Of the eight people who failed to use the stop function intuitively the first time, 
six were in the 45–54 and >55 age groups, so it is possible to assume that age might have been 
the contributing factors in the result.  
 
There could have been two reasons for this: the size of the button or the familiarity of the 
symbol. Because the button was so small, it is possible that older users found it more difficult to 
see (indeed, both the younger users who also failed to use it intuitively first time wore 
spectacles). Several people pressed the circular skip button (which actually had no function) 
when looking for stop; thus, making the stop button an equivalent size to the play button may 
also make it more obvious and communicate its status as a function on the same level as the 
play button. Alternatively, the symbol stop was less well recognised by these people than the 
word play. A solution would be to use both words and symbols, or words only.  
 
8.4 Summary 
 
Experiment 2 was conducted using a universal remote control to further test the thesis that 
intuitive use is based on past experience with similar features. Technology familiarity score was 
the independent variable. This was determined by the technology familiarity questionnaire 
which was adapted to include products similar to the remote rather than the camera. The results 
from Experiment 2 accord with those from Experiment 1: the more familiar a feature is, the 
more quickly and intuitively people are able to use it by transferring knowledge of known 
products to the new one. The detailed data enabled the re-design of the remote control in a 
systematic way that was aimed at increasing the possibility of intuitive interaction with the 
product. The new design and further experimentation will be discussed in Chapter 9. Neither of 
the first two experiments revealed which factors of the features (function, location or 
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appearance) have the most influence on intuitive interaction. This is also addressed in Chapter 
9.
 173 
 
Chapter 9 
 
Redesign and Experiment 3 
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9.0 Introduction 
 
Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that prior knowledge of features of a digital camera and a 
universal remote control allowed participants to use those features intuitively. Three factors – 
function, location and appearance – were investigated in Experiments 1 and 2 through 
subjective feedback from participants, with some measure of success. However, the subjective 
data were not definitive enough for the more complex product (the remote), so Experiment 3 
was designed to investigate the factors more empirically. This involved re-designing and testing 
the remote control.  
 
This chapter first details the principles for intuitive use that were developed on the basis of the 
results from Experiments 1 and 2, and which were then used to re-design the remote control. It 
then describes Experiment 3, which was developed to test several different interface designs on 
the remote control. The intention was to further explore the factors of function, location and 
appearance by manipulating them. Since function was pre-determined by the product, the 
experiment was designed to establish whether the location or appearance of a feature was the 
dominant factor in intuitive use. It was predicted that the new designs would result in quicker 
times and more intuitive uses than the default interface, and that the experiment should 
determine whether location or appearance would have the most effect. This experiment has also 
been reported elsewhere (Blackler, Popovic, & Mahar, 2004a; Blackler et al., 2007b). 
 
9.1 Principles of Intuitive Interaction 
 
A method, or at least a formalised approach, is needed to increase the probability of designers 
developing display designs that support the nature of decision making in dynamic environments 
(Wong, 1999). Existing methods contain procedures for exhaustive analysis and description of 
the cognitive work and the complexities of the task domain. “However, the literature provides 
little advice on how the understanding and insight gained from these processes should be 
represented. This is the design gap”  (Wong, 1999, p2). Numerous guidelines for detail design 
are available; for example, colour, placement of text and so on (for examples, see Wickens et al. 
1998). However, there are currently no guidelines that are directed explicitly at intuitive 
interaction. The following preliminary principles were developed on the basis of the 
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experimentation reported in Chapters 7 and 8 and cover all three factors of function, location 
and appearance of the features on a product or interface.  
 
1. Use familiar symbols and/or words for well-known functions, place them in a familiar 
or expected position and make the function comparable with similar functions users 
have seen before. 
2. Make it obvious what less well-known functions will do by using familiar things as 
metaphors to demonstrate their function. Again, use familiar symbols and/or words 
and location. 
3. Increase the consistency between devices and features so that function, location and 
appearance of features are consistent between different parts of the design (in this 
case, between AV devices) and on every page, panel and/or part. 
 
9.2 Re-Design 
 
These principles were applied to the re-design of the remote control. Since the functions of the 
remote control’s features were already determined, it was possible to make changes only to the 
location and appearance of the features. There were several features with which participants 
performed the worst in terms of mistakes, intuitive uses and incorrect uses, as explained in 
Chapter 8. Those selected to focus on for the re-design were: back/ahead, AV function, 
skip/index, remote on, 4-way and menu. Navigation was also flagged as a problem area in 
Chapter 8. However, it is not included in this analysis as it was not possible within the 
constraints of the remote control programming to re-design the navigation structure or interface. 
Nevertheless, some very minor changes were made to the scroll arrows that formed part of the 
navigation system. 
 
9.2.1 Interface Design Process 
 
Eighteen postgraduate industrial designers were asked to re-design the remote control interface 
according to the principles proposed above. The researcher developed a brief, specifying the 
icons to be used for particular features (Appendix G), and students were given copies of the 
icons specified in enlarged format. Before starting the design process, the students watched a 
presentation explaining the research and the previous findings. They also attempted the tasks 
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used for Experiment 2 in order to gain experience at using the remote control, and completed 
the ratings for function, location and appearance of features which were part of the interview for 
Experiment 2 (Appendix D).  
Table 9.1 Re-designed features 
Feature Reference for design Illustration  
Play CEI/IEC 60417-2 
ISO/IEC 18035 
             
Stop ISO/IEC 18035 
 
          
               
Forward/rewind CEI/IEC 60417-2 
ISO/IEC 18035 
              
4-way Designers choice  
VCR on/off CEI/IEC 60417-2 
              
Enter Designers choice  
Menu Label as VCR menu 
Exact style designers choice 
 
TV on/off CEI/IEC 60417-2 
            
AV function Label as TV/Video  
Exact style designers choice 
 
Remote on Label as “Touch screen to start” 
or similar 
Exact style designers choice 
 
Back/ahead Label Back and          as Internet 
Browsers 
Mark hard keys as mobile 
phones 
 
 
Skip/index ISO/IEC 18035 
   
 
The icons were developed from international standards where such standards existed (CEI/IEC, 
1998; ISO/IEC, 2003), as it was assumed that standardised icons would be frequently applied to 
similar interfaces and therefore be most familiar to users. Where standards did not exist, similar 
products (such as software and other remote controls) were investigated to see which icons 
and/or designs should be most familiar to users. For features that had no clearly established 
precedent, the designers were asked to develop a design which would be familiar to users. The 
icons chosen for each feature are shown in Table 9.1.  
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Four test designs (or configurations, as Marantz calls them) were required for Experiment 3 
(Table 9.2). The designers worked only on the total re-design (Location–Appearance), not the 
Location and Appearance designs. (The Location design used only the new locations for the 
features, while the Appearance design used only the new appearances.) 
Table 9.2 Interface designs 
Configuration  Explanation 
Default  Default design used in Experiment 2 
Location  New location for features, default appearance 
Appearance  New appearance for features, default location  
Location-Appearance  New appearance and location. 
 
The features changed were those that were most frequently used in Experiment 2, and which it 
was possible to change within the constraints of the remote control technology (some of the 
features of the default design could not be changed). Designers were told that all designs must 
be suitable for application to the product. They had therefore to be of an appropriate size to fit 
into panels and greyscale. Designers were asked not to add new commands and to produce a 
final design with each feature as a separate bitmap. The chosen Location–Appearance Design is 
shown in Figures 9.1 to 9.3. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Remote-on  
 
 
 
 
TV on/off 
 
 
 
AV function  
(renamed  
TV/video) 
 
 
Figure 9.1 Location–Appearance 
design on TV main screen 
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The Location–Appearance design selected (Figures 9.1 to 9.3) was simple and clear, similar 
enough to the existing interface so as not to confound the experiment by revealing to 
participants which screens were changed from the original, and easy to adapt to the Location 
and Appearance designs. Some fine-tuning was done by the researcher before the design was 
ready for testing. Much of this consisted of refining the location of the features by looking at 
existing audio, TV and VCR remote control devices and software in order to establish the most 
 
Skip  
(renamed index) 
 
Fast forward 
Play 
Stop 
 
Ahead 
 
 
Menu (VCR menu) 
 
Four way navigation keys 
 
Enter 
 
 
 
Figure 9.3 Location–Appearance 
design on VCR menu screen
 
 
 
VCR on/off 
 
Rewind 
 
AV  
(renamed TV/video) 
Back 
Figure 9.2 Location–Appearance 
design on VCR main screen 
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common (therefore most familiar) locations for the features. The Location–Appearance design 
was then transposed into the Location and Appearance designs to create the three new 
configurations used in Experiment 3. 
 
The software used to produce the configurations from the individual bitmaps was the Marantz 
RC5000 setup package Version 2.3 (available through Marantz, and designed for the purpose of 
re-configuring the remote). This basic package had to be used to assemble the bitmap images of 
the buttons onto the screens and to download each configuration into the device. 
 
9.2.2 Familiarity of Features (Principles 1 and 2) 
 
This section discusses in detail how the principles for intuitive interaction (explained 
previously) were applied to the re-designed remote control, for the factors location and 
appearance. 
 
Appearance 
 
Weiss (2002) recommends that icons should have audio or visual feedback to show that they 
have been selected. Inverting colours is a popular way to provide visual feedback (Weiss, 2002) 
and, indeed, the default and new designs all use this method. These recommendations were also 
followed in order to make the interface as standard as possible. Weiss (2002) also discusses the 
typical ways of finding a home page or menu: menu key (e.g. mobile phones), home button 
(Palm), Start button (Windows CE), up or back keys (mobile phones and WAP). The back 
function key was re-designed to look like the keys on a mobile phone and thus gain familiarity. 
The home button was part of the navigation system that could not be changed. 
 
As previously mentioned, icons from international standards were used where applicable, under 
the assumption that these would be the most commonly used and therefore the most familiar. 
Norman (1995) supports this assumption, claiming that “Standards are forever, because once 
established, they simplify and dominate the lives of millions, even billions.” Other icons were 
transferred from existing remotes and other similar types of devices, such as PC software, 
mobile phones and PDAs. 
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Location 
 
Much of the fine tuning consisted of refining the location of each feature by looking at existing 
audio, TV and VCR remotes and software in order to establish the most common (therefore 
most familiar) locations for the features. Arnold (year unstated, in Wheildon, 1984) believed 
that the design of a page should take into account the linearity of the Latin alphabet and the 
physiology of the act of reading. People start at the top left and work their way across and 
down, left to right until they reach the bottom corner. This is called reading gravity. Arnold 
devised the Gutenberg diagram, which has the Primary Optical Area in the top left corner, 
where the eyes fall naturally. From there, the eyes move across and down the page, returning to 
an axis of orientation after each left–right sweep. In the bottom right is the terminal anchor 
where readers expect to end their interaction with that page. The top right and bottom left are 
called fallow corners, where the eye does not fall naturally and where objects may be missed. 
The eye does not willingly go against reading gravity (Wheildon, 1984). 
 
Wheildon (1984) investigated this and other principles in a large study over several years. He 
presented articles about current affairs (such as would be seen in a newspaper) to 224 
participants. Half of them were given an article which complied with the Gutenberg diagram; 
the other half were given an alternative layout. The conditions were reversed each time an 
article was presented. The participants read the articles and were then asked questions to 
determine their level of comprehension. It became apparent that the layout which defied 
Arnold’s ideas was “faulty” (Wheildon, 1984, p190). 
 
Smith (1998) found that, within a screen, there was generally a top-to-bottom, left-to-right 
hierarchy, which was building on the users’ experience with the typical layout of newspapers, 
books and other paper-based graphical information. This suggests that the ideas put forward by 
Wheildon (1984) relating to page layout should be transferable to screen applications. 
Therefore, where there was no established position for features based on familiarity of other 
remotes, they were placed according to the Gutenberg diagram, using the familiar printed page 
as a metaphor. 
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9.2.3 Increase Consistency (Principle 3)  
 
Hafner (2004) mentions a review that Jakob Nielsen conducted on his own remote controls. 
Nielsen was struck by the lack of universal standards for remotes, most noticeably in terms of 
the power button. In an examination of six remotes, he found three different ways of turning the 
devices on, and he suggests that the proliferation of remotes (i.e. several in each household) 
leads to a multiplying complexity that would overwhelm anybody. Universal remotes should 
help to address this problem, but even the default design of the Marantz remote was not 
internally consistent. Consistency between the same functions on different devices was a 
particular problem identified in Experiment 2 (Section 8.3.3). This problem was addressed by 
making the location and appearance of these functions the same in each device.  
 
To make the location of features as consistent as possible, the screens that were chosen all 
followed the layout recommended by Wheildon (1984) and flowed from top left to bottom 
right. Also, the buttons all followed the same style so that their appearance was consistent. The 
chosen design also has some aesthetic similarities to the default design. There were two 
advantages to this. Firstly, it meant that the whole product still retained some consistency and, 
secondly, it meant that participants could not easily tell which screens had been changed, thus 
avoiding a confound in the experiment. 
 
9.3 Experiment 3 
 
Following the re-design of the remote control, a third experiment was planned, with the 
objective of testing the three new designs against the default design in order to establish if 
changing the location and/or the appearance of the icons on the remote would make it more 
intuitive to use than the default design. This experiment has also been reported by Blackler, 
Popovic, and Mahar (2004a). 
 
It was predicted that either the Location configuration, the Appearance configuration or the 
Location–Appearance configuration would be more intuitive to use than the other three so it 
would be possible to determine that either location of features, appearance of features or a 
combination of the two would be the determining factor of intuitiveness. However, it was also 
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possible that some or all of the Location, Appearance and Location–Appearance configurations 
would be more intuitive to use than Default but have no significant differences between 
themselves; in this case, it would be impossible to establish for certain which factor increases 
intuitiveness. 
9.3.1 Method 
 
Participants and experiment design 
 
University staff and students, and employees of three local companies were asked to volunteer 
to take part in the study, and participants were selected from the pool of volunteers. None of the 
participants had encountered the remote control used in the tests before, and none received 
payment. A sample size of 15 for each condition in a 4x3 matched-subjects between-groups 
design (Table 9.3) was chosen to yield adequate power. The Independent Variable (IV) 
configuration had four levels: Appearance, Default, Location and Location–Appearance. The 
IV age group had three levels: 18–29, 30–39 and >40.  
Table 9.3 Experimental groups for Experiment 3 
Configuration Age group Male Female Total 
Appearance 
(A) 
18–29 
30–39 
40+ 
Total 
1 
2 
4 
7 
4 
3 
1 
8 
5 
5 
5 
15 
Default (D) 18–29 
30–39 
40+ 
Total 
2 
1 
4 
7 
3 
4 
1 
8 
5 
5 
5 
15 
Location (L) 18–29 
30–39 
40+ 
Total 
2 
2 
3 
7 
3 
3 
2 
8 
5 
5 
5 
15 
Location–
Appearance 
(LA) 
18–29 
30s 
40+ 
Total 
1 
3 
3 
7 
4 
2 
2 
8 
5 
5 
5 
15 
Total  28 32 60 
 
 
This was a matched subjects design and, in order to balance the groups, potential participants 
were asked to fill in a technology familiarity questionnaire (Appendix B) when they 
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volunteered so that all four groups had a good representation of gender, level of education and 
technology familiarity (TF). This questionnaire had a hypothetical minimum score of zero and a 
hypothetical maximum score of 110, and was essentially identical to the one used in 
Experiment 2; however, volunteers were asked for their exact age in order for the age variable 
to be investigated more thoroughly. Appendix C shows an example of how the scores were 
calculated. 
Apparatus and measures 
 
The variables measured in this experiment and the methods and tools used are shown in Table 
9.4. Again, the main performance measures were time to complete operations and intuitive uses.  
Table 9.4 Dependent variables and measures used 
Dependent variables Measures required 
Intuitive and correct uses of features (%) Observation through Observer  
Concurrent Protocol 
Familiarity of features Structured follow up interview 
Expectedness of function, location and 
appearance of features 
Structured follow up interview  
(rating scales) 
Intuitive first uses per participant  
(correct only)  
Observation through Observer  
Concurrent Protocol 
Intuitive uses per participant  
(correct only) 
Observation through Observer  
Concurrent Protocol 
Intuitive first uses per participant  
(correct and correct but in appropriate)  
Observation through Observer  
Concurrent Protocol 
Intuitive uses per participant  
(correct and correct-but-inappropriate)  
Observation through Observer  
Concurrent Protocol 
Assistance received  Observation through Observer  
Concurrent Protocol 
Time on tasks  Observation through Observer  
 
 
The Product used in the experiments was the Marantz RC5000i universal touch-screen remote 
control, used with Panasonic NV SD 220 video and NEC Chromovision TV. These were 
identical to those used in Experiment 2, except that the remote used four configurations instead 
of just the default one. 
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Procedure 
 
Apart from some minor differences (reported below), the procedure followed was identical to 
that for Experiment 2. The participants were asked to complete the same three operations as 
those set in Experiment 2 (Table 8.3), so that some comparison could be made between the two 
experiments, and also because they forced the use of many of the features being investigated. 
As previously, participants were delivering concurrent protocol during the operations.  
The first difference was that the interface configurations was downloaded into the Marantz 
RC5000i universal touch screen remote control from the Marantz RC5000 setup software prior 
to each session, according to the group into which the participant had been placed. Labels for 
remote on and back/ahead were also added for the Appearance and Location–Appearance 
configurations. Secondly, two digital video cameras were again used to record the activity. One 
was focussed close-up on the participants’ hands as they operated the remote; the other recorded 
the whole scene for Operations 1 and 2, and was then moved to focus on the TV screen once the 
menu was brought up during Operation 3 (Figure 9.4). This was done to allow for easier coding 
of the clock-set task. Thirdly, participants were supervised and assisted where necessary while 
completing the rating scales in the follow-up interview (Appendix D). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.4 Mixed view from both video cameras showing TV screen 
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9.3.2 Results 
 
The assumptions upon which this work was based were drawn from the findings of Experiments 
1 and 2. The assumptions were that those with a higher technology familiarity (TF) score would 
perform the tasks more quickly and intuitively than those with lower scores, and that there 
would be no significant differences in performance due to either gender or anxiety level. There 
was a significant negative correlation between TF score and time to complete operations, r(58) 
= –.57, p < .0001, and a significant positive correlation between TF score and the percentage of 
features that were used intuitively and correctly the first time, r(58) = .45, p < .0001. The 
relationship between time and technology familiarity is shown in Figure 9.5. These results are 
similar to those achieved during Experiments 1 and 2. A t test revealed that gender had no 
significant effect on time to complete operations, t(59) = .72, p < .05. Time to complete 
operations was also not significantly different for those who said they were anxious and those 
who did not, t(59) = 1.594, p > .05. An ANOVA showed that level of education also had no 
significant effect on time to complete tasks, F(3,56) = 1.58, p > .05 (Ε2 = .078, power = .39). 
This is a moderate effect with low power so it is possible that there was a Type II error in this 
case and the effect is masked by the low power. However, the assumptions are met and the 
comparisons between the interfaces can be seen as valid. 
Time to complete operations (secs)
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Figure 9.5 Time to complete tasks by TF score 
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The performance indicators were (again): time to complete operations, percentage of uses that 
were intuitive and percentage of first uses that were intuitive. The data on intuitive first uses are 
particularly important as they confirm that people are able to use a feature intuitively the first 
time they encounter it if it is something they can recognise. 
 
Time to complete operations showed variation between the groups (Figure 9.6). A two-way 
ANOVA revealed that configuration had a significant main effect on time to complete tasks, 
F(3,48) = 3.801, p < .016. The Location–Appearance group was quickest, followed by 
Appearance, Location and then Default groups. A Tukey HSD post hoc test was used to explore 
the main effect (Table 9.5). Age group also had a significant main effect on time to complete 
tasks, F(2,48) = 5.627, p < .006. The significant difference between age groups indicates that 
age is a predictor of the time it will take to do the tasks (Table 9.6), with both the younger 
groups completing the operations significantly faster than the oldest one. There was no 
interaction between these factors, F(6, 48) <1, n.s. 
 
 
Figure 9.6 Time to complete tasks by configuration and age group 
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Table 9.5 Tukey HSD post hoc test showing differences in time to complete operations between 
configurations 
Configuration Configuration Mean 
Difference 
Standard 
Error 
Significance 
Appearance Default –148.81 94.85 .406 
  Location –121.72 94.85 .578 
  Location-App. 137.04 94.85 .478 
Default Appearance 148.81 94.85 .406 
  Location 27.09 94.85 .992 
  Location-App. 285.85(*) 94.85 .021 
Location Appearance 121.72 94.85 .578 
  Default –27.09 94.85 .992 
  Location-App. 258.76(*) 94.85 .043 
Location-App Appearance –137.04 94.85 .478 
  Default –285.85(*) 94.85 .021 
  Location –258.76(*) 94.85 .043 
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
Table 9.6.Tukey HSD post hoc test showing differences in time to complete operations between 
age groups 
Age group Age group Mean 
       Difference 
Standard 
Error 
Significance 
20s 30s –58.36 82.14 .759 
  40s –262.4(*) 82.14 .007 
30s 20s 58.36 82.14 .759 
  40s –204.04(*) 82.14 .043 
40s 20s 262.4(*) 82.14 .007 
  30s 204.04(*) 82.14 .043 
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
A two-way ANOVA revealed that the percentage of intuitive first uses (correct only) did not 
show any significant variance according to age group, F(2,48) = 2.403, p > .05 (Ε2 = .09, power 
= .46). However, due to the lower power and moderate effect here, it is possible that the low 
power is masking an effect. The percentage of intuitive first uses (correct only) showed a 
significant main effect between the configurations, F(3, 48)= 5.584, p < .002. All the new 
designs had a higher percentage of intuitive (correct only) first uses than the Default, but the 
Location group had a mean closer to the Default group (lowest) and the Appearance group 
nearer to the Location–Appearance group (highest) (Figure 9.7).  
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Figure 9.7 Percentage of intuitive first uses (correct only) by configuration and age group 
 
Again a Tukey HSD post hoc test was used to explore the significant main effect (Table 9.7). 
Intuitive uses were significantly higher for the Location–Appearance group than the Location 
and Default groups.  
Table 9.7 Tukey HSD post hoc test showing differences between configurations for the variable 
percentage of intuitive (correct only) first uses 
Configuration Configuration Mean 
Difference  
Standard Error Significance 
Appearance Default 16.43 7.04 .105 
  Location 9.36 7.04 .549 
  Location-App. –10.7 7.04 .434 
Default Appearance –16.43 7.04 .105 
  Location –7.07 7.04 .747 
  Location-App. –27.13(*) 7.04 .002 
Location Appearance –9.36 7.04 .549 
  Default 7.07 7.04 .747 
  Location-App. –20.06(*) 7.04 .032 
Location-App. Appearance 10.70 7.04 .434 
  Default 27.13(*) 7.04 .002 
  Location 20.06(*) 7.04 .032 
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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The percentage of intuitive first uses (correct and correct-but-inappropriate) showed similar 
results. Levene’s test for homogeneity was significant, F(11,48) = 2.608, p < .05; thus, a strict 
alpha level of .025 was adopted, as before. Configuration had a significant effect on 
performance in this variable, F(3, 48) = 6.896, p < .001 (Figure 9.8). The significant difference 
was between the Location–Appearance group and both the Default (p = .001) and Location (p = 
.008) groups. Age group did not have a significant effect, F(2,48) = 3.523, p = .037 (Ε2 = .13, 
power = .63). However, the power is moderate and the effect large, so it is possible that 
adoption of the stringent alpha level with the low power has masked the effect. 
 
Figure 9.8 Percentage of intuitive first uses (correct and correct-but-inappropriate) by 
configuration and age group 
 
A two-way ANOVA revealed that the effect of configuration on the percentage of intuitive uses 
(correct only) throughout the operations was also significant, F(3,48) = 4.66, p < .01, with 
differences shown by the Tukey HSD post hoc test as between the Location–Appearance 
configuration and both Location (p = .011) and Default (p = .012). There was also a significant 
main effect between age groups, F(2,48) = 4.45, p < .05 (Figure 9.9). The significant difference 
here was between the >40 age group and both the 18–29 group (p = .035) and the 30–39 group 
(p = .031). There was no interaction between age group and configuration, F(6,48) <1, n.s. 
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Figure 9.9 Percentage of intuitive uses (correct only) by configuration and age group 
 
 
The percentage of intuitive uses (correct and correct-but-inappropriate) throughout operations 
showed a significant effect for configuration, F(3,48) = 4.25, p < .01, with the Tukey post hoc 
test revealing significant differences between the Location–Appearance group and both the 
Location (p = .015) and Default (p = .02) groups. For age group, there was also a significant 
main effect, F(2,48) = 5.34, p < .05. The differences here were between the 30–39 and >40 age 
groups (p =.008) (Figure 9.10). Again, there was no interaction between configuration and age 
groups, F(6,48) =.502, p > .05. 
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Figure 9.10 Percentage of intuitive uses (correct and correct-but-inappropriate) by configuration 
and age group 
 
 
Time spent consulting a manual, the number of times participants received verbal assistance and 
the total number of times participants received help were analysed for differences between the 
configurations or age groups using two-way ANOVAs. Levene’s test was significant in all 
cases, F(11,47) = 17.68, p < .0001, F(11,47) = 4.38, p < .0001 and F(11,48) = 4.56, p < .0001 
respectively. None of the ANOVAs showed a significant p value less than .025, F(11,47) = .55, 
p > .05, F(11,47) = 3.19, p > .025 and F(11,48) = 2.81, p > .05 respectively for age group, and 
F(11,47) = 2.14, p > .05, F(11,47) = 1.97, p > .05 and F(11,48) = 1.82, p > .05 respectively for 
configuration. Therefore, no significant differences exist between these variables and neither 
age group nor configuration had a significant effect on help received by participants. 
 
The subjective ratings that participants gave during the interviews were compared between the 
age groups and configurations. Although there were higher mean scores for all familiarity and 
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function ratings for the Appearance and Location–Appearance conditions than for the Default 
and Location conditions, two-way ANOVAs showed no significant differences. Results for 
familiarity were, F(3,48) = 1.65, p > .05 (Ε2 = .09, power = .404) and  for function, F(3,48) = 
2.67, p > .05 (Ε2 = .14, power = .616).  However, in these cases at least, moderate effect sizes 
were evident, and power was low to moderate. Thus it is possible that a Type II error occurred 
in these cases and the effect was masked by the low power. Subsequent research should test this 
possibility by employing an experiment design with greater power. 
 
A two-way ANOVA revealed that there was a significant main effect for age group in the 
location ratings, F(2,48) = 6.22, p < .005. The 30–39 age group rated location significantly 
higher than the >40 group (p = .003). Although there was no significant main effect for 
configuration in the location rating, F(3,48) = 2.54, p > .05 (Ε2 = .14, power = .59), the Tukey 
post hoc test revealed a difference between the Default and Location–Appearance groups that 
was very close to significance (p = 0.54). Because the power is low and the effect size moderate 
here, there is the possibility of a Type II error; an experiment with more power may reveal 
more. 
 
However, the two-way ANOVA used to assess ratings for appearance really showed some 
differences. The Levene’s test was significant, F(11,48) = .3.185, p < .05, so again a strict alpha 
level of  p < .025 was applied. There was a significant main effect for configuration, F(3,48) = 
10.711, p < .0001. Again, the Tukey test revealed that the differences were between the 
Appearance and the Default (p = .001) and Location (p = .0001) groups, and also between the 
Location–Appearance group and the Default (p  = 008) and Location (p = .003) groups. Also, 
there was a significant main effect for age group, F(2,48) = 5.310, p < .025, and the Tukey post 
hoc tests showed that both the 18–29 group (p = .012)  and the 30–39 (p = .030) groups were 
significantly different from the >40 group. 
 
There were also variations in intuitive uses between each feature (Table 9.8). The Location–
Appearance design performed the best for the greatest number of features, followed by 
Appearance, Location and, lastly, Default. All the new designs showed more intuitive first uses 
than the default for most of the features. The results for the focus features identified in Chapter 
8 are discussed below. 
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Table 9.8 Percentages of intuitive uses per feature for each group 
Feature Appearance Default Location Location–Appearance 
Play 93.33 66.66 86.66    100 
Stop 46.66 53.33 46.66 60 
Forward/rewind 66.66 71.42 80.00 81.81 
4-way 73.33 40.00 53.33 80 
VCR on/off 27.27 76.92 78.57 77.77 
Enter 66.66 40.00 66.66 66.66 
Menu 66.66 26.66 33.33 60 
TV on/off 30.76 35.71 33.33 81.81 
AV function 15.38 14.28 21.42 20 
Remote on 71.42 6.66 0 66.66 
Back/ahead 20 0 8.33 16.66 
Skip/index 60 0 0 83.33 
Scroll arrows 0 0 10 16.66 
 
 
The back/ahead feature still needs improving but the new design performed much better than 
the Default design. There were 20 times more intuitive uses for Appearance than for Default, 
and most people did work it out in the Appearance and Location–Appearance conditions. In the 
Location and Default conditions many participants tried the back/ahead function, did not 
understand what it did, and did not use it again unless they grew desperate. Generally, 
participants in the Location and Default conditions were more likely to find and use the home 
button for navigation than the back/ahead ones.  
 
Back/ahead could have been more clearly designed. However, due to some concern about 
multi-modal use for more advanced features of the remote, it was decided not to label the hard 
buttons with arrows as had originally been planned, but only to try to relate them more clearly 
to the soft labels. However, the soft label could be changed in only a very limited way, and 
could not be enlarged at all (as was intended after Experiment 2); thus, it was not possible to 
make them much clearer than previously. Although this did improve performance, for the 
purposes of the experiment (which did not really use the advanced features), arrows on the hard 
keys could have been used and would very likely have shown a more marked improvement over 
the default design. 
 
The icon for the AV function was put on both VCR and TV main pages to prevent people 
(especially novices) from getting lost looking for it; it was re-named “TV/video”, which is a 
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more common label on existing remotes. This seemed to cause much less confusion and, 
although there were no real differences in intuitive uses between the groups, default still had the 
lowest percentage. The new design may have contributed to overall faster times as people 
needed to navigate less. Interestingly, some more expert users still navigated from the VCR 
panel to the TV panel to find the button, even though they could have accessed it from the VCR 
panel. The double placement made more difference for those lower TF users who did not really 
know where to expect it, and who were also more likely to become lost in the navigation 
process. In consequence, this feature may have contributed to overall faster times in the 
Location–Appearance condition and, to some extent, the Location condition. 
 
Skip/index was used much more in the Appearance and Location–Appearance conditions, and 
there were large increases in intuitive uses for Appearance and Location–Appearance designs. 
The “skip” terminology used in the default design was more similar to CD and DVD players, 
but people seemed unable to transfer that knowledge to VCRs. However, “index” was 
associated with VCRs, and those who used it generally had a good idea of what it would do. It 
was also less likely to become confused with the stop function, which happened with the default 
device once or twice, and also in Experiment 2. The buttons are also much clearer and the label 
is next to the button rather than on it, so it is obvious which part to press and what each one 
does. In the default design, people often pressed the centre “button” – which had a label on it, 
but was not actually a button at all – and ignored the directional buttons.  
 
The Remote-on feature was much clearer in the Appearance and Location–Appearance designs. 
This made a big difference in intuitive uses and, although it saved only a few seconds at the 
start, it also had a knock-on effect. People who used back/ahead to turn on (they were the 
largest physical buttons on the remote, so the most popular choice for the majority of 
participants, who did not know that the remote had a touch screen) often consequently moved 
right at the start to a page that was not the homepage; this confused them. They then wasted 
time getting started and more time navigating during the rest of the experiment, with many 
never subsequently understanding the navigation hierarchy. The clear labelling in the new 
design prevented this. 
 
Four-way showed a fairly small improvement in intuitive uses but, based on qualitative data 
from observation, the new design seemed to make it much easier to use and caused less 
confusion between 4-way arrows and the +/– labels on volume and channel controls. This 
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confusion had been observed during Experiment 2 and was observed again with the default 
condition. People tried to use the volume and channel buttons to navigate the on-screen menu as 
the arrows were not obvious, so they looked for some other way of moving the cursor around 
the screen. The new design reduced the incidence of this problem and so saved time. 
 
Menu was spotted quickly more often in the new design. The impression from Experiment 2 
was that the location was the biggest problem. Location showed some improvements in intuitive 
uses, but appearance again made the real difference. The larger, clearer button which pointed to 
“VCR menu” rather than just “menu” (and, therefore, possibly to the homepage or another page 
or menu within the remote) was spotted more quickly when participants were searching for 
access to the clock-set function and pressed more readily, with less hesitation. 
 
9.3.3 Discussion 
 
All the groups using the new designs performed better than the default group. The participants 
in the Location–Appearance group completed the tasks most quickly and achieved significantly 
higher levels of intuitive uses than the default group. The participants in the Appearance 
condition were not far behind the Location–Appearance group in terms of time and intuitive 
uses. Participants in the Location group were the slowest of those using the new designs and 
had fewer intuitive uses. These results suggest that the change in appearance of the features had 
more effect upon these performance measures than the change in location. The significant 
differences in the subjective ratings for appearance also suggest that appearance was the 
important factor in expectedness, as the groups with the new Appearance and Location-
Appearance designs rated appearance as being more expected than those with the new Location 
or Default design. Also, younger people found the appearance of the features to be more as they 
expected. This could be because the appearance was based on contemporary features from 
similar products, and younger people may have had more experience with contemporary 
products, whereas older people may be more used to older styles (for example, several 
mentioned during the interviews that they would have preferred the use of words over symbols).  
 
However, location should not be neglected altogether, as there was some qualitative evidence 
(through observation) that the correct location could help to decrease search times for individual 
features. Appearance may have had more effect as it helped to prevent confusion and time 
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wasting on searching for and using the wrong features; this saved more time than simply a 
faster response to a single feature. However, once a person knows what s/he is looking for, 
putting that feature in a familiar location has been shown to decrease response times (Pearson & 
van Schaik, 2003; Proctor et al., 1995; Wickens, 1992). 
 
Some of the locations chosen may have been less than ideal. For example, “Enter” was re-
located to the bottom right of the screen as it is on a keyboard (as recommended by Wheildon, 
1984), but many people expected it to be in the centre of the 4-way, as it is on some digital 
cameras, remotes and other devices, including the default design. This suggests that people 
were expecting to see the small device standard and not the computer standard, so transfer 
between similar products may be easier than transfer between more dissimilar ones. In addition, 
people may use tactile cues rather than visual ones to locate functions, especially for products 
such as remote controls or car stereos. The product used for the experiment was a touch-screen 
device, so did not allow for this possibility.  
 
Notwithstanding, it does appear that the most important factor in the new designs was 
appearance. Making the appearance familiar seems to be a more successful strategy than 
making the location familiar. It seems that people can find something familiar in an unexpected 
place, but cannot recognise something unfamiliar even if it is in a familiar place. Generally, 
research findings show no relationship between users’ subjective ratings of a product and their 
objectively measured performance in using it. In most cases, performance is as important (if not 
more) than satisfaction (Allen & Buie, 2002). Perhaps it is not surprising then that most of the 
subjective ratings do not show the sort of significant differences that are so clear from the 
observational data. However, the subjective results that are significant back up the empirical 
evidence that appearance is the most important factor of a feature in terms of making it intuitive 
to use. 
 
Age had a weaker effect than configuration on intuitive uses. Overall, however, the results seem 
to suggest that there is an effect, with older people completing tasks more slowly and with a 
lower percentage of intuitive uses. This relationship is worth exploring in more depth as older 
people are becoming the major market in many Western nations. This is discussed further in 
Chapters 10 and 11. 
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The new design (Location–Appearance) is not perfect and the experiment has revealed flaws in 
it. For the sake of the experiment, the back/ahead feature should have had standard browser 
arrows attached onto the hard buttons (notwithstanding the multi-functionality of these buttons). 
The location of the Enter key also could have been kept in the centre of the 4-way, as is 
standard on many small devices such as cameras, remotes and phones. However, iteration is 
inevitable in design (Preece et al., 2002) and, in practice, several iterations would be tested 
before the design was finalised. As a test of a first iteration designed to uncover the factors 
behind intuitive use, the experiment was a success. 
 
9.4 Summary 
 
This chapter has covered the re-design process and method used to incorporate intuitive use into 
interface design. The interfaces were designed according to principles developed from the 
previous research. Users were video-recorded doing set tasks with one of the four remote 
control interfaces. The video data were later analysed using Noldus Observer. 
 
All of the new interfaces were found to be quicker and more intuitive to use than the default 
interface provided by the manufacturers. The evidence certainly suggests that the work done to 
make the appearance and location of the features more familiar made the products easier and 
quicker to use. These findings support those of Experiments 1 and 2, and suggest that relevant 
past experience is transferable between products (and probably also between contexts), and 
performance is affected by a person’s level of familiarity with similar technologies. Using 
familiar labels and icons – and possibly positions  – for buttons helps people to use a product 
quickly and intuitively the first time they encounter it. Appearance (shape, size and labelling of 
buttons) seems to be the variable that most affects time on task and intuitive uses.  
 
The fact that the Location group was quicker and had more intuitive first uses than the Default 
group, and that the Location–Appearance group was quicker and had more intuitive first uses 
than the Appearance group, suggests that location of features does have some effect; however, 
appearance of features is far more significant. Age is also a factor that affects an individual’s 
performance with a new product, as was suggested by the results of Experiment 2 and borne out 
by more rigorous testing in Experiment 3.  
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By applying the principles of intuitive interaction, it was possible to increase intuitive uses of 
the product. Chapter 10 discusses the implications of these findings on a wider scale and 
provides extended principles, and recommendations for designers on applying intuitive 
interaction to product and interface design. 
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Chapter 10 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
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10.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the implications of the results presented in Chapters 7 to 9 and how they 
interconnect with the theories discussed in Chapters 1 to 5. This is followed by the outcomes 
and recommendations, including a set of principles (extended from those applied to the re-
design process) and a conceptual tool to assist designers in applying intuitive interaction during 
the design process in order to produce better interfaces. Conclusions are then presented. 
 
10.1 Discussion 
 
The main findings from the research were: familiarity with similar features allowed people to 
use features more quickly and intuitively than those with a lower level of familiarity with 
relevant features; the appearance of a feature had more effect than its location on how 
intuitively it was used; and age also had an effect on how quickly and how intuitively 
participants could complete tasks. Reflecting these results, this discussion falls into three main 
sections: intuition, intuitive use and prior experience; intuitive use and function, appearance and 
location; intuitive use and age. 
 
10.1.1 Intuition, Intuitive Use and Prior Experience 
 
The literature revealed that intuition is based on experiential knowledge, and that people can 
use intuitive processing only if they have previous experience on which they can draw. Intuition 
is generally non-conscious and so is not verbalisable or recallable. Therefore, people using 
intuitive processing are often unable to explain how they made a decision. Because it is 
efficient, intuition is also generally faster than conscious forms of cognitive processing. 
However, researchers agree that, while it is often correct, it is not infallible.  
 
The experiments conducted for this research have supported these views. Intuition was found to 
be facilitated through past experience, and participants who had relevant past experience with 
particular features used those features intuitively. Intuition was also found to be faster than 
conscious reasoning and often correct, but not infallible. The fact that intuition is non-conscious 
was used – along with other properties such as prior experience, speed, correctness and 
 204 
expectedness – to develop heuristics to separate intuitive processing from other types of 
cognitive processing during the coding process. 
 
In support of the arguments of those authors who claim that intuition and intuitive interaction 
are based on past experience, all the experiments showed that familiarity with a feature will 
allow a person to use it more quickly and intuitively. This is the foundational conclusion to 
come from this research and informs the principles and tools which have been developed for 
designing for intuitive interaction, as well as ongoing work (Chapter 11). Although other 
authors have reported related studies [e.g. Langdon et al. (2007), working on prior experience], 
and some have touched on the issue of intuitive use, none have empirically tested the nature of 
intuitive interaction or linked intuitive interaction to the existing theoretical knowledge base as 
has been done here. Some issues that have implications for intuitive interaction based on past 
experience need to be discussed in more depth. These are: establishing familiarity for various 
user groups, managing change, categories, mental models and anxiety. 
 
Establishing familiarity for various user groups 
 
Using familiar features is the central tenet of the recommendations (Section 10.2). However, 
"…making design decisions about familiarity is not always simple” (Rosson & Carroll, 2002, 
p121). Familiar terms can have multiple meanings. Also, familiarity to one user is not 
familiarity to others. Even translation may not achieve the same level of familiarity in another 
language. In order to design a product to facilitate intuitive interaction, designers need to 
carefully identify the target market for the products and establish what features target users 
would be familiar with. Metaphors should be selected for their appropriateness to the target 
market and should be matched to the experiences and capabilities of typical users (Smith, 
1998). Many designers believe icons have more universal familiarity than labels, as all users 
live in the same visual world; even so, items can look different. For example, mailbox icons 
commonly used for email are based on US rural mailbox designs which are not seen in Europe. 
It takes some careful research to make sure the familiar features chosen are going to be 
understood by all users. A localisation process may also be necessary for products released 
internationally.  
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Spool (2005) favours field studies for identifying the user’s current knowledge. Watching 
potential users in their own environment and working with their normal tools and tasks reveals 
their knowledge and the upper bounds of it. For identifying target knowledge, he recommends 
usability testing. After such a test, it is possible to list all the knowledge the user needed to 
acquire during the test. Spool found during his user testing that groups of users form clusters 
around the various current knowledge points. This could lead to a way of better defining target 
users and what they know, but he does not explain exactly how it is done. He does say that 
design teams can work with users in the middle of the important clusters and this helps them to 
define personas. Personas were often linked to lifestyle in the past, but here is real and useful 
link to prior experience that could be used to allow intuitive interaction. However, personas can 
encourage designers to base their designs on assumptions rather than facts, so should be used 
with caution. 
 
Margolin (1997) also discusses how designers can gain more knowledge about users. He 
suggests that designers gain such knowledge from their own experiences as users, from 
communities or subcultures of users (e.g. Internet forums or clubs), and from market research. 
However, none of these are really enough as they stand at present, and designers do not 
currently have enough information about people and products to create products that better 
represent the desire for a satisfying world  (Margolin, 1997). Designers do not have enough 
information to go on when developing new products, and Margolin sees a need for large scale 
research on the subject of product use. 
 
Preece et al. (2002) argue that it is imperative that representative users from real target groups 
be consulted, and recommend that designers start with an understanding of how people use 
similar products, even if the product they are designing has no exact equivalents. When 
introducing a new product type (their example is the introduction of the mobile phone), it may 
not be possible to study people using them; but there are predecessor products (e.g. standard 
phones) that can help to inform designers about users’ behaviour with similar products. Preece 
at al. (2002) mention the need to find out about the tasks users currently perform, their 
associated goals, and the context in which they are performed. They recommend a combination 
of naturalistic observations of users’ existing tasks, questionnaires, interviews, focus groups, 
user participatory design workshops and study of documentation in order to find out about 
users’ behaviour with similar products and their aspirations for the new one. Of these, 
observation seems to be the method they most favour; this, they say, gives insights that other 
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techniques cannot, and they emphasise that the day-to-day use of products will differ from the 
procedures set out in the documentation. 
 
Rohlfs (1998) describes re-design of legacy software applications. He used current and new 
users’ experience with an existing application (or similar products and/or applications) and also 
their familiarity with the task to be performed, to inform a new design. He converted this sort of 
information into a current task definition which described how users currently perform the 
tasks. Understanding how the tasks are currently performed provides an important foundation 
for the design process. It allows designers to maintain the aspects of current tasks that work 
well, and to identify which features are well-used and would be suitable to transfer to new 
interfaces.  
 
Legacy systems have some advantages here as they may provide some features to draw on. For 
new-generation product design, it is helpful to understand the typical tasks performed with 
several of the antecedent products (Smith, 1998). There may be more than one of these if a new 
device merges tasks previously undertaken with different products. It can also be helpful to 
keep an interface for a new generation product unstructured, because new generation products 
are often put to completely different uses than those originally envisaged, and an excessively 
structured interface will limit these new uses (Smith, 1998). This is another advantage of a 
features approach over a mental models one, as designers can use familiar features rather than 
looking at the whole structure. Some researchers also suggest that metaphors which relate to 
surface features are the most successful (Bowden, 1997; Klein, 1998; Kolodner, 1993). 
 
This research has highlighted an opportunity for further research to establish which user groups 
have familiarity with which types of features. This research is now ongoing (Section 11.3). 
Whatever tools are used, it is clear that establishing the knowledge that users already have is an 
important step in selecting familiar features to design into a product.  
 
Redundancy is also essential in ensuring that a design is as inclusive as possible. Presenting the 
same feature in different ways is the classic approach to ensuring that diverse groups can access 
that feature. Therefore, in addition to identifying a target market and establishing what the users 
will be familiar with, it is essential that designers use redundant cues to make sure all users in 
the group are included. This could include using both symbols and words, both visual and 
auditory cues, or providing two or more different ways of accomplishing a task within a system. 
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Redundancy allows for more inclusiveness and gives users more choice about the way they do 
things. 
 
Managing change 
 
Technology has the capacity to change the way that tasks are accomplished. Thus, as well as 
designing for users’ existing stereotypes and expectations, designers may have to think about 
whether these should and/or will change in future and, if so, how these changes should be 
brought about (Harker & Eason, 1984). Marakas, Johnson and Palmer (2000) state that, while 
the use of metaphor does provide a starting point for developing an understanding, at some 
point the descriptive metaphor must be replaced with direct reference to the object itself.  
 
Some people have been concerned that always using familiar features and structures would lead 
to a loss of originality in interface design (Discuss-interactiondesigners.com, 2004). Raskin 
(1994) argues that intuitive interfaces could reduce innovation as an intuitive interface cannot 
be completely new, so intuitiveness could be a negative property for an interface. Hutchins, 
Hollan and Norman (1986) also raise the issue of restricting innovation by using familiar things 
in a design. However, there are innovative ways in which users’ current knowledge can be 
applied or transferred. For example, Beltzner (2004) suggests that it is best to design primary 
interaction paths for beginners, and then add secondary (accelerator) interaction paths that 
speed up people’s interaction with the product once they become more advanced users. This 
allows users with more familiarity with the system to use it more efficiently. 
 
Also, applying existing icons does not mean that a new product cannot be innovative. It may 
perform new tasks never before envisaged but, in order to make the new tasks easy to 
understand, it would be preferable to transfer some existing feature(s) or metaphors that users 
can readily identify and use. Features or icons themselves do not make a whole product; the 
way an object looks, feels and/or functions can still be innovative. Transferring single features 
rather than having to apply whole mental models allows for more flexibility and more 
innovative interfaces. In addition, outside of the software realm, there are many new devices 
appearing, many of which are borrowing features and functions from other things (often 
software). Transferring features from other product types and experiences (which is often 
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necessary with a new product type), and using metaphors, can allow both innovative and 
intuitive interfaces.  
 
However, when a familiar feature has become outdated and there is valid reason to change it, it 
should be possible to gradually develop people’s understanding through incremental changes 
and the use of metaphor to explain the unfamiliar. This needs to be well managed, or users 
could be encumbered with inferior and out of date metaphors for years to come, or have new 
and unfamiliar features, icons or ideas foisted upon them too quickly. Metaphors are catalysts 
for change; the metaphors of one generation become the well-accepted expressions of the next 
(Marakas et al., 2000). Some linguistic metaphors have become part of the language and the 
original vehicles for those metaphors are largely lost (e.g. ring the changes, grist for the mill, 
keyboard). In many cases this does not matter, but for an interface there may be some instances 
where it would become counterintuitive. A feature which is familiar because it has been used in 
the past for the same function may become counterintuitive if a new technology means that the 
feature no longer conforms to compatibility and mapping principles.  
 
For example, the “desktop” metaphor was very successful in moving desk workers onto GUIs, 
but is less applicable to younger computer users today who have never used a desk without a 
computer, and some interaction designers find it very limiting (Discuss-
interactiondesigners.com, 2004). Even the play, fast-forward and rewind icons which 
demonstrate some sort of directionality in the way a medium will move are becoming less 
applicable to new media. Technology may evolve that makes them problematic because of the 
directionality they show. These ideas have been explored through design to show intuitive 
evolution of icons (Table 10.1). This work has been produced to demonstrate how some of the 
common interface commands used in the products investigated (digital camera and universal 
remote control) can be evolved to allow for more suitable metaphors (Blackler, Popovic, & 
Mahar, 2005). This has been done in several steps to allow familiarity at each incarnation. 
 
The menu feature has been shown with both an alphanumeric and alternative pictorial stream, 
leading from the familiar word currently used, through incarnations including the word, and 
finally to a simple letter or icon based on the previous designs. The feature OK/enter/confirm 
could progress using the familiar enter symbol or tick – the tick particularly lending itself to use 
with touch-screen, stylus and gestural interfaces. Back/cancel can be simplified to the familiar 
arrow of the internet browser simply by first using the icon and label together, and then 
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removing the label. Review or playback of pictures, based currently on the directionality of 
obsolete media, may make more sense in the future without the directional arrow. Two 
possibilities for this progression are shown for digital cameras. The tree symbol was used as it 
is already a standardised icon for the zoom function of cameras (Crist & Aurelio, 1990).  
Finally, picture mode on digital cameras is currently still based on the shape of cameras from 
fifty years ago and is becoming less familiar and more arbitrary as the years pass. The new icon 
is similar and familiar enough to allow easy transfer, and it looks more like a digital camera 
than a traditional 35 mm film camera. 
 
Table 10.1 Intuitive evolution of icons 
 
Feature 
 
Current 
 
1st Evolution 
  
2nd Evolution 
 
3rd Evolution 
 
Menu 
 
MENU 
 
 MENU 
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         OK 
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Back/ 
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Delete 
 
BACK 
CANCEL 
DELETE 
 
 
 
   BACK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Review/ 
Playback 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
       
      
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 
mode 
   
 
 
    
  
MENU 
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These types of issues have been successfully addressed in the design of new products such as 
phone cameras and digital cameras. Digital cameras for the first few years retained the form of 
traditional cameras, even where there was no need for this. Now that users have embraced the 
concept of digital photography and understand that the digital camera need not look like a 
traditional camera, new forms are starting to be explored. The first phone cameras required the 
user to interact with a camera buried within a phone interface that looked like a phone. Fairly 
quickly, these evolved to present the two-fold function more effectively, with one side of the 
product taking the traditional form of the phone and the other of the digital camera, often 
rotating to resemble a phone when in portrait position, and a camera when in landscape. Some 
also have a separate shutter button so that the camera operates more like a digital camera and 
less like a function within a phone.  
 
Table 10.1 demonstrates that change can be managed by allowing users to apply some 
knowledge they already have to each new feature, while all the time progressing towards a new 
design or metaphor for that feature. Although location has less effect on intuitive use than 
appearance, where it is necessary to change the appearance of an icon, keeping the location 
consistent with previous or familiar interfaces may allow users to more easily adapt to a new 
icon. Managing change in this way should help to retain intuitiveness of an interface while 
simultaneously moving users towards a better or more appropriate icon or metaphor. However, 
it needs to be a long term strategy as change that moves too fast will leave the majority of users 
behind. 
 
Categories 
 
The prototype theory of categorisation holds that people employ categories all the time in basic 
thought, speech and action, and perception. Lakoff  (1987) claims that people could not 
function physically, socially or intellectually without the ability to categorise. He claims that 
categorisation is a matter of both human experience and imagination. Storing information in 
categories could be detrimental to transferring knowledge to something new if the new thing is 
stored in a category different from that of the relevant previous knowledge. For example, in 
Experiment 3 many people expected the enter feature to be in the centre of the 4-way as it is on 
some digital cameras, remotes, mobile phones and other devices, including the default design. It 
was actually relocated to the bottom right during the re-design, as it would be on a computer 
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keyboard, and as recommended by Whielden (1984). This suggests that people were expecting 
to see the small device standard and not the computer standard, so transfer between similar 
products may be easier than transfer between more dissimilar ones. 
 
It is possible that the boundaries of a category blur when a person knows something well and 
this may allow him/her to transfer between contexts more easily. Categorisation could be what 
people do when they are learning something [as Lakoff (1987) emphasises], and when things 
are already well known, knowledge could become more generally available. Alternatively, 
when people do not immediately make a connection with something in the same category, they 
may start to look outside of that category. 
 
Applying the theory of connectionism or spreading activation (Section 2.2.2), it can be 
supposed that if more links to a concept exist, then that concept can pass more easily over 
category boundaries. Links are made by using knowledge and applying it to other things. 
Therefore, the more well known or familiar something is, the more easily or quickly it should 
be recognised, understood or used. Connectionism could help to overcome the limitations of 
categorisation by allowing people to make links between categories. However, the links within 
categories are presumably always going to be the strongest and most often used. Therefore, 
using familiar features from the same product types may always be more successful than using 
features from less strongly related products or experiences. This conclusion is reflected in the 
conceptual tool described later in this chapter. 
 
Mental models 
 
It was obvious when observing users with lower technology familiarity that they were not 
building a mental model of the product; they seemed to be unable to learn the structure of the 
device through using it. However, it appeared that more experienced (higher TF) users were 
learning the structure of the device through use. Because not all users were able to successfully 
construct a model, applying a mental models approach or trying to find a mental model that will 
suit all or even most users does not seem to be suitable. Other authors concur, saying that 
constructing models for general purpose systems and differing users can be very difficult, and 
the perfect model does not exist (Fischer, 1991). Models are messy and indistinct (Norman, 
1983) and the sheer number of different models a user would need to create over a lifetime, if 
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s/he needed one for each product or system, is daunting (Wickens et al., 1998). In addition, 
systems that allow the user to decide how to use them are better (and more flexible) than mental 
model-based systems which try to anticipate what the user wants to do (Richards & Compton, 
1998). 
 
If using a mental model approach, it is necessary to establish a reliable way to predict what a 
mental model might be and how to trigger it. It is very difficult to assess if a person or group of 
people share a whole model or not. Marchionini (1995) claims that each individual user 
possesses unique mental models, which would make it difficult to apply them successfully to 
systems or product design. Some of the authors cited in Chapters 2 to 5 used a mental models 
approach to applying intuitive use to software. This is not a successful or appropriate approach 
in all situations, and those who assumed a mental model for the users (e.g. Okoye, 1998) do not 
convincingly argue that a model can be correctly assumed. 
 
Although Johnson-Laird (1981) proposed that mental models are likely to underlie the 
perception of objects by providing prototypical information about them – which suggests that 
models are built from past experience – it would seem unlikely that, with the thousands of 
products people use, they should have a separate model for each one. It is more likely that they 
have a series of overlapping models or that there are familiar features used across many 
products. The connectionist theory supports this argument; Clark (1997) suggests that a 
connectionist brain could use methods of overlapping storage so each neuron plays a role in 
encoding many different things. For this reason, it is the features that the intuitive interaction 
principles and tools proposed in this book depend upon. It is also likely that it would be easier 
for designers to apply familiar features than to try to apply a whole model, especially for new 
product types.  
 
From the results obtained in this research, it can be suggested that, although mental models may 
have some part to play in intuitive use in some cases, trying to apply them to interface design is 
too complex. It is likely that intuitive interaction can be designed in, without having to try to 
apply one specific mental model to a device.  
 
 213 
Anxiety 
 
Making an interface intuitive may help users to be less anxious when they encounter it. Several 
researchers suggest that intuition is linked with low stress and arousal (Hammond, 1993; 
Laughlin, 1997; Simonton, 1980), so encouraging this type of interaction may make 
encountering a new product a less stressful experience, especially for users who are nervous of 
change and are slower to adopt new technologies. Some participants in the experiments 
commented that they were anxious at first, but when they realised the product features were 
familiar to them, they relaxed more. Using familiar features to make a new product or product 
type familiar may help new users to feel more comfortable and less anxious than might 
otherwise be the case, as well as allowing them to use the product more quickly and intuitively. 
Further research on anxiety and intuitive interaction is underway and is briefly described in 
Chapter 11.3. 
 
10.1.2 Intuitive Use and Function, Appearance and Location 
 
The three factors – function, appearance and location – were investigated in all three 
experiments through subjective feedback from participants. It was found that this was not 
offering adequate and definite data for the more complex product (remote control), so 
Experiment 3 was designed to investigate the factors more empirically. Experiment 3 (Chapter 
9) demonstrated that intuitive use is enabled more by the appearance of features than by their 
location. Making the appearance of features (such as buttons and icons) familiar by using 
familiar symbols and icons, accepted conventions for labelling and naming, and also by sizing 
buttons as users might expect, will allow people to use an interface intuitively.  This has 
implications for the design of interfaces as it seems more important to concentrate on getting 
the appearance right, rather than the location. Appearance is also more multi-faceted – 
comprising shape, size, colour and labelling – whereas location comprises only location within 
local components and (for complex products) global systems. Since appearance is more 
complex as well as more important for intuitive interaction, it is justified as a priority over 
location. 
 
In the case of the remote control, appearance was in most cases based on a standard and many 
other audiovisual (AV) products use similar icons. Reasonable consistency in the appearance of 
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these features between various remotes and other audiovisual devices has allowed users to have 
more exposure to, and therefore more familiarity with, the appearance than the location. 
Location has not been standardised on these types of products, or between product types, and 
location of features on remote controls is generally different from location of the same features 
on the corresponding products. Location is more difficult to standardise between disparate 
product types because of the many different potential forms and functions of products (although 
in theory it should be possible to standardise it to some extent within types, such as remote 
controls). This means that audiovisual symbols would have more standardised appearances than 
standardised locations. It is hypothesised that this is the case with many product types, and that 
appearance is generally more standardised than location; thus, appearance will likely remain the 
most important factor in intuitive interaction.  
 
However, location should not be neglected altogether as there was some qualitative evidence 
(through observation) that the correct location could help to decrease search times for individual 
features. Once a person knows what s/he is looking for, putting that feature in a familiar 
location has been shown to increase response times (Pearson & van Schaik, 2003). Appearance 
may have had more effect as it helped to prevent confusion and time wasting on searching for 
and using the wrong features; this saved more time than simply a faster response to a single 
feature.  
 
More standardisation of location on products (similar to the standardisation of location of 
various key features in software) may make location more important and products more 
intuitive to use. Some products do have standard positions for some functions; for example, 
mobile phone power buttons are almost exclusively located on the top face or the very top of 
the front face, which makes them easy to find. More features located consistently in this way 
would allow location to play a more important role in intuitive interaction. 
 
One of the limitations of this research was that it was not possible to test the function of the 
various features for intuitive interaction because the mediating products already had functions 
assigned to the features. However, it could be assumed that function is the most important of the 
three factors as, without being familiar with the function of a feature, users would not have any 
idea what to do with it. Therefore, it can be recommended that functions required on a product, 
and the way in which those functions work, need to be based on familiar processes that users 
have seen before. Further work is needed to confirm these assumptions with a more flexible 
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product mediator, or even with software. Meanwhile, the three factors have been applied to a 
conceptual tool which designers can use to make interfaces more intuitive (Section 10.2.3). 
 
10.1.3 Intuitive Use and Age 
 
This research showed that older people used products more slowly and less intuitively. Other 
researchers have reported similar results, with age having an impact on time and error rates for 
tasks with a digital camera, microwaves and a car (Langdon et al., 2007; Lewis et al., 2008). 
Langdon, Lewis and Clarkson also found that more complex interfaces (e.g. button controlled 
microwave) result in a more diverse range of times for older users than simpler ones (e.g. dial 
controlled microwave). Well known factors of ageing such as speed of reaction times and 
cognitive processing could be responsible for the slower times of older people. However, the 
evidence in Chapters 8 and 9 also suggests a previously unexplored relationship between age 
and intuitive uses, so it seems likely that there are other factors at work. Prior experience is 
important for older adults interacting with new technologies, and is known to affect older 
adults’ performance with new technologies (Fisk et al., 2004; Rudinger, Espey, Neuf, and Paus, 
(1994). Older people obviously have more overall experience than younger ones, but it is likely 
that there is some difference in the way that people of different ages can utilise their prior 
experience to intuitively use a new product. Possible reasons for this are discussed below 
 
Older people who do have relevant experience with similar devices have gained that experience 
only recently, and therefore it has been difficult to learn and retain. Young people learn more 
easily (Baracat & Marquie, 1994; Howard & Howard, 1997; Kok, Lorist, Cremer, & Snel, 
1994). Fluid abilities, including decision making, working memory and attention, play a role in 
acquisition and transformation of information. Age-related cognitive decline is most 
conspicuous for fluid functions, whereas crystallised abilities are more resistant to ageing (Kok 
et al., 1994).  
 
Crystallised abilities are associated with previously acquired skills and depend strongly on 
experience. They are activated mainly when information stored in long term memory is used 
(Kok et al., (1994). Cremer (1994) defines crystallised abilities as passive use of available 
knowledge and learned skills. This is similar to the definition of intuition in Section 5.10 – 
using existing knowledge and experience largely non-consciously. Older people can use skills 
and experience to compensate for physical limitations (Rabbitt and Carmichael, 1994). 
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However, there is a need to address how experience and skills may be used to compensate for 
the decline in fluid cognitive abilities in complex, real-life task conditions (Kok et al., 1994). 
This research will help to fill that gap. 
 
The experience that older people have may not be relevant to contemporary tasks or technology, 
and their crystallised knowledge may be based on skills and knowledge acquired when younger. 
Weiss (2002) states that “teenagers are likely to pick up new technology quickly … Older 
people are also less adaptable to new interaction mechanisms” (p74). He does not explain why, 
but one possible explanation is that children and teenagers are at the right age to learn new 
things and their brains are more receptive to laying down this information. Older adults may 
still have their mental models based around the interaction techniques they learned in their 
youth, which are now obsolete, and it is known that older people need to make more effort in 
order to learn new things (Howard & Howard, 1997). The decision to use standardised symbols 
and contemporary products as comparisons may have excluded older users from some of the 
benefits of the re-design (Chapter 9). In Experiment 2 some of them showed better performance 
with words than with symbols, so increasing redundancy by providing both words and symbols 
could be helpful for older people who are less familiar with contemporary symbols. 
 
Damasio (1994) hypothesises that the critical and formative set of somatic markers that respond 
to certain stimuli is formed in childhood and adolescence. Accrual of somatically marked 
stimuli continues throughout life, but the formative ones are there from early on. This may 
suggest that the things people can use the most intuitively are those that follow somatic markers 
established in their youth. Those formative markers may be the ones that people refer back to 
throughout life. Docampo Rama, de Ridder, & Bouma (2001) also suggest this and have built a 
theory of “technology generations” on this assumption. In a primitive lifestyle, this would make 
age an advantage; an older person would have more experience to compensate for loss of 
strength and other factors of aging. However, now that the environment with which people 
interact has started to change so much during each lifetime, people need to continually keep 
making new somatic markers and new links to experiences to replace the formative ones. This 
could be one factor that affects the performance of older people as compared to younger ones 
who are still able to use their formative markers. According to connectionist theories, the 
connections required for these long held markers are reinforced by constant use and so would 
be very strongly preferred.  
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Mescellany (2002) claims that younger people (particularly children and teenagers) are simply 
more motivated than older people to use new technologies, especially those that allow them to 
communicate with their friends. Norman (2002) agrees, putting forward three possible reasons 
for the differences. Firstly, adults are more hesitant and afraid they might break something, 
whereas children experiment much more, and therefore learn more. Secondly, children spend 
more time at it. Most adults give up after a short time because they are less motivated. This is 
essentially the same argument as that put forward by Mescellany. Also, Norman claims that 
children are not yet “burned out”. Many of the things they use are new to them, so are a novelty.  
 
However, the results in this book show people in their twenties and thirties achieving 
significantly faster times and more intuitive uses than people over forty. People in their twenties 
and thirties are unlikely to be behaving in the way children do in their approach to new 
technology. Therefore, while some of their ideas are no doubt valid, it does seem that there is 
more to this issue than Norman and Mescellany suggest. Further work focussed more 
specifically on intuitive interaction and ageing is underway to determine the exact cause of 
these differences and develop strategies to mitigate them. This is discussed further in Section 
11.3. 
 
10.2 Outcomes and Recommendations 
 
This section offers ideas about how intuitive interaction can be applied within the design 
process. The recommendations are based around the principles and conceptual tool that have 
been developed.  
 
10.2.1 The Principles  
 
The following principles have been extended from the preliminary principles used as part of the 
re-design process (Chapter 9), where they worked successfully in enabling a design to be 
produced that was more intuitive to use. They can be recommended as guidelines to help 
designers develop interfaces which are intuitive to use. 
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Principle 1: use familiar features from the same domain 
 
Make function, appearance and location familiar for features that are already known. Use 
familiar symbols and/or words; put them in a familiar or expected position and make the 
function comparable with similar functions users have seen before. Principle 1 involves 
inserting existing features or labels or icons that users have seen before in similar products that 
perform the same function. This is the simplest level of applying intuitive interaction and uses 
features transferred from similar contexts. For example, play and related functions for the re-
designed remote control (Figure 9.2) were simply familiar icons designed for a new interface. 
The simplest application of Principle 1 would be through real or physical affordances (Norman, 
2004b) or body reflectors (Bush, 1989) which people can understand immediately, simply 
because they reflect their ingrained experience of embodiment in the world. These will be 
discussed further in Section 10.2.2. 
 
Principle 2: transfer familiar things from other domains 
 
Make it obvious what less well-known functions will do by using familiar things to demonstrate 
their function. Again, use familiar function, appearance and location. Principle 2 sometimes 
requires the use of metaphor to make something that is completely new familiar by relating it to 
something already existing. This principle requires transfer of features from differing domains 
(either different types of products or technologies or things from the physical world transferred 
to the virtual world). Some of the emerging technologies mentioned in Chapter 1 (e.g. gestural 
interfaces, ubiquitous computing) may require application of this principle as there is nothing 
similar enough to some of these interfaces to allow application of Principle 1. The desktop 
metaphor was a good example of this sort of metaphor successfully applied (Perkins et al., 
1997; Smith et al., 1982), and this example suggests that use of this principle will allow 
interfaces to be both intuitive and innovative. Also, the re-designed back/ahead function (Figure 
9.2) was designed according to this principle, taking a feature commonly used on mobile 
phones for a slightly different purpose and applying it to a new product type. 
 
Principles 1 and 2 involve applying external consistency. Weiss (2002) argues that external 
consistency can be an effective tool to increase ease of use but warns that it could hinder good 
design when migrating a user interface from platform to platform. Designers should retain 
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terminology and processes from PC applications and use them for smaller devices only when 
they are equally appropriate for the smaller screen (Weiss, 2002). Familiar things should not be 
indiscriminately applied when they are not suitable for a new platform or hardware. For 
example (as discussed in Section 10.1.1), in the remote re-design, the use of the computer 
standard for location of enter (rather than the small device standard) appeared to cause 
problems. 
Principle 3: redundancy and internal consistency 
 
Redundancy is essential in ensuring that as many users as possible can use an interface 
intuitively. This involves tactics such as using visual and audible feedback, including labels as 
well as symbols or icons, and providing different ways of doing things so that both novices and 
experts, and older and younger users, can use the same interface easily and efficiently. If one 
user is familiar with a word, another may be familiar with the corresponding symbol; or one 
user may be used to one way of navigating a device and another may prefer an alternative way. 
Providing as many options as possible will enable more people to use the interface intuitively. 
Redundancy is a basic and well known principle of interface design and applying it will help to 
make an interface intuitive (and also flexible) for more people. 
 
Increase the consistency within the interface so that function, appearance and location of 
features are consistent between different parts of the design and on every page, screen, part 
and/or mode. Keeping internal consistency allows users to apply the same knowledge and 
metaphors to all parts of the interface (Kellogg, 1989). Principle 3 is demonstrated by the power 
symbols applied to the new remote control interface. In the default design, the power icon was 
different in function, location and appearance for each device; on the full re-design (Location–
Appearance) it was consistent (Figures 9.1 and 9.2). 
 
Alternative approaches  
 
The only author to have offered anything similar to these principles is Spool (2005). Spool uses 
the terms current and target knowledge to refer to the knowledge that users already had and the 
knowledge they would need in order to use a product respectively. He presents two principles 
for intuitive use. Firstly, a designer can design so that both the current knowledge point and the 
target knowledge point are identical. Here the user already knows everything s/he needs to use 
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the interface because the designer has applied familiar features. This idea is similar to Principle 
1.  
 
Secondly, the designer can design so that current and target knowledge points are separate, but 
the user is unaware of this as the design is bridging the gap. The user is being trained in a way 
that seems natural. This is similar to Principle 2, where metaphor is used to transfer knowledge 
from one domain or product to another. However, Spool’s (2005) work has not yet been 
developed any further or tested empirically. He has offered definitions based on his experience 
with user testing and his categorisations have similarities with those developed here, but his 
ideas are less rigorously based and do not offer tools by which designers can apply intuitive 
interaction. 
 
10.2.2 Continuum of Intuitive Interaction 
 
It is likely that intuition operates as part of a continuum between highly controlled and 
completely automatic processes (Isen & Diamond, 1989; Logan, 1985). Further, it seems likely 
that there is a continuum of intuitive interaction (Figure 10.1). The continuum starts from the 
simplest form of intuitive interaction: body reflectors (Bush, 1989) or physical affordances 
(Norman, 2004b), which are based on embodied knowledge learned so early that it seems 
almost innate. At a more complex level, intuitive interaction employs population stereotypes 
which are engrained from an early age, and at the next level again, can work through similar 
features from the same or differing domains. At its most complex, intuitive interaction requires 
the application of metaphor, used to explain a completely new concept or function.  
Figure 10.1 links the various theories that have been discussed throughout this book and places 
them on the continuum in the context of intuitive interaction. Each of these terms will be 
discussed below – first the ones used in the top line on the continuum, (which have been 
adopted for further research by this author and are used later in this book) and then the 
alternative terms on the bottom line. 
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Old           Product context or technology        New 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.1 The intuitive interaction continuum as it relates to the three principles for intuitive 
interaction and other theories of interaction design 
 
Body reflectors 
 
Body reflectors (Bush, 1989) are based on embodied knowledge learned so early that it seems 
almost innate. Bush (1989) describes body reflectors as products or parts that resemble or 
mirror the body because they come into close contact with it. Examples include headsets, 
glasses, shoes, gloves and combs. He claims that humans are pre-disposed to perceive body 
images for evolutionary reasons. Therefore, designs which use body images should be more 
readily perceivable. Bush claims that it is not necessary to be familiar with a body reflector in 
order to ascertain its relation to a person; these forms are self evident in relation to people. Any 
person would be able to make the association whether familiar with similar things or not. This 
idea has also been discussed by Norman (2004b) in relation to physical, or real, affordances.  
  
Population stereotypes 
 
At a more complex level, intuitive interaction employs population stereotypes which are 
engrained from an early age. Humans have assimilated a large number of arbitrary, unnatural 
mappings from products that were not designed to be usable but which they use easily because 
they have learned to use them from a young age (Norman 1988, 1993). Population stereotypes 
derive largely from experience of cultural conventions.  
 
Principle 1 Principle 2  
Principle 3 
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Familiar features 
 
At the next level again, intuitive interaction can work through similar features from the same or 
differing domains. There is general consensus about the importance of designing artefacts that 
relate to users’ prior knowledge and familiarity, particularly in HCI, but with growing force also 
in design. The experiments described in this book were based on the differentiation of familiar 
and unfamiliar features, applied from both similar and differing domains. All these experiments 
showed that familiarity with a feature will allow a person to use it more quickly and intuitively. 
This is the foundational conclusion to come from this research and informs the principles and 
models which have been developed for designing for intuitive interaction.  
 
Metaphor 
 
At its most complex, intuitive interaction requires the application of metaphor, used to explain a 
completely new concept or function. Metaphor involves retrieval of useful analogies from 
memory and mapping of the elements of a known situation, the source, and a new situation, the 
target (Holyoak, 1991; Lakoff, 1987). Metaphors are grounded in experience and understood 
only in relation to experience (Lakoff & Johnson, 1981, p202). Intuition is enabled by this sort 
of transfer. (Rasmussen, 1986, p123). Metaphor allows people to transfer knowledge between 
domains. When a person has relevant experience in a different domain, metaphors could be 
used to relate that knowledge to a new situation.  
 
Affordances 
 
Norman (2004b) has talked about perceived and real affordances. Physical objects have real 
affordances – such as grasping – that are perceptually obvious and do not have to be learned. A 
physical object such as a door handle affords actions because its physical properties constrain 
what can be done with it. However, a virtual object such as an icon button invites pushing or 
clicking because a user has learned initially that that is what it does. User interfaces that are 
screen-based do not have real affordances; they have perceived affordances, which are 
essentially learned conventions. This is a useful distinction – between “real”, or physical, 
affordances that do not require learning beyond experience of being in a human body, and 
perceived affordances which are based on prior experience with similar things. Norman’s 
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(2004b) perceived affordances have therefore been placed on the continuum as being equivalent 
to familiar features from the same domain, whereas physical affordances are seen as equivalent 
to body reflectors. 
 
Compatibility 
 
Stimulus-response compatibility relates to the relationships of controls and the object they are 
controlling. It is important because a system with a greater degree of compatibility will result in 
faster learning and response times, fewer errors and a lower mental workload (Wickens, 1987; 
Wu, 1997). Responses are faster when the structural features of stimulus and response sets 
correspond and the S-R mappings can be characterised by rules (Barker & van Schaik, 2000; 
Norman, 1993; Proctor et al., 1995; Wickens, 1992). These simple rules (Wickens, 1992) seem 
to be drawn from population stereotypes to map the set of stimuli to the set of responses. The 
fewer rules have to be utilised, the faster the response time.  
 
Ravden and Johnson (1989) also relate compatibility to similarity of the interface with other 
familiar systems and with users’ expectations and mental models of the system. This highlights 
the fact that mappings are learned conventions and rely on past experience. Hence, compatible 
mappings have been equated with population stereotypes on the continuum. Population 
stereotypes and compatible mapping have a similar level of intuitive interaction; they are 
completely ingrained cultural norms that are widely but fairly unconsciously known by the 
majority of a particular population. 
 
External consistency 
 
External consistency is the consistency of a system with things outside it; for example, 
metaphors, user knowledge, the work domain and other systems  (Kellogg, 1987). External 
consistency is assumed to enhance the possibility that the user can transfer skills from one 
system to another, which makes new systems easier to use (Nielsen, 1989; Preece et al., 2002; 
Thimbleby, 1991). It improves users’ productivity because they can predict what a system will 
do in a given situation and can rely on a few rules to govern their use of the system (Nielsen, 
1989). Both Principles 1 and 2 involve applying external consistency. It can be seen as 
equivalent to applying familiar features or applying metaphors (Kellogg, 1987). 
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The continuum and the principles 
 
Figure 10.1 also demonstrates how the principles relate to the continuum of intuitive 
interaction. Principle 1 relates to the simpler end of the continuum, where body reflectors, 
population stereotypes or familiar things from the same domain are applied. Principle 2 relates 
to transferring things from other domains, including the use of metaphor. Principle 3, internal 
consistency and redundancy (represented by the dotted line), needs to be considered at all times 
and so it surrounds the other principles. 
 
It is suggested that, as the newness or unfamiliarity of a product increases, so too does the 
complexity of the designing required to make the interface intuitive to use. Very innovative 
products (or those based on very new technologies that have no established conventions) may 
require the application of features from other domains or metaphors, whereas familiar 
technologies or features can utilise familiar things from similar products, or even standard 
stereotypes and body reflectors.  
 
Looking at this continuum, it may seem to make sense to say that, as one moves along to the 
right, more technology familiarity would be required to use the interface. However, if the 
design is done well, and if tools and principles suggested here are used, it should be possible to 
design an interface at any of these levels which people with differing levels of technology 
familiarity could use intuitively. For example, a metaphor or familiar feature from another 
domain may be more familiar to some than a feature from the same domain – depending on 
their experience with the various domains. Therefore, the continuum corresponds to the 
complexity or recency of the product or technology but not necessarily the level of technology 
familiarity required to use it.  
 
10.2.3 Conceptual Tool for Applying Intuitive Interaction 
 
Figure 10.2 shows how the principles could be applied during the design process. The 
continuum is juxtaposed with an iterative spiral, which represents a design process which has a 
variety of entry and exit points.  
 
 225 
As discussed in Section 10.1.1, before starting design, the designers need to establish who the 
users are and what they are already familiar with, so that they know what features or metaphors 
would be suitable to apply.  
 
Figure 10.2 Conceptual tool for applying intuitive interaction during the design process 
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Designers then need to go through the spiral twice. Firstly, the structure or form of the system 
or product needs to be established. This would involve primarily establishing the various 
functions that need to be included in the interface or product as, until the functions are 
established, nothing else can be done. Following that, overall appearance (look and feel or 
form) can be established and, finally, location of global features within the structure. Once this 
first stage is completed the spiral is entered a second time for the detailed design of each 
feature.  
 
Each loop of the spiral has three layers. These layers represent the function, appearance and 
location (Figure 10.3). They are placed so that function is tackled first, then appearance and, 
finally, location. The factors are addressed in this order as that is the order of priority that has 
been established through this research (Section 10.1.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.3 Detail of the three loops within each spiral 
 
The conceptual tool has been designed so that one can enter the spiral at a suitable point and 
leave it when necessary. As designers work down the spiral, they can establish the earliest point 
at which a familiar thing can be applied to that feature. For a simple interface, this may be a 
body reflector for a handle or a population stereotype for direction of a scale. For more complex 
interfaces, it would involve applying familiar features from similar or extra domain products. 
For very new technology which has none of its own conventions, a metaphor which relates to 
something that is familiar to the users would need to be applied. The spiral should be exited at 
the point at which a suitable level is found. 
 
However, it is also possible to enter the spiral further down if appropriate, especially after 
designers have worked through the first few features and have established where on the 
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continuum they are working. Figure 10.4 shows an example of a designer entering the spiral 
near the top (applying a population stereotype). Figure 10.5 shows an example of a designer 
entering at the halfway point, not finding suitable familiar features to apply, and thus needing to 
progress to the metaphor level. 
 
Internal consistency and redundancy are represented as a dotted line surrounding the spiral, as 
also shown in Figure 10.1. They should be considered at all times during the design process in 
order for design for intuitive interaction to be effective. Applying a similar type of familiarity to 
each factor of each feature is part of remaining consistent. This could mean that, if the function 
of the feature requires a metaphor, that metaphor is also applied to the appearance and location 
of that feature, so that the metaphor remains consistent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.4 Working at the second level on the continuum 
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Figure 10.5 Working from the halfway point to the bottom of the continuum 
 
Once the entire form or structure of the product and the design of all the features have been 
taken through this process, an appropriate level of familiarity based on things that target users 
already know will have been applied consistently throughout the design. According to all the 
conclusions reached though this research, working through this process should mean that the 
resulting product is intuitive to use. This tool has undergone testing since it was developed. This 
is discussed in Chapter 11.  
 
10.3 Conclusions 
 
The concept of intuitive interaction had been mentioned and even applied but never really 
addressed in depth. Prior to this research, no other author had described in sufficient detail 
exactly how products and systems can be designed to encourage intuitive interaction, but 
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intuitive interaction had, in most cases, been related to familiarity. This research goes further in 
empirically establishing that intuitive interaction and familiarity are related and how the 
different aspects of an interface design can affect intuitive interaction. 
 
Intuition is based on past experience and is generally non-conscious and fast. Intuitive 
interaction is based on past experience, which can be transferred between different products or 
systems to allow people to use a new product intuitively if they have used similar features 
previously. Intuitive interaction can be seen as a continuum ranging from the simplest physical 
affordances through to complex metaphors. Designers can facilitate intuitive interaction with 
products by using the principles and conceptual tool that have been developed.  
 
This conclusion supplies confirmation for the existing theory that suggests intuition itself relies 
on past experience. However, more specifically, this work has built on that theory to establish 
firm conclusions about intuitive interaction. Other researchers had suggested the idea that 
intuitive interaction is based on familiarity with similar things, but none had carried out 
experimentation to empirically test it.  
 
The appearance of a feature is more important for intuitive use than its location. This suggests 
that the cues which people store in memory about a product’s features depend more on how the 
feature looks than where on the product it is placed. It seems likely that feature appearance is 
easier for users to transfer between products than location, as feature appearance tends to be 
more standardised than location on a wide variety of interfaces. Location of features was shown 
to be much less important than appearance, although qualitative data and traditional stimulus 
response work suggest that location should make some difference to the speed of sub-tasks. No 
other author has successfully applied intuitive interaction to the detail design of an interface in 
this way. This allows designers to prioritise those factors of the interface design that require 
more attention. 
 
Older people take longer to complete tasks and are less likely to use features intuitively the first 
time they encounter them. There may be several reasons for this, and more research is 
underway to establish which is the most likely (Chapter 11). Although it is known that older 
people are slower at some tasks, the fact that they are also using products less intuitively could 
shed new light on the true reasons behind the problems they experience. Because the baby 
boomer generation is such a major market force and is now starting to age, it is important to 
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develop this research further in order to determine solutions that will assist older people to use 
new technologies. 
 
An understanding of intuitive interaction and tools to help apply it will allow designers to make 
interfaces that are easier to use. The aim of this research was to provide designers with 
principles and tools which they can use during the design process in order to make their 
products more intuitive to use. From the conclusions above, three principles that designers can 
directly apply to their designs have been developed. These principles recommend that a 
designer should use familiar features as much as possible, apply familiar metaphors to things 
that are novel and keep products internally consistent.  
 
A continuum to locate intuitive interaction principles within those of other theories and 
guidelines has been provided and a conceptual tool has been developed to guide designers 
through the process of applying intuitive interaction to products. No clear guidelines, principles 
or tools specifically and explicitly to help designers apply intuitive interaction have been 
produced in the past. This work may be particularly important for the design of those interfaces 
that are based on new technologies or formats and so have no established conventions, or for 
those with a lot of one-off or occasional users. Testing and refinement of the tool are discussed 
in Chapter 11. 
 
Further, this research has contributed to new methods in three ways. The first of these is the 
development of a method of measuring technology familiarity (Appendices B and C). This 
measure provides an index that correlates with performance on products relevant to the familiar 
technology. This could be applied to further work on intuitive interaction, and indeed it has 
been (Chapter 11), as well as various other areas of human centred design and usability 
research.  
 
The second contribution to new methods is the detailed use of video observation software to 
make decisions about the type of cognitive processing a participant is using during an 
experiment (detailed in Section 6.5.3). These data, along with more empirical data traditionally 
used in user testing (such as time to complete tasks), were used to draw conclusions about 
whether or not a participant was using the features of the product intuitively. This has since 
been applied to commercial projects and further research on intuitive interaction, and could be 
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applied to further work on intuition itself. It may also be valuable for other psychological 
research which looks at cognitive processes.  
 
The third contribution to new methods is the successful use of the three factors of function, 
location and appearance to unravel the way in which users experience problems with an 
interface. These factors were applied to simple rating scales and used to gain feedback after the 
participant had completed tasks with the product. For simple products where users can easily 
distinguish the function, location and appearance of each feature, these factors worked very 
successfully in bringing out which factors of each feature could be potentially problematic. For 
more complex products, where the factors can become more ambiguous, they showed some 
measure of success but were less clear. The factors have also been applied to experiment design 
to investigate the differences between the factors more empirically. This method could be 
successfully applied to user centred design research and also to usability testing. It could help 
designers or researchers to understand more clearly the problems that users may be 
experiencing with an interface during a user test. 
 
10.4 Future Directions 
 
As mentioned above, age and its relationship with intuitive use is an area that warrants further 
study. It would be helpful to see how this relationship can be explained and to establish what 
designers can do to help older people to use things more intuitively. Work on this has begun and 
is discussed in Chapter 11. 
 
It would be interesting to discover if the principles and tools developed here could be easily 
applied to design practice, and to investigate how the recommended approach might alter the 
design process and the acceptance of the product by consumers. Testing and further refinement 
of the tool has begun and results are discussed in Section 11.1. 
 
The location of features was shown (through Experiment 3) to be much less important than 
appearance, and the way in which appearance and location of features are varied to different 
extents in existing interfaces would seem to explain this. However, qualitative data and work on 
response times (e.g. Pearson & van Schaik, 2003) would suggest that location does make some 
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difference to the speed of sub-tasks. Eye tracking studies may reveal more about users’ intuitive 
search behaviour. 
 
The function of features is assumed to be the foundation of interface design, ideally needing to 
be tackled before either location or appearance. However, it was not possible to investigate the 
function of features in depth because of the functions already assigned to the features of the 
mediating products. Function could be investigated with experiments similar to those reported 
here, using software to simulate various familiar and unfamiliar functions for features.  
 
Due to the limitations of the products used for the experiments, it was not possible to 
investigate the effects of colour on intuitive interaction. Some conclusions about the way colour 
could be used can be generalised from the results, but specific investigations focussing on 
colour are not included. Software or reconfigurable colour touch-screen-based devices (similar 
to the remote control) could be used to mediate this kind of investigation. The microwave 
experiment reported in Section 11.1.2 has begun to address this limitation. 
 
The application of these principles to other areas of design, such as software, would be a useful 
contribution. There are many overlaps and shared metaphors between digital devices and 
computer software, so similar principles should be applicable. 
 
Detailed methods to establish which features are familiar to particular user groups need to be 
developed so that these principles can be applied successfully to all types of artefacts for many 
groups of users. Work on this has begun as part of the project on intuitive interaction for older 
people (Section 11.3)   As mentioned in Section 5.6, there is also a dearth of research into 
stereotypes for new and digital products, and this research has highlighted the need for that to 
be addressed. Theme 1 of the project (described in Section 11.3) may go some way towards 
mitigating this, at least for older people. 
 
The research reported in this book has established a foundation for the study of intuitive 
interaction, and gives researchers in this area a solid basis for future work. Some of the future 
work identified has already begun and is described in Chapter 11. 
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Chapter 11 
 
Further Work
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11.0 Introduction 
 
Since the experiments reported above were completed in 2004, more research has been done on 
intuitive interaction. This chapter reviews the new work of this author, all of which builds on 
the research described in Chapters 1-10 and much of which is ongoing. It also compares the 
work of this author with that of others. Three areas are focussed on: testing and development of 
the conceptual tool, comparisons with other emerging research on intuitive interaction, and 
intuitive interaction and older people. 
 
11.1 Testing and Development of the Conceptual Tool 
 
Testing and refinement of the conceptual tool presented in Chapter 10 has taken place and will 
be reported in this section. The two components of the tool are referred to as shown in Figure 
11.1.  
 
 
Figure 11.1 Conceptual tool split into two components (Blackler et al., 2007a) 
Investigation 
component 
Design 
process 
component 
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11.1.1. Trial One 
 
The conceptual tool was first trialled by asking an undergraduate designer to apply it while 
designing a digital camera over a 10 week period, during which he was mentored weekly. 
This trial has been reported in depth by Blackler, Popovic and Mahar (2006; 2007a) and 
will be reviewed here. The student designed the form and the interaction of the camera – 
including all the menu functions – using the tool to consider function, appearance and 
location of each aspect in detail. He kept a journal during this process and provided a report 
at the end. 
 
The designer found that the tool forced him to spend a great deal more time investigating 
and analysing the intended users than he would otherwise. It encouraged him to gain an 
understanding of information related to other products that the user group would already be 
experienced with. During this process, the designer searched the literature for current trends 
in digital cameras and their users and buyers. He found that many new digital camera users 
were first becoming accustomed to the idea of digital photography through using camera 
phones, and then buying digital cameras because they desired better picture resolution 
(PC_Magazine, 2005). He then used a detailed product review to investigate existing digital 
cameras and mobile phones in order to establish the function, location and appearance of 
features relevant to digital camera design.  
 
The designer believed that this allowed a minor breakthrough in the digital camera design 
(Figures 11.2 and 11.3): the inclusion of soft keys to be used in conjunction with a 4 way 
navigation tool for menu interaction. By looking at other products that the intended user 
group interacted with, he was able to design features which they would already be familiar 
with, and which would enable the new design to be used more intuitively. This is something 
that he did not believe he could have done if he had followed his usual design process. 
 237 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.2 Physical aspects of new camera design (Blackler et al., 2007a) 
 
The design of the camera (Figure 11.2) applies various levels from the continuum: 
1.  Hand grip – body reflector 
2.  4 way navigation – familiar feature from same and other domains (e.g. phones, remote 
controls) 
3.  DISP (display) button – familiar feature from same domain 
4.  Menu navigation buttons (soft keys) – familiar feature from other domain (mobile phones) 
5.  LCD screen – familiar feature from same domain 
6.  Viewfinder – familiar feature from same domain 
7.  Mode slider – familiar feature from same domain 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.3 Menu icons for new camera design (Blackler et al., 2007a) 
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The design of the menu (Figure 11.3) uses various aspects from the continuum: 
o Gallery and settings icons – Familiar features from other domain (mobile phones) 
o Timer, mode and macro icons – Familiar features from same domain 
o Compactor icon – Metaphor 
o Labels for menu navigation buttons (soft keys) – Familiar feature from other domain 
(mobile phones) 
 
Despite having produced a successful design, the designer felt that the significance of the 
investigation component was not conveyed by the tool in its current form.  He commented 
that the investigation component takes up only a very small portion of the page when 
viewed in comparison with the design component, which does not accurately portray the 
importance of the two initial steps.   
 
11.1.2 Trial Two 
 
Trial 2 was embedded into a postgraduate unit called “Advanced Ergonomics” as an optional 
part of the main project, which involved re-design of a consumer product. The tool was tested 
by seven groups of designers, as their chosen methodology for the re-design project. This 
process is discussed in depth by Blackler et al. (2007a) but is reviewed in this section. Students 
had more information and support for the investigation component than during the previous 
trial. The two boxes –“user group” and “user familiarity” – were extrapolated with the use of 
questions, and suggested methods for answering those questions were provided (Figure 11.4). 
Students were also provided with suggestions for library searches to help with answering these 
questions and mentored weekly. At the end of the process, they provided copies of their designs 
and accompanying reports to the researcher and were also asked for feedback via 
questionnaires. 
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Figure 11.4 Extrapolation of research phases provided for trial two (Blackler et al., 2007a) 
 
Methods the student groups used to investigate user group and user familiarity and to test their 
designs included literature searches, product reviews, questionnaires, recognition exercises to 
identify familiar icons/symbols, observations, expert analyses and primitive forms of 
participatory design. Literature search was fairly basic and based on recommended sources for 
demographic and market data; some students found useful information but much was 
incomplete. However, this was probably the most difficult data to find as so much market 
research is not in the public domain. Most questionnaires used were based on the technology 
familiarity questionnaire (Appendices B and C). It adapted well to this task and students often 
got useful information from this kind of exercise. Most of the groups produced successful 
designs, with some particularly thorough. A good example of a new product designed during 
this trial is discussed below.  
Who are the users of previous devices or competitor’s products?
Who are the users of products that perform similar or equivalent tasks?
Are there general demographic trends?
Are there predicted trends in this market?
Products/devices/artefacts
What do they use?
What are they buying? What else do they use?
(to use themselves) (eg at work or in public domain?)
Which features do they use?
What features do they need on new product?
What can be transferred from these things to a new product?
(eg features from same or different domain)
Other experiences
What other life experiences do they have that could be transferred?
(eg body reflectors, population stereotypes and metaphors)
Sales figures and market 
statistics
Demographic data
Brief/specification
Literature on sales and 
market trends
Literature on sales and 
trends
Sales figures and market 
statistics
Observations of user group
Interviews with user group 
TF questionnaire 
International standards for 
relevant features
Review of function, 
appearance and location of 
features of  relevant products
Observations
Interviews
Questionnaire or card sorting 
task for other experiences
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Microwave 
 
The microwave group followed the tool closely, concentrated on covering all the details and 
came up with an innovative new design. The original product worked in a similar way to most 
domestic microwave ovens. The new design addressed all the main usability problems the 
students identified with the original product (Figure 11.5) and went much further, offering an 
innovative solution soundly based on the principles and tool for intuitive interaction (Figure 
11.6).  
 
Figure 11.5 Original microwave design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.6 New microwave design 
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This group discovered that microwave users are extremely diverse – ranging from children to 
the elderly, and covering a great variety of backgrounds. They used a technology familiarity-
type questionnaire to find out which products were commonly used in the everyday lives of 
microwave users. The group also used card sorting to specifically identify the most suitable 
icons for the interactive display on the microwave. Observations were also carried out in which 
the participants, ranging in age from 18 to 63, were asked to perform common microwave tasks 
using paper prototypes of the designs. The group also used an evaluations checklist (Ravden & 
Johnson, 1989), as well as expert appraisals to help them refine their design. 
 
The dial was a considerable change from the numerical keypad. The dial can be used without 
entering the menu, or in conjunction with the menu, to use timer, defrost, etc. The population 
stereotype of clockwise to increase was used here. The dial incorporates two parts: the outside 
ring is used to adjust time and the inside button is for start and stop. The ring and button 
incorporate lights to help the user with understanding what needs to be done to complete the 
task. The green START light illuminates only when enough information has been entered for a 
process to start, and the red STOP light is illuminated when the user has the option to stop or 
pause. This colour coding, based on population stereotypes, was designed to guide the user 
through the interface, which was something that was lacking in the original product. The deeper 
menu and use of soft keys allow more detailed information to be displayed, therefore helping to 
identify the function and use of each option (Figure 11.7). This soft key and screen combination 
is transferred from ATM interfaces, which were found through the students’ questionnaires to 
be well known throughout the user group.  
 
 
Figure 11.7 Example sub-menu  
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The group’s user observations suggested that the new product is more intuitive to use than the 
original. The students believed that the transfer of features from another domain and the focus 
on the function, appearance and location of each feature was a huge success. The design 
maximises function with a minimal aesthetic, and the students felt that using the tool was a 
major factor in the increased usability of the product. 
 
The microwave interface (Figure 11.6) is currently being tested against the original microwave 
design (Figure 11.5) with groups of older, middle aged and younger users. This experiment 
(based on the methodology reported in Chapter 6) is designed to establish whether the new 
microwave design is more intuitive (i.e. whether the tool is effective). The experiment is also 
intended to make it possible to distinguish between differences in performance that are related 
to loss of faculties through ageing and those that are related to less effective use of intuition, in 
order to reveal more about the relationship between intuitive interaction and age. The process of 
prototyping the interfaces ready for testing is discussed by Blackler (2008) and further 
investigation into age and intuitive use is covered in Section 11.3. 
 
Trail two feedback 
 
Students were asked to fill in a questionnaire (Appendix H) at the end of the semester to 
evaluate the tool. There were 17 responses. Full findings are reported by Blackler et al. (2007).  
 
Overall, effectiveness of the tool in making their new design intuitive to use was rated at a mean 
of 5.05 out of 6. A large proportion (82%) believed the investigation component of the tool 
made them do investigations they would not normally have done as part of the design process. 
However, ease of use of the question format (Figure 11.4) scored a mean of 4 out of 6. Some 
comments indicated that this component was difficult to understand at first. 
 
Usefulness of design process component scored a mean 4.58 out of 6, but ease of understanding 
the design process component scored lower, at mean 3.79 out of 6. The two layers in the design 
process (structure and features) scored 4.1 for usefulness. The majority (58.8%) became 
confused or lost at some point in this component. Overall, responses to the tool from the 
students were very positive and they were enthusiastic about its potential to improve interfaces. 
However, the feedback indicates that the tool is more useful than it is usable. 
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11.1.3 Conclusions from Tool Trials 
 
The designs produced during the trials appear to be better and (very likely) more intuitive to use 
than the originals, and results of the latest experiment with the microwave interfaces will reveal 
more about this. Feedback has been overwhelmingly positive and the tool works well in a 
pedagogical context, but is not very intuitive itself. It works in this context as the designers have 
a detailed introduction and mentoring throughout the process. The two layers (structure/form 
and features) could be confusing and may be seen as overly proscriptive. Designers know what 
they need to design and when, so removing the separate system structure and feature design 
boxes could simplify the tool. The trials have also shown that the tool needs to be more flexible. 
Paradoxically, it also needs to be simpler and easier to understand. 
 
Currently, the tool is undergoing refinement to make it easier to understand and follow. It will 
be then tested with designers in practice and finally developed into an interactive software tool 
that has the benefits of both simple and intuitive understanding and interaction, as well as depth 
and breadth of information and advice. This is discussed further in Section 11.3. 
 
11.2 Comparisons with Newly Emerging Intuitive Interaction Research 
 
In recent years, other researchers have begun investigating intuitive interaction, although they 
do not all refer to it using this term. For example, Langdon et al. (2007) and Lewis et al.(2008) 
have recently investigated the impact of prior experience on product use. They have reported 
similar results to those in Chapters 7 – 9 in terms of both age and prior experience impacting on 
successful use of products (measured in their case by time on task and rate of errors). However, 
they have not as yet investigated any theoretical aspects of intuition or intuitive interaction. The 
main body of work (apart from this one) focussing on intuitive interaction has been conducted 
by the IUUI group from Germany.  
 
The IUUI (Intuitive Use of User Interfaces) research group was established at the postgraduate 
research school “prometei” at the Technische Universität Berlin in late 2005. There are many 
similarities between the work of the IUUI group and this author, as well as some differences. In 
depth discussion of these can be found in Blackler and Hurtienne (2007), and a summary is 
included here.  
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The IUUI definition of intuitive use is based on a literature review of usability design criteria 
and a series of interviews and workshops with users, usability specialists, and user interface 
design practitioners: 
 
A technical system is intuitively usable if the users‘ unconscious application 
of prior knowledge leads to effective interaction (Mohs et al., 2006). 
 
Origins of the definitions of intuitive interaction used by the IUUI group and this author 
(Section 5.10) vary slightly but not much – both approaches are grounded in the literature and 
in experimentation. Importantly, what is common across the definitions is the unconscious use 
of prior knowledge. This author and the IUUI group also agree that intuitive use is most 
beneficial for first, early and intermittent uses of interfaces.  
 
The IUUI group has developed tools to help designers to build intuitive interaction, for 
example, a questionnaire (Evalint) to evaluate intuitive use based on perceived effortlessness, 
perceived error rate, perceived achievement of goals and perceived effort of learning. They 
have also developed a catalogue of image schemata suitable to draw on to develop intuitive 
interactions (ISCAT). ISCAT is based on analyses of user interfaces as diverse as aeroplane 
cockpits, ATMs, ticket machines and software (Blackler & Hurtienne, 2007). It is based on 
Johnson’s (1987) image schemata (Section 2.3) translated into relevant various user interface 
elements. For example, vertical sliders are instances of the UP-DOWN and SCALE image schemata 
(Hurtienne & Blessing, 2007). 
 
The IUUI group has also developed a continuum. Figure 11.8 shows a comparison of their 
continuum with that presented in Figure 10.1. Although the continua are different at first 
glance, there are definite overlaps. The body reflector is sensorimotor. Population stereotypes 
are linked to the sensorimotor stage (like the convention “upwards to increase,” based on image 
schemata) or to particular cultures (like the different light switch conventions in the US and 
UK). Knowledge of familiar features comes from expertise with other products and systems 
(tools). However, metaphor can apply across the IUUI continuum from sensorimotor to 
expertise.  
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Figure 11.8 Interaction of the two continua (Blackler & Hurtienne, 2007) 
 
This author has not included innate knowledge on the continuum, whereas the IUUI has. An 
example of innate knowledge that IUUI uses is reflexes. For instance, the startle response: an 
involuntary reaction to a sudden unexpected stimulus (especially a loud noise) which involves 
flexion of most skeletal muscles and a variety of visceral reactions. If a dot on a screen rapidly 
expands, the operator will involuntarily wince. It is easy to see how incorporating this kind of 
reflex reaction into user interfaces can increase their effectiveness and make them more 
intuitive to use. Having worked with the IUUI group, this author would argue that, although 
innate reflexes not based on learned knowledge cannot be intuition, in some cases, they can 
contribute to intuitive interaction.  
 
Another point of agreement is the idea that the simpler levels on both continua will apply to 
more people, and using them where possible (rather than the familiar features or expertise 
levels) will make an interface more universally usable. This is why they are placed at the top of 
the spiral in the tool presented in Figure 10.4.  Metaphor, however, has the potential to operate 
on all these levels, as it allows experiences many people have had in everyday life to be applied 
to quite complex features and functions. This can allow the maximum number of people, 
regardless of their technology familiarity, to use complex interfaces intuitively. Overall, the 
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approaches, results and tools are similar. The main findings of each group correspond and the 
theories based on them are complementary (Blackler & Hurtienne, 2007).  
 
11.3 Intuitive Interaction and Older People 
 
The findings reported in this book suggest that older people use interfaces more slowly and less 
intuitively. Subsequent findings from a confidential commercial project and initial findings 
from the microwave experiment (36 participants) mentioned in Section 11.1.2, also suggest that 
older people are significantly slower than younger ones at completing set tasks. Partial 
correlations for the microwave experiment showed that both technology familiarity and age 
affect time independently of each other. A significant, moderate and positive correlation, r(33) 
=.452, p<.05, was found between age and experiment time with technology familiarity 
controlled. A significant strong, negative correlation, r(33) = -.512, p<.005, was found between 
technology familiarity and experiment time with age controlled. A one way ANOVA also 
showed that there were significant differences between age groups, F(2, 33) = 6.152, p <.005. 
A Tukey HSD post hoc test revealed that the older age group (participants aged over 57) was 
significantly slower at completing the set tasks than the younger age group (aged between 20 
and 39) (p = .004). Other researchers have also reported more errors and slower times for older 
people (Langdon et al., 2007; Lewis et al., 2008). A partial correlation was performed to check 
for any possible confounding effects of visual acuity on the microwave experiment. It was 
found that with the vision variable controlled, the relationship between age and experiment time 
still showed a significant moderate positive correlation, r(31) = .459, p<.005. (Full results of 
this experiment will be published elsewhere.) 
 
Therefore, a large project funded by the Australian Research Council (ARC) is underway to 
address this issue. The overall aim of the project is to better understand the relationship between 
age and intuitive interaction with complex electronic devices, developing a picture of intuitive 
interaction in older people. It may be tempting to think that, as the population continues to age, 
people who are experienced with these technologies will also age and the problem will resolve 
itself. However, technology is very dynamic, and it is likely that there will always be a disparity 
between the experience of older adults and the new devices of the day (Fisk, Rogers, Charness, 
Czaja, & Sharit, 2004), which makes this research essential.  
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Older people encounter a broad range of technologies in their daily lives. They do have uses for 
new technologies and in many cases are keen to use them (Fisk et al., 2004; Rabbitt & 
Carmichael, 1994), but many of them find complex devices difficult to use. This research is 
aimed at providing devices whose interfaces allow older people to use them more intuitively, 
and so benefit from them as younger people do. This has significance for older people in several 
ways:  
• Facilitating social interaction through communication technologies allows older people to 
interact with friends and family – especially those of younger generations who rely heavily 
on new communication technologies such as mobile phones, text messages and email. This 
would reduce isolation (Fisk et al., 2004), and consequent depression and morbidity (Bird & 
Parslow, 2002). 
• Helping to keep older people at work to help counteract impending skills shortages, as well 
as possible isolation. People who are able to easily use the devices they encounter at work 
may be more likely to stay at, or return to, work. 
• There are also many ways in which complex devices are used in the delivery of healthcare. 
The older healthcare market is an increasingly healthy and educated group, and this market 
is growing very fast (Gardner-Bonneau & Gosbee, 1997). Older adults often have at least 
one chronic condition, such as arthritis, hypertension or diabetes, and many are also 
caregivers for a spouse or elderly relative (Fisk et al., 2004). Healthcare devices are 
commonly recommended for home use by patients and/or their partners, but are notoriously 
difficult to use, especially for older people (Fisk et al., 2004; Gardner-Bonneau & Gosbee, 
1997).  
 
Well-known effects of ageing could be responsible for the slower task times of older people. 
However, the evidence in Chapter 9 also suggests a previously unexplored relationship between 
age and intuitive uses, so it seems likely that there are other factors at work. Prior experience is 
important for older adults interacting with new technologies, and is known to affect older 
adults’ performance with new technologies (Fisk et al., 2004; Rudinger, Espey, Neuf, and Paus, 
(1994). However, there is currently no firm understanding of the experience of older people 
with various technologies, and how that experience relates to their use of new things. There are 
also no established methods by which designers can acquire that kind of information. This 
project is intended to address these deficiencies. The four main objectives for the overall 
research project are: 
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1. Understanding why older people use complex devices less intuitively than younger ones 
2. Investigating possible solutions for making interfaces more intuitive for older people to use 
3. Developing methods for designers to consult with older people and investigate what features 
they are familiar with 
4. Developing and testing a design tool to assist designers in making interfaces more intuitive 
for older people to use 
 
Expected outcomes of this research include an increased understanding of the nature of intuitive 
interaction, especially for older people, and an integrated tool for designers to make interfaces 
intuitive for older people. This tool will use the intuitive interaction continuum as a backbone, 
but will be more flexible and usable than the existing conceptual tool (Figure 10.4). The project 
is organised into three themes, all contributing to the objectives and outcomes of the whole 
project. The themes are described briefly below.  
 
11.3.1 Theme One – Investigating Familiarity of Older People 
 
The research questions in theme one are: 
How can designers utilise familiarity to facilitate intuitive interaction with older adults? 
 -  What is the experience of older adults in relation to interfaces, both old and new?  
 -  How can designers determine with what older adults are familiar? 
 
In theme one, suitable approaches will be developed for designers to investigate the experience 
and familiarity that older people have with various features and devices. These will be included 
in an investigation component of the new design tool to assist designers in determining what is 
familiar to older adults in a particular product category.  
 
11.3.2 Theme Two – Strategies for Designing for Older People 
 
The research questions in theme two are: 
What are the possible approaches to designing intuitive interfaces for complex devices for the 
aged? 
– Does stress and anxiety resulting from the interaction with complex technological 
devices have any impact on intuitive use of a product in older adults? 
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– Does redundancy in interface design affect intuitive interaction with complex devices 
in older adults? 
 
Theme two concentrates on finding ways to mitigate the problems that older people have with 
complex interfaces, and also looks more deeply into the relationships between intuitive 
interaction, age and anxiety. The envisaged outcomes of theme two include answers about the 
effects of anxiety on intuitive interaction, especially in older people, as well as a set of 
approaches and strategies that will form the design component of the new tool. This will aim to 
conform to the approach preferred by each designer rather than to impose a design process. 
 
11.3.3 Theme Three – Understanding Intuitive Interaction for Older People 
 
The research questions in theme three are: 
What are the cognitive structures and processes that underlie intuitive interaction with 
technological devices? 
– Are the associations older people have formed in memory consistent or inconsistent 
with contemporary device interfaces? 
– Do older people have difficulty accessing associations of old and/or new features that 
they encounter? 
– Do older people have difficulty forming new associations, for example, of new features 
that they encounter? 
 
Theme three is expected to provide additional theoretical knowledge about the nature of 
intuitive interaction, and to generate answers about the reasons older people have less intuitive 
interaction with contemporary technological devices than their younger counterparts. It may 
also suggest ways in which interfaces can be improved based on this understanding. These 
contributions will have an impact on the way in which the designers’ tool is developed. 
 
11.3.4 Project Contributions 
 
This project is expected to lead to the re-development of the conceptual tool into a more flexible 
and usable instrument. It remains to be discovered whether or not the tool developed for 
designing for older people can also cater for designing for younger people, or whether there will 
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need to be separate components or options of a larger tool for different age-groups. Each 
approach may have its pros and cons. 
 
Helping designers to make more intuitive interfaces for older community members has great 
potential for improving their lives and health, thus benefiting the community generally. Making 
complex devices easier for older people to use will allow them to participate more fully in 
society and/or the workplace, and help to prevent them from becoming isolated. This project 
will also apply intuitive interaction to healthcare devices that older people use, which could 
save costly mistakes. In addition, the project will contribute to further understanding of intuitive 
interaction for both older and younger people, and therefore help to further build knowledge in 
this area.  
 
11.4 Conclusion 
 
The work reported in Chapters 1-10 forms a cornerstone for intuitive interaction research, and 
the further work reviewed in this chapter builds on this foundation. The rigorous, empirical 
approach taken throughout the research reported here allows a strong foundation for others to 
build on (e.g. Marsh & Setchi, 2008; O’Brien, Rogers, & Fisk, 2008a; O’Brien, Rogers, & Fisk, 
2008b). 
 
Intuitive interaction research is significant because it impacts on everyday use of everyday 
devices by everyday people. This exciting and important research area has the potential to affect 
the ways in which products are designed and, more importantly, the ways in which they are 
understood by their users. Intuitive interaction can: help to keep people, even people of 
differing generations, or those geographically separated, connected with each other; prevent 
various levels of risk where interfaces are safety critical; and provide health care devices that 
allow safe, easy and accurate use.  It can also provide answers about differences in interaction 
speed, intuitiveness and accuracy between users of different ages, and clues about how the 
human mind processes new interaction experiences. The author looks forward to further 
investigating this fascinating area. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR VOLUNTEERS 
 
Thank you for volunteering to participate in my experiment. The purpose of this 
questionnaire is to sort the volunteers into groups according to their level of experience 
with digital cameras. Each group will also have a similar distribution of age groups and 
gender among its members. When I have sorted people into the groups, I will contact 
you to arrange a convenient time for you to participate in the experiment. 
 
Answer each question by circling or underlining the appropriate answer 
 
 
1. Name _____________________________________________ 
 
 
2. Email contact and/or phone number 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
3. Age group  
 
 
Under 25  25-35  35-45  45-55  55+ 
 
 
4. Gender 
 
 
Male Female 
 
 
5. How often do you use a digital camera? 
 
At least once a week 
 
At least once a month  
 
Once every few months 
 
I have only used one once or twice 
 
I have never used one 
 
Thank you for your time.   
 268 
 269 
 
Appendix B 
 
Representative example of technology familiarity questionnaire (from Experiment 2) 
 270 
  
 271 
User Technology Familiarity Questionnaire 
 
Thank you for volunteering to assist with my experiment. 
 
This questionnaire is intended to give me more information about volunteers so that I can sort 
them into appropriate groups for the experiment.  
 
The first section requires personal information that will allow me to get a good cross- section of 
the community as participants. These participants should then be representative of the 
population as a whole. 
 
The second section (pages 2 and 3) is intended to show how familiar you are with various 
types of complex electronic products. It will allow me to assess how much experience you have 
had with products similar to the remote control to be used in the experiment. Therefore, I will 
be able to group participants according to their level of experience with these types of products 
and their features. 
 
All information will be treated confidentially. 
 
Please answer all questions and return all three pages to me via email at 
a.blackler@qut.edu.au or to level 5, D Block, Gardens Point. If at any time you are unsure 
about a question, please contact me via email or call me on 3864 4334 or 0410 736494 to 
clarify your query.  
 
Thank you for your time 
 
Thea Blackler 
 
 
SECTION ONE 
 
6. Name _____________________________________________ 
 
 
7. Email contact and/or phone number 
 
 
 
8. highest academic qualification (I need a good cross-section) 
 
 
 
4. Age group  
 
 
Under 25  25-34  35-44  45-54  55+ 
 
 
5. Gender 
 
Male Female 
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SECTION TWO 
 
Please note 
• A universal remote control is a single handheld device that can be taught to control 
many different appliances. 
• “Other” appliances with remotes  may include air conditioning, DVD, satellite TV, 
digital TV, etc 
• Other devices employing touchscreens may include photocopiers, ATMs, information points, etc 
 
Please tick the appropriate boxes, and fill in the blanks if appropriate.  
 
6.  How often do you use the following products? (if you have never used a product of the 
type, please tick never) 
 
 
Product every 
day 
several 
times a 
week 
once or 
twice a 
week 
every 
few 
weeks 
every 
few 
months 
Only ever 
used it once 
or twice 
never 
Marantz RC5000i universal 
remote control 
       
Other universal remote 
controls 
 
Which brands?.….…... 
……………………... 
 
       
Standard remote controls 
for TV 
       
Standard remote controls 
for VCR 
       
 
Standard remote controls 
for stereo 
       
Remote controls for other 
appliances  
 
Which ones?...……….. 
………………………….. 
………………………….. 
 
       
Mobile phone 
 
       
 
Stereo, car stereo or 
personal stereo without 
remote 
       
Personal digital organiser 
or Palm. 
       
Web browser (eg Netscape 
or Internet Explorer)  
       
Windows or similar 
 
       
Other devices with 
touchscreens 
 
Which ones?...… 
       
Please tick the appropriate boxes, and fill in the blanks if appropriate.  
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7. When using versions of these products (below), how many of the features on the 
product do you use? (if you do not use a product of the type please tick none) 
 
Product All of the 
features 
(you read 
the manual 
to check 
them) 
As many 
features as 
you can 
figure out 
without 
manual 
Just 
enough 
features 
to get by 
with 
Your limited 
knowledge of the 
features limits 
your use of the 
product 
None of the 
features – 
you do not 
use this 
product 
Marantz RC5000i universal 
remote control 
     
Other universal remote 
controls 
 
Which brands?…….…... 
…………………….…. 
 
     
Standard remote controls 
for TV 
     
Standard remote controls 
for VCR 
     
Standard remote controls 
for stereo 
     
Remote controls for other 
appliances  
 
Which ones?…………… 
……………………………. 
……………………………. 
 
     
Mobile phone 
 
     
Stereo, car stereo or 
personal stereo without 
remote 
     
Personal digital organiser 
or Palm. 
     
Web browser (eg Netscape 
or Internet Explorer)  
     
Windows or similar 
 
     
Other devices with 
touchscreens 
 
Which ones?……………. 
……………………………. 
……………………………. 
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Appendix C 
 
Example of technology familiarity questionnaire (from Experiment 2) showing scoring system 
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User Technology Familiarity Questionnaire scoring example sheet 
 
 
How often do you use the following products? (if you have never used a 
product of the type, please tick never) 
 
Product every 
day 
several 
times a 
week 
once or 
twice a 
week 
every 
few 
weeks 
every 
few 
months 
Only ever 
used it once 
or twice 
never 
Marantz RC5000i universal 
remote control 
      
 
Other universal remote 
controls 
Which brands?.…. 
…Sony………………….
.. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
Standard remote controls 
for TV 
 
 
     
Standard remote controls 
for VCR 
   
 
   
 
Standard remote controls 
for stereo 
   
 
   
Remote controls for other 
appliances  
 
Which ones?...……….. 
…DVD…………………….. 
  
 
 
     
Mobile phone 
 
 
      
 
Stereo, car stereo or 
personal stereo without 
remote 
 
 
 
     
Personal digital organiser 
or Palm. 
    
 
  
Web browser (eg Netscape 
or Internet Explorer)  
 
      
Windows or similar 
 
 
      
Other devices with 
touchscreens 
 
Which ones?........... … 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
Score for each entry 
 
 
 
6 
 
5 
 
4 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
0 
 
Total for column 
 
 
18 
 
15 
 
4 
 
6 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Total for this question 
 
 
                                               45 
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When using versions of these products (below), how many of the features on the 
product do you use? (if you do not use a product of the type please tick none) 
 
Product All of the 
features 
(you read 
the manual 
to check 
them) 
As many 
features as 
you can 
figure out 
without 
manual 
Just 
enough 
features 
to get by 
with 
Your limited 
knowledge of the 
features limits 
your use of the 
product 
None of the 
features – 
you do not 
use this 
product 
Marantz RC5000i universal 
remote control 
     
Other universal remote 
controls 
Which brands?…….…... 
…Sony………………….
…. 
  
 
   
Standard remote controls 
for TV 
     
Standard remote controls 
for VCR 
     
Standard remote controls 
for stereo 
     
Remote controls for other 
appliances  
 
Which ones?…DVD……… 
………………………………. 
  
 
 
 
  
Mobile phone 
 
     
Stereo, car stereo or 
personal stereo without 
remote 
  
 
   
Personal digital organiser 
or Palm. 
     
Web browser (eg Netscape 
or Internet Explorer)  
     
Windows or similar 
 
     
Other devices with 
touchscreens 
 
Which ones?……………. 
……………………………. 
     
 
 
Score for each entry 
 
 
4 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
0 
 
Total for column 
 
 
0 
 
21 
 
4 
 
1 
 
0 
 
Total for this question 
 
 
                                                     26 
 
Grand total (=TF score) 
 
 
                                                     71 
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Appendix D 
 
Representative example of interview proforma (from Experiment 2) 
 280 
 281 
Follow up Interview 
 
Control 
 
Familiar? Where from? Ie, what product or experience? 1 - 6 
Remote  
on 
   
TV    
on/off 
   
VCR 
on/off 
   
Navigable 
windows 
or screens 
   
Back and 
Ahead 
   
Home 
 
   
Touch 
screen/sof
t keys 
   
Play     
Stop     
Pause    
Fwd and 
Rwd 
   
Skip/index 
back and 
forward 
   
Number 
pads 
   
Navigation 
between 
devices 
   
Volume / 
channel 
   
AV 
function 
   
 
Mute 
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Did you feel at all anxious during the test?   Y  N 
 
 
 
Why?   
 
 
• monitoring equipment  
 
 
 
• presence of experimenter  
 
 
 
• using remote 
 
 
 
• other 
 
 
 
 
Please mark the following features on the scale to show how to compared with 
your expectations: 
 
 
Remote On function 
 
Did not work as you would expect                     worked as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Was not located where you would expect               was located where you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Appearance was not as you would expect                                      appearance was as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
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Navigable windows or screens 
 
Did not work as you would expect                     worked as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Was not located where you would expect               was located where you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Appearance was not as you would expect                                      appearance was as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 
 
Back and ahead 
 
Did not work as you would expect                     worked as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Was not located where you would expect               was located where you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Appearance was not as you would expect                                      appearance was as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 
 
TV on/off 
 
Did not work as you would expect                     worked as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Was not located where you would expect               was located where you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Appearance was not as you would expect                                      appearance was as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
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Touch screen 
 
Did not work as you would expect                     worked as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Was not located where you would expect               was located where you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Appearance was not as you would expect                                      appearance was as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 
 
Play 
 
Did not work as you would expect                     worked as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Was not located where you would expect               was located where you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Appearance was not as you would expect                                      appearance was as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 
 
Stop 
 
Did not work as you would expect                     worked as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Was not located where you would expect               was located where you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Appearance was not as you would expect                                      appearance was as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
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Fast Forward and rewind 
 
Did not work as you would expect                     worked as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Was not located where you would expect               was located where you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Appearance was not as you would expect                                      appearance was as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 
 
 
Skip/index   
 
Did not work as you would expect                     worked as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Was not located where you would expect               was located where you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Appearance was not as you would expect                                      appearance was as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 
 
 
VCR on/off 
 
Did not work as you would expect                     worked as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Was not located where you would expect               was located where you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Appearance was not as you would expect                                      appearance was as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
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4 way 
 
Did not work as you would expect                     worked as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Was not located where you would expect               was located where you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Appearance was not as you would expect                                      appearance was as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 
 
Volume / channel 
 
Did not work as you would expect                     worked as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Was not located where you would expect               was located where you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Appearance was not as you would expect                                      appearance was as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 
 
AV function 
 
Did not work as you would expect                     worked as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Was not located where you would expect               was located where you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Appearance was not as you would expect                                      appearance was as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
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Menu 
 
Did not work as you would expect                     worked as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Was not located where you would expect               was located where you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Appearance was not as you would expect                                      appearance was as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 
 
 
Number pads 
 
Did not work as you would expect                     worked as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Was not located where you would expect               was located where you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Appearance was not as you would expect                                      appearance was as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 
 
Navigation between devices 
 
Did not work as you would expect                     worked as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Was not located where you would expect               was located where you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Appearance was not as you would expect                                      appearance was as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
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Home function 
 
Did not work as you would expect                     worked as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Was not located where you would expect               was located where you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
Appearance was not as you would expect                                      appearance was as you would expect 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 
 
 
 
Are there any parts, features or things that you found particularly difficult to use or 
contrary to your expectations and that you think should be changed? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you 
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Appendix E 
 
Representative example of information package and consent form  
(from Experiment 2) 
 290 
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Contact Information: Thea Blackler 
    School of Design and Built Environment 
   D Block, Gardens Point Campus 
    Phone 07 3864 4334 
    Mobile 0410 736494 
 
Project Title:  Intuitive Use of Products 
 
This project is being conducted as part of my PhD studies at Queensland University of 
Technology. This study is designed to investigate the issue of whether or not it is 
possible to design products to be intuitive to use. The main conclusion reached 
through the literature review and first round of experiments is that intuitive use of things 
would appear to be experiential. In other words, things that humans use intuitively are 
those that they have used before. Therefore, the issue being investigated is how it may 
be possible to use design to help users transfer the intuitive knowledge gained from 
familiar products to new products. 
 
Project Objectives:  
 
• To investigate how the use of products becomes intuitive. 
• To identify functional features of products that target user groups would find 
intuitive to use. 
• To establish how intuitive procedural knowledge can be transferred from a 
known scenario to one involving new products. 
 
What you are being asked to do: 
 
You will be asked to complete specified tasks with the product that I am investigating. 
You will be filmed undertaking the tasks and afterwards asked about different features 
and controls of the product that you have been using. It is not possible to participate in 
the project without being recorded, but only members of the research team will have 
access to the recordings.  
 
Selection of participants: 
 
Participants are recruited to ensure that a balanced number of people with low, 
medium and high levels of experience with similar products undertake the experiment. 
This is to allow for comparison between the groups. 
 
Expected outcomes of the research: 
 
I hope to develop a conceptual model to be used during the design process to assist in 
designing products so that their use is intuitive. 
 
This would be supported by relevant examples and results are expected to be 
published in scholarly journals. If you would like to have copies of published papers or 
feedback about the results of the research when data has been analysed, please 
contact Thea Blackler (contact details at top). 
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Benefits of the research: 
 
Products are often difficult to use correctly and are frequently misused for a variety of 
reasons. While there are no direct and immediate benefits for you as a participant 
agreeing to take part in this research, the research is expected to benefit the wider 
community of consumers by providing suggestions to designers about how they can 
make their products more intuitive to use. 
 
Confidentiality: 
 
Your confidentiality will be protected at all times. Your name will not be used to identify 
you in any document or published paper, and only the research team and myself will 
have direct access to the collected data, which will be kept in a secure location. 
 
Voluntary Participation: 
 
Your participation in the project is entirely voluntary. If you decide to withdraw from the 
study, you will not be penalised or judged in any way. You may discontinue 
participation at any time without any comment. 
 
Please contact Thea Blackler (details at top) for any further details about this project, 
or if you have any questions. 
 
If you have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of this project, you 
should contact the Secretary of the University Human research Ethics Committee on 
07 3864 2902. 
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Contact Information: Thea Blackler 
    School of Design and Built Environment 
   D Block, Gardens Point Campus 
    Phone 07 3864 4334 
    Mobile 0410 736494 
 
Project Title:  Intuitive Use of Products 
 
Statement of consent: 
 
I have read and understood the information provided, and have had any questions 
answered to my satisfaction.  
 
I understand that I can contact the researcher if I have any additional questions.  
 
I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without comment or 
penalty.  
 
I understand that I can contact the Secretary of the University Human research Ethics 
Committee on 3864 2902 if I have any concerns about the ethical conduct of a project.  
 
I understand that participation in this project involves being recorded, and that it is not 
possible to participate in the project without being recorded. I understand that only 
members of the research team will have access to the recordings and they will be 
stored in a secure location. 
  
I consent to having video footage or stills of myself that are taken during the tests 
published or displayed for the purpose of explaining the results. * 
 
I agree to participate in this project. 
 
 
Name____________________________ 
 
 
Signature_________________________ 
 
 
Date________ 
 
*Please delete this paragraph if you do not consent to have images of yourself used 
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Appendix F 
 
Representative example of experiment script (from Experiments 2 and 3) 
 296 
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SCRIPT FOR EXPERIMENTS 
 
Hello, _____________ , I’m Thea.  
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate. 
 
Now could you please read through the information package? 
 
 
Do you have any questions you would like to ask about the 
project or the experiments we are doing here today? 
 
Answer questions as appropriate 
 
 
Could you please read and sign the consent form if you are still 
happy to participate? 
 
Answer questions as appropriate. 
 
I just want to take a moment to explain all the equipment that is 
here. 
 
We have two video cameras that will be used to film you using 
the product.  
 
There is an audio tape recorder to make a clear recording of 
what you say, onto a standard tape format that is easier to 
transcribe than video. 
 
Set up equipment and get participant seated comfortably with the 
video cameras positioned correctly 
 
 
Do you have any questions about any of the equipment? 
 
Answer questions as appropriate 
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This is the product that I am using for the tests. It is a universal 
remote control. 
 
Please do only the tasks I will set you during the experiment. If 
you would like to look at the remote more closely you are 
welcome to do so after the test. 
 
While you are performing the tasks, please talk aloud about what 
you are doing with the remote so I can record your thoughts 
about how you use the product.  
 
While remaining sitting where you are, please could you use this 
remote to perform the following tasks. 
 
There is a written copy of the tasks here so you do not have to 
remember all the instructions now. 
 
 
READ OPERATION ONE 
 
 
READ OPERATION TWO 
 
 
The manuals for the remote, TV and video are in the room, but I 
am trying to investigate how people will be able to work out the 
product on their own, so please only ask for the manual when 
you have already tried all the ways you can think of to do a task 
yourself. 
 
Above all please remember that the product is being tested, not 
you. Try to relax. 
 
 
Any questions? 
 
Answer questions as appropriate 
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OK please wait while I start all the monitoring equipment.  
 
Set tape recorder and video cameras to record.  
 
OK please pick up the remote and start the first task now. 
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Appendix G 
 
Brief for re-design of remote control interface 
 302 
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Brief for redesign of remote control interface 
 
Principles for intuitive design developed from Experiment 2: 
 
1. Use familiar symbols and/or words for well-known functions 
2. Make it obvious what less well-known functions will do by using familiar things to 
demonstrate their function 
3. Increase the consistency between devices and features  
4. Make buttons larger and clearer with maximum space between them. 
 
Based on Experiment 2, there are several features that appear to be performing badly and 
therefore those to focus on are: 
 
1. Back and ahead 
2. Navigation 
3. AV function 
4. Skip/index 
5. Remote on 
 
Use the standard icons provided  
 
Go through the experimental tasks (used for Experiment 2) and answer the questionnaire on 
function, location and appearance to get a better understanding of the problems with the 
features. 
 
All designs must be suitable for application to the product. Therefore, they must be: 
 
• Appropriate size to fit the panels 
• Greyscale 
 
Do not add new commands 
Produce final design with each feature as a separate bitmap. 
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Feature Reference for design Illustration  
Play CEI/IEC 60417-2 ISO/IEC 18035 
             
Stop ISO/IEC 18035 
 
          
               
Forward 
/Rewind 
CEI/IEC 60417-2 
ISO/IEC 18035 
              
Four way Designers choice  
VCR on/off CEI/IEC 60417-2 
              
Enter Designers choice  
Menu Label as VCR menu Exact style designers choice 
 
TV on/off CEI/IEC 60417-2 
            
AV function Label as TV/Video  Exact style designers choice 
 
Remote on 
Label as “Touch screen to start” or 
similar 
Exact style designers choice 
 
Back/ahead 
Label Back and          as Internet 
Browsers 
Mark on hard keys as mobile 
phones 
 
 
Skip/index ISO/IEC 18035 
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Appendix H 
 
Questionnaire given to postgraduate students for feedback on the conceptual tool (Blackler et 
al., 2007a) 
 306 
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Intuitive use tool. Designers’ questionnaire 
 
Thank-you for the help you have given me this semester in testing out my tool. This 
questionnaire is meant to help me to establish how useful and easy to use you found it. Please 
take your time answering the questions. Ask for help if you are unsure about the meaning of any 
question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section one is 
about this bit, 
including this 
detail 
Section 2 is 
about this bit 
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Section 1. Establishing user group and user familiarity 
 
Did this part of the tool make you undertake research you normally would not have done? 
 
Yes  No 
 
 
How useful was the information you found? 
 
Not at all useful                        very useful 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 
 
How useful was the question format provided in helping you to find that information? 
 
Not at all useful                        very useful 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 
 
 
How easy to use was the question format provided in this part of the tool? 
 
Very difficult                        very easy 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 
 
How helpful were the directions and hints provided in finding this information? 
 
Not at all helpful                        very helpful 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 
Any other comments/feedback on this section of the tool? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 309 
 
Section 2. The design process 
How useful did you find this section of the tool in your design process? 
 
Not at all useful                        very useful 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 
 
How easy was it to understand? 
 
Very difficult                        very easy 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 
 
How easy was it to follow as part of the design process? 
 
Very difficult                        very easy 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 
 
Did you find the two steps (system structure/form and the feature design) useful 
 
Not at all useful                        very useful 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 
 
 
Was it helpful in assisting you to apply the information you had already researched? 
 
Not at all helpful                        very helpful 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  
 
 
 
Do you believe it has been effective in making your design intuitive to use? 
 
Not at all effective                        very effective 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
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Did you get confused or lost at any point? 
 
Yes   No 
 
If yes please describe what happened and how you resolved the issue 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Any other comments/feedback on this section of the tool? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Section 3 Additional comments 
 
Please use this space to give any general feedback on the usefulness of the tool  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
What do you feel you have learnt from this experience?  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
And finally… 
 
I may want to follow up with some of you if I have questions after I read your report or I want 
to clarify an issue. If you are happy for this to happen please can you provide a non QUT email 
address so that I can contact you after you have graduated. You do not need to do this if you 
would prefer not to. 
 
………………@........................ 
 
Thanks, from Thea 
 
